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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff/Respondent

vs
Michael Jay Freitas
Defendant/Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NUMBER
41378

)

CLERK'S RECORD

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICTD
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE HONORABLE LANSING L. HAYNES, PRESIDING JUDGE
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PRESIDING

MR. JAY LOGSDON
PUBLIC DEFENDER
400 NORTHWEST BLVD.
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

Michael Jay Freitas

MR. LAWRENCE WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
700 W JEFFERSON, STE 210
ID
83720-0010
BOISE
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First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County

Date: 10/21/2013
Time: 06:25 PM

User: MCCANDLESS

ROAReport

Page 1 of 3

Case: CR-2012-0018513 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes
Defendant: Freitas, Michael Jay

State of Idaho vs. Michael Jay Freitas
Date

Code

User

10/10/2012

NCRM

LUCKEY

New Case Filed - Misdemeanor

To Be Assigned

10/17/2012

NFTA

OREILLY

Notice Of Failure To Appear

To Be Assigned

10/18/2012

HRSC

HODGE

Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial
Conference/Arraignment 11/15/2012 01:00PM)

To Be Assigned

HODGE

Notice of Pretrial Conference

To Be Assigned

11/15/2012

11/20/2012

Judge

0. Lynn Brower

ARRN

BIELEC

Hearing result for Pre-Trial
Conference/Arraignment scheduled on
11/15/2012 01:00PM: Arraignment/ First
Appearance

ORPD

BIELEC

Defendant: Freitas, Michael Jay Order Appointing 0. Lynn Brower
Public Defender Public defender Public Defender

PLEA

BIELEC

A Plea is entered for charge: - NG
(M291-7.4.10--SL UNLAWFUL TAMPERING
WITH WATER SYSTEM)

0. Lynn Brower

ARPG

BIELEC

Acknowledgement Of Rights & Plea Of Guilty

0. Lynn Brower

ADMR

HOFFMAN

Administrative assignment of Judge

Clark A. Peterson

HRSC

HOFFMAN

Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference
12/26/2012 01:00PM)

Clark A. Peterson

HRSC

HOFFMAN

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled
01/07/2013 08:30AM) 1/7-1/11

Clark A. Peterson

HOFFMAN

Notice of Pre-Trial Conference and Trial

Clark A. Peterson

11/21/2012

STRS

HOFFMAN

Speedy Trial Limit Satisfied

Clark A. Peterson

11/26/2012

PRSD

BIELEC

Plaintiffs Response To Discovery

Clark A. Peterson

PROD

BIELEC

Plaintiffs Request For Discovery

Clark A. Peterson

NANG

MCCANDLESS Notice of Appearance, Plea of Not Guilty &
Demand For Jury Trial

Clark A. Peterson

DRQD

MCCANDLESS Defendant's Request For Discovery

Clark A. Peterson

DISF

ALBERS

Disqualification Of Judge Watson - Self

Barry E. Watson

DRSD

LUCKEY

Defendant's Response To Discovery

Clark A. Peterson

12/12/2012

MNDS

MCCANDLESS Motion To Dismiss

12/19/2012

HRSC

STOKES

NOTH

MCCANDLESS Notice Of Hearing

12/26/2012

HRHD

ROHRBACH

Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference
scheduled on 12/26/2012 01:00 PM: Hearing
Held - off the record

Robert B. Burton

12/31/2012

WITP

BROWN

Witness List - Plaintiffs

Clark A. Peterson

BROM

BROWN

Brief in Opposition to Motion To Dismiss

Clark A. Peterson

DENY

STOKES

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled
on 01/03/2013 01 :30 PM: Motion Denied
Logsdon - 15mins

Clark A. Peterson

Plaintiffs Supplemental
41378 Response To Discovery

Clark A. Peterson
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12/3/2012

12/7/2012

1/3/2013

1/4/2013

Michael
Jay Freitas CARROLL
PSRS

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue
01/03/2013 01:30PM) Logsdon -15mins

Clark A. Peterson
Clark A. Peterson
Clark A. Peterson
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Case: CR-2012-0018513 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes
Defendant: Freitas, Michael Jay

State of Idaho vs. Michael Jay Freitas
Date

Code

User

1/4/2013

MNLI

CARROLL

1/7/2013

PSRS

MCCANDLESS Plaintiff's 2nd Supplemental Response To
Discovery

Clark A. Peterson

DROR

STOKES

Defendant released on own recognizance

Clark A. Peterson

SUBF

CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 1/3/13 BSN

DRJI

STOKES

PRJ I

MCCANDLESS Plaintiff's Requested Jury Instructions

HRHD

ROHRBACH

Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled Clark A. Peterson
on 01/07/2013 08:30AM: Hearing Held
1/7-1/11

HRSC

ROHRBACH

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled
01/08/2013 08:30AM)

RTSV

CRUMPACKER Return Of NonService AS

JTST

STOKES

Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled Clark A. Peterson
on 01/08/2013 08:30AM: Jury Trial Started

MISC

STOKES

Jury Instructions Given

Clark A. Peterson

VERD

BURRINGTON

Verdict

Clark A. Peterson

SNPF

BURRINGTON

Sentenced To Pay Fine (M291-7.4.10--SL
UNLAWFUL TAMPERING WITH WATER
SYSTEM)

Clark A. Peterson

STAT

BURRINGTON

Case status changed: closed pending clerk
action

Clark A. Peterson

JDMT

BURRINGTON

Judgment

Clark A. Peterson

ADMR

BROWN

Administrative assignment of Judge

Lansing L. Haynes

NOTC

BROWN

Notice Of Appeal

Lansing L. Haynes

CAMPBELL

Estimate Of Transcript Costs

Lansing L. Haynes

1/8/2013

1/9/2013

1/11/2013

.ESTI

Judge
Motion In Limine

Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions

Clark A. Peterson

Clark A. Peterson
Clark A. Peterson
Clark A. Peterson

Clark A. Peterson
Clark A. Peterson

1/16/2013

ORDR

SVERDSTEN

Order to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal

Lansing L. Haynes

2/20/2013

NLTR

CAMPBELL

Notice of Lodging Transcript - Motion Hearing
and Jury Trial (2 transcripts)

Lansing L. Haynes

LODG

CAMPBELL

Lodged - Transcript - Motion Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes

LODG

CAMPBELL

Lodged -Transcript- Jury Trial

Lansing L. Haynes

RECT

BROWN

Receipt Of Transcript- Motion Hearing And Jury
Trial- KCPA

Lansing L. Haynes

2/21/2013

FILE

MCCANDLESS New File Created Expando

2/22/2013

RECT

BROWN

3/12/2013

BRIE

MCCANDLESS Brief Supporting Appeal

3/19/2013

NOTS

CAMPBELL

Notice Of Settling Transcript On Appeal and
Briefing Schedule

Lansing L. Haynes

5/20/2013

BRFR

CARROLL

Brief Of Respondent

Lansing L. Haynes

5/22/2013

Receipt Of Transcript - Motion Hearing and Jury
Trial- PO

Brief
Michael
Jay Freitas MCCANDLESS Appellant's Reply
41378
BRIE

Lansing L. Haynes
Lansing L. Haynes
Lansing L. Haynes

Lansing L. Haynes
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Case: CR-2012-0018513 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes
Defendant: Freitas, Michael Jay

State of Idaho vs. Michael Jay Freitas
Date

Code

User

5/30/2013

HRSC

SVERDSTEN
SVERDSTEN

Judge
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal
07/01/2013 09:30AM)
Notice of Hearing

Lansing L. Haynes
Lansing L. Haynes

7/1/2013

DCHH

SVERDSTEN

Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal
scheduled on 07/01/2013 09:30AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

Lansing L. Haynes

8/8/2013

OPIN

SVERDSTEN

Intermediate Appellate Opinion

Lansing L. Haynes

8/13/2013

APSC

OREILLY

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Lansing L. Haynes

9/12/2013

NAPL

OREILLY

Notice Of Appeal Due Date From Supreme Court Lansing L. Haynes

Michael Jay Freitas

41378
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7813

SPIRIT LAK~

POLICE DEPT.
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
1ST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO

KOOTENAI

_ _ _ _ _ Mp.
Date
Date

. County, Idaho.

Officer/Party

.Serial #/Address

Dept.

Witnessing Officer

Serial #/Address

Dept.

THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT:

I hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 20
Officer

NOTICE: See reverse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions.

COURT COPY VIOLATION #1

Michael Jay Freitas

41378
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SPIRIT LAKE POLICE DEPAR·rMENT

I

AGENCY

2808

DIST

I

P~YCRIMECODEANDNAME

7-4-1 0 Spirit Lake City Code Violation

IFRI

City of Spirit Lake

I

NAME

I

AGE

.I

I

D.O.B.

I

(LAST, FIRST MIDDLE)

OCCUPATION

I

I

I

D.O.B.

AGE

0LOSS OF TEETH
0UNCONSCIOUSNESS
RESIDENCE PHONE

RESIDENCE ADDRESS

BUSINESS PHONE

BUSINESS NAME/ADDRESS (SCHOOL IF JUVENILE)

RESIDENCE PHONE

RESIDENCE ADDRESS

CODE

RACE/SEX

BUSINESS PHONE

0APPARENT MINOR INJURY
00THER MAJOR INJURY

0POSSffiLE INTERNAL INJURY

I

RACE/SEX

RESIDENCE PHONE

RESIDENCE ADDRESS

-,CODE

I

I5870 W. Rhode Island St.

Spirit Lake, ld.

O~VERE LACERATIONS

NAME (LAST, FIRST MIDDLE)

OCCUPATION

1 OF2

BUSINESS NAME/ADDRESS (SCHOOL IF JUVENILE)

D.O.B.

AGE

0 NOT APPLICABLE 0NONE
0APPARENT BROKEN BONES

INJURIES

PAGE

!NOR NEAR CITY, STATE

M MENTIONED

I~DE
I

I

I

RACE/SEX

CASE NUMBER

SL12 -1458
LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE

09/28/12 @ 1330 hrs.

RP=REPORTING PARTY

W~WITNESS

NAME (LAST. FIRST MIDDLE)
OCCUPATION

DATE & TIME REPORTED

DAY

09/28/12 @ 1330 hrs.
V-VICTIM

.I

~CONDARYOUMECODEANDNAME

DATE & TIME OCCURRED
LEGEND:

INCIDENT REPORT 0

CRIME REPORT 181

14

BUSINESS PHONE

BUSINESS NAME/ADDRESS (SCHOOL IF JUVENILE)

SUSPECT OR INVESTIGATIVE LEADS

IW/M I44

D.O.B

No I. NAME (LAST, FIRST MIDDLE)

RACE/SEX

Freitas, Michael J.
ADDRESS

AGE

HT.

505

l15o I8Ro IHAZ
EYES

CLOTHING WORN

HOMEPHONE

208 623-2517
D.L. #/STATE

ALIAS NAME

No. 2 NAME (LAST, FIRST MIDDLE)

D.O.B.

AGE

I

ADDRESS
SSN

I

MAKE/MODEL

I

I

LICENSE NO.

BODY

ADDmONAL VEHICLE IDENTIFIERS

I

I

WT.

EYES

HAIR

D.L. #/STATE

VEIDCLE IF INVOLVED

I

COLOR/COLOR

HT.
CLOTHING WORN

HOMEPHONE

ALIAS NAME

YEAR

I

RACE/SEX

ARRESTED
181YES 0NO

STATE

ARRESTED
DYES 0NO

I

I

LOCATION

VIN

OVICTIM
0 SUSPECT
VALUE

EVIDENCE/PROPERTY
USE CODE FOR TYPE OF EVIDENCE
IF DAMAGED
li=LOST
ITEM

QTY

S=STOLEN

R=RECOVERED

USE CODE FOR ITEMS BEING HELD AS
E=EVIDENCE
S=SAFEKEEPING

O=OTHER

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION- ITEMIZE PROPERTY- BRAND, COLOR, SIZE, ~NUMBER, OTHER IDENTIFIERS

F=FOUND

DATEI11ME ENlERED

VALUE

O=OTJIER
TYPE

HELD AS

I
OFFENDER USING

OA

DD

REPORTING OFFICER

Officer T. Wise

Michael Jay Freitas

DC

ON

l5ao6

I

RELATION TO VICTIM

ou

I

APPROVED BY

41378

BADGE#

Tcrw2a112
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SUSPECT I VICTIM I REPORTING PARTY

Freitas, Michael J.

SPIRIT LAKE POLICE
OFFICER'S REPORT

CRIME CODE OR INCIDENT TYPE

DATE & TIME OF ORIGINAL INCIDENT

0CONTINUATION
0TRAFFIC
LOCATION

09/28/12@ 1330 hrs.

5870 W. Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, Jd

Spirit Lake City Code Violation

(1)
(2)

DESCRIBE EVIDENCE/PROPERTY
DESCRIBE WHERE EVIDENCE WAS
FOUND, BY WHOM, & DISPOSITION
(3) IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL VICTIMS
(4) IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL WITNESSES
(5) IDENTIFY AND/OR DESCRIBE
ADDITIONAL SUSPECTS

CASE NUMBER

SL12 -1458

0
0

INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENT

0 CRIME
0 OTHER

PAGE 2 OF 2
DATE OF THIS REPORT

(6) DESCRIBE ADDITIONAL VEHICLE(S)
INVOLVED
(7) DESCRIBE VICTIMS INJURIES AND
WHERE MEDICAL EXAM OCCURRED
(8) DESCRIBE VICTIM PREMISES OR
VEHICLE LOCATION
(9) DESCRIBE M.O.E.,WHERE, HOW
AND TOOLS USED FOR ENTRY

09/28/12
(10) RECONSTRUCT INCIDENT
(11) FORJWENILES,INDICATE

PARENT & HOW NOTIFIED
(12) INDICATE ARRAIGNMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS
(13) SPECIAL ROUTING
(14) OFFICER OPINIONS

On 09/28/12 at approximately 1330 hours, I was asked by the Spirit Lake City Clerk, Barbara Brown, to cite Michael J.
Freitas for a Spirit Lake City water system violation.
Freitas had been given a written warning on 09/27/12. He is providing water to a neighbor, George Adams at 5822 Rhode
Island whose water has been turned off due to non payment. I saw a water hose stretching from Freitas's outside water
faucet, across the alley way and attached to the Adam's residence.
Ord. 7-4-10 430, 8-221998:
Every part of the city water system up to and including, any shutoff valve and or meter, which may be installed at or near
the property line of nay lot, is the property of the city. It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper
with, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or other building not
otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter, or to operate or introduce any substance into any
part of the city water system unless that person is acting under the direct supervision of a qualified employee of the city or
first obtains express written permission from the mayor.
Freitas was issued a uniform citation for Spirit Lake City, water system code violation 7-4-10, unlawful act and issued
citation #7813.

INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Officer T. Wise #5006
STATUS

[8:1 ACTIVE
0 INACTIVE
0CLOSED

Michael Jay Freitas

I

[8]ARREST OINSUF. EV
0REF. TO OTHER AGENCY
0 UNFOUNDED 0 OTHER

J

,

"'---;--;;:?.
Officer
T.
Wise
#5006
~-c.A.A..__j
I
SIGNATURE

I

ARRESTED
[8]ADULT [8]MALE
0JUV. 0FEMALE

41378

I

APPROVING OFFICER

DATE

09/28/12
DATE
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM11 o·· . ~/15/2012

Page 1 of 1

Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael20121115 Pretrial Conference Arraignment
Judge 0. Lynn Brower
Clerk - Blair Bielec
Rights Video 1:03pm

D

·1·11·1 ~/LU12

II

02:43:27 PM Judge 0. Lynn
Brower
02:43:52 PM Michael Freitas,
PA

02:44:25 PM Judge 0. Lynn
Brower
02:44:28 PM

1

1K-COURTROOM11

Speaker

Time

02:44:03 PM

location

~

~ ~H i7l'A Jf "'- )

1

KCPA- Laura McClinton & Jim Reierson

Note
Calls Case-- Michael Freitas, Def

BGvL

!:luilty

State was only recommending a fine at this point in time
but jail may be asked for later
NG/PTC/JT
II~~

•

r-u 1-\PPOINTED

02:44:33 P_M II END
Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com

Michael Jay Freitas

41378

file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\Magistrate\Crirninal\Brower\CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michae...
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11115/2012

>ss
)

CASE NO.

Q£ 4a- }~·~

CL

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RIGHTS UPON GUILTY PLEA
1.

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in court.

2.

You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you can not afford the services of an
attorney you are entitled to a court appointed lawyer at public expense.

3.

You have the right to a trial by jury. In order for the jury to reach a verdict all six (6) jurors must
agree on the verdict.

4.

The burden of proving any criminal charge is solely upon the prosecution. The State must prove
each and every element of the criminal charge by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

5.

You have a right to cross examine any witness that the State calls against you and to confront any
evidence presented.

6.

You have the right to bring witnesses of your own choosing to testify on your behalf at trial. You
may compel the attendance of witnesses without expense to you.

7.

You have the right to testify at trial on your own behalf. You can not be forced to testify. If you
choose not to testify or call any witnesses, your silence at trial can not be used against you.

8.

You have the right to appeal the conviction.

9.

If you plead guilty you are admitting that you have committed the crime with which you are
charged.

10. If you plead guilty you are giving up any defense that you may have to the charge.
11. If you plead guilty there will not be a trial and you will be giving up those rights that go along with
the trial that have been explained in this document.
12. The court will explain to you the maximum penalty for the crime charged. The court will also tell
you if there is a mandatory penalty that must be imposed if you plead guilty.
13. If the prosecutor has agreed to make a certain recommendation to the court regarding the
sentence it is important that you understand that the court is not required to go along with that
recommendation.
14. If you are not a citizen of the United States, it is possibie ihai ihe eniry of a guilty piea couid have
immigration consequences of deportation, inabiiity to obtain legal status, or denial of United States
citizenship.

Michael Jay Freitas
Acknowledgment
of Rights Upon Guilty Plea

41378
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DC 039 Rev.
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MUST BE COMPLETED
TO BE CONSIDERED

BELOW IS A TRUE AND CORRECT STATEMENT OF MY FINANCIAL CONDITION:
1. EMPLOYMENT:
A. Employed: __yes

.·

~o

B. Spouse Employed: __yes __no

C. If not employed, or self-employed, last date of employment~d:::;..o_dO--=...::;d"""------------D. My employer is:_~-·---------------------------Address: ___
---__- _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME MONTHLY (Include income of spouse):
Other income: (Specify: Child Support, S.S., V.S., A.D.C.,
Wages before deductions $

y Zi3

LessDeductions
Net Monthly Wages

3.

$
$

.

C, f~

~Etc.)
7

~ .

HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES MONTHLY~-··Rent or Mortgage Payment $.,
-~
Utilities
$/
Clothing
$l
Transportation
$
$
School
Food
$ _ _ _ __

-;;;,.r;

rjY

Michael Jay Freitas

Child Care
Recreation
Medical
Insurance
Other (Specify)

~

$ ......./...__,-:J!d.__-..c-----$ _ _ _ __
$ _ _ _ __
$ _ _ _ __

41378
10 of 235
Financial Statement and Order Regarding Public Defender, page 1 DC 028-.Rei¥.-V.~3JO.m.6--

3.

0

~~(j~~~~'~··__permo

$ ......

DEBTS: Creditor ~~'+"""ii+-"""--'lfi'F-ri-/L.6.X.l""'f--'u...;o""'f.,
Total$ ~(.A,,..4-..L..,~

Creditor -¥.-~~~-=--L-'"\+--
Creditor --==~V41---II-.I-=~-Y+--+--4.

Total $\...4...~===:...----

- -r-'r"'• oc2:::::>

$ ~L.I
0:=$ U..2

<90

permo
·permo

oe:;

ASSETS:
A. I (we) have cash on hand or in banks

$~5~~~,-·
-------------

$~~~·=----------------

B. I (we) own personal property valued at

$--~~---------------------
/~11~~-- - - -

C. I (we) own vehicle(s) valued at
D. I (we) own real property valued at
$ __
E. I (we) own stocks, bonds, securities, or interest therein $----"~z_L.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
5.

THE FOLLOWING ALSO AFFECTS MY FINANCIAL CONDITION (Specify): ___________________

6.

DEPENDENTS:

___self

___spouse

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

AP LICANT

/

v0

t

{<;
~ _{
l v/~
day of --=-...::0:.....0=-·-=C:...J·~~:.....Q_1L..u..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 20~

~/;:},d£.--tJ /LJ El#_;] (1-111/if:/
NOTARY PUBLIC/CLERK/JUDGE

;G

The above named
defendant
parent
guardian appeared before the
court on the aforesaid charge and requested~ aid of counsel. The court having considered the foregoing, and
having personally examined the applicant; ~ORDERS
~IES the appointment of the s_ervice of

y~cs\.)~ ~'-~

counsel.

\t\ov\fd--

, 20___

The applicant is ordered to pay $
monthly beginning
for the cost of appointed counsel. Payments are to continue until

~

[ ] notified by the court that no further amount is due.
has been paid.
[ ] the sum of$
THE APPLICANT IS ORDERED TO PAY REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE COST OF APPOINTED COUNSEL AT
THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE; THISdUNT MAY BE IN ADDITION TO ANY SUMS ORDERED ABOVE.
ENTERED this

/~

Custody Status: ___ In

day of

Out

~tJW&U

, 20_tg_.

es to:

t(1 ~rosecuting Attorney
~ublic Defender
Bond$_ _ _ _ __

V\i\ \LL\ \Y} ~Ou~ ~

Date
Michael Jay Freitas

eputy Clerk

41378
Financial Statement and Order Regarding Public
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Defel"ldel',...pag&-2---QG-a28-R~IG6--

12/04/2012 TUE 12:05

~

11

FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC

Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender

DEFENDER~~~

Dist. Court-file docs

141003/015

.·

PO Box 9000
.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1791
Bar Number: 8759

.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF rHE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

) CASE NUMBER
CR-12-0018513
Misd
).
)
) . MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
) PURSUANT TO ICR 25

v.
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,

)
)

Defendant.

~------------------------~)
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Jay Logsdon,
Deputy Public.Defender, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25 and hereby moves the Court for an
Order Disqualifying the Honorable Barry E. Watson in the above-entitled case.
This motion is not made to hinder, delay or obstruct the administration of justice.

DATED this

'{-

day ofDece~ber, 2012.
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY:

tl<

·
t'~~
J~OGSIIN
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by

placing a copy ofthe same as indicated below on the
to:
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-183 3
. ~ ViaFax

'(

day ofDecember, 2012, addressed

Interoffice Mail

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
Page 1
Michael Jay Freitas
-~···--------

·········~----:--·--·.---:·--·-.-------~--~-·-·-.-:

41378
---·-;-···-------~-~~
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-

.. .... ...........
~

~··

12/04/2012 TUE 12:05

FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER

~~~

Dist. Court-file docs

141004/015

Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender
The Law Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8759
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF l'HE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

v.

CASE NUMBER

CR-12-0018513
Mud

)

)

ORDER TO DISQUALIFY

)
)

MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,

Defendant.

)

--------------------------~

The Court having before it the timely Motion to Disqualify and good cause appearing,
now, therefore
IT. IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Barry E. Watson be and hereby is
disqualified from hearing the above-entitled proceeding.
DATED this

2

day of December; 2012.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the ']
day of December, 2012, addressed
to:

Kootenai County Public Defender FAX 446-1701V"
.Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 /
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Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County
POBox 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8759

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NUMBER

CR-12-0018513
Misd

MOTION TO DISMISS

COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Jay Logsdon,
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves this honorable Court for an order dismissing the
above entitled matter. This motion is made pursuant to I.C.R. 48.
This motion is made on the grounds that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is unconstitutional
on its face and as applied under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I§§ 1, 13, 14, 15, 21, Article XII§ 2, Article XV §1, 4, 5.

I.

The City of Spirit Lake has no claim of ownership over water once it has been draWn.
The City of Spirit Lake owns and operates a municipal water system. See Ordinance 7-4-

2, 7-4-3. The service sells water for use by residents in a propriety capacity. Skaggs Drug
Centers v. City ofIdaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 7 (1965) (citing Gilbert v. ·Village of Bancroft, 80
PageO
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Idaho 186 (1958); Hooton v. City ofBurley, 70 Idaho 369 (1950)).
The city's relationship with its citizens as regards the water service is contractual. City of

Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535 (1989). Once the water has been drawn, the resident owes
the municipality for that water which is recorded by a meter so that the city may collect using a
monthly bill. See Ordinances 7-4-4, 7-4-5. Municipalities are granted the power to own,
maintain, and operate a water system by the Idaho Legislature. See I.C. § 50-323. No
constitutional provision, law, or Spirit Lake ordinance allows the Spirit Lake to retain a
possessory interest in the water once it has been drawn.
Possessory interests in water are protected by the Idaho Constitution and cannot be altered
by government without due process of law and just compensation. Bennett v. Twin Falls North

Side Land & Water Co. et al., 27 Idaho 643, 150 P. 336, 339 (1915); see also Article XV§§ 1, 4,
5 of the Idaho Constitution. Therefore, the City of Spirit Lake cannot by ordinance alone take the
property of one of its citizens. See also Article I§ 14 of the Idaho Constitution.
The City of Spirit Lake for the reasons stated has.no possessory interest in water once
drawn and therefore cannot regulate the use of the water in ways that do not comport with the
public interest. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 375 (1965)
II. The City of Spirit Lake has no authority to pass laws criminalizing the sharing of water.
The Idaho Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that municipalities may exercise only
those powers granted to them or necessarily implied from the powers granted." City of

Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535, 538 (1989) citing Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160
(1980); Hendricks v. City ofNampa, 93 Idaho 95, 98,456 P.2d 262 (1969). If there is a fair,
reasonable, substantial doubt as to the existence of a power, the doubt·must be resolved against
Page1
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tlie city. O'Bryant v. City ofIdaho Falls, 78 Idaho 313, 320, 303 P.2d 672 (1956), Oregon Short

Line Railroad Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, 83 Idaho 62, 65, 357 P.2d 1101 (1960).
A city acts in a proprietary capacity when it owns, maintains, and operates a water system
for the benefit of its inhabitants. Skaggs Drug Centers v. City ofIdaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 7
(1965) (citing Gilbert v. Village of Bancroft, 80 Idaho 186 (1958); Hooton v. City ofBurley, 10
Idaho 369 (1950)). Municipalities are granted the power to own, maintain, and operate a water
system by the Idaho Legislature. See I.C. § 50~323. The Legislature further provided that
municipalities may

.. .prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the
levy or assessment ofsuch rates, fees, tolls or charges against
governmental units, departments or agencies, including the state of
_Idaho and its subdivisions, for the services, facilitie~ and .
commodities furnished by such works, or by such rehabilitated
e~isting electrical generating facilities, a11d to provide methods of
collections and penalties, including denial ofservice for
nonpayment ofsuch rates, fees, tolls or charges; ...
I.C. 50-:1030(f)
The City of Spirit Lake passed local ordinances 7-4-2 and 7-4-3 making the city the
qwner and operator of its municipal water system. The city also provided for fees and denial of
s~ce. See Ordinance_ 7-4-4, 7-4-8. Once service is denied, the city may declare the residence

or building unfit for habitation and a public nuisance. See Ordinance 7-4-9.
The city took an e?{tra ~tep to consolidate its power over water by passing ordinance 7-410. The ordin~~e-states

]ivery part of the city water system up to, and including, any
shutoff valve andlor·m.eter, which may be installed at or near the ·
property line ofany /(Jt, is the property of the city. It shaU be

unlawful for any perso~ to connect to, interfere or tamper with,
Page2
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turn on or off, Pll!:_mit connection or delivery of water to third 7
persons l!!_r qse wjtlaiM B: I'BSidenep or other building not
otherwise provided with water service in accordance with. this
chapter. or to operate or introduce any substance into any part of
the city water system unless that person is acting under the direct
supervision ofa qualified employee of the city or first obtains
express written permission from the mayor. (emphasis added)
The ordinance makes it unlawful for a person to permit connection or delivery of water to third
persons for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this
chapter. While this leads to the absurd result that a person commits a misdemeanor by filling a water
bottle with tap water in Spirit Lake and later sharing that tap water with a person that does not live in
their home while both are in either a home or building without water from Spirit Lake, criminal laws
must be strictly construed, and the Supreme Court will not change or strike down a law for absurdity.

See Verska v. SaintAlphonsus Regional Med. (:enter, 151_Idaho 889,895 (2011);Statev. Sivak, 119
Idaho 320, 325 (1990).
However, the City of Spirit Lake lacks the _authority

to criminalize these acts.

In City of

Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
allowing a municipality to place a lien for nonpayment of utilities on a property owner when his
tenants failed to pay. The Court found that

the city may collect the charges for the water, sewer and garbage
services provided by the city from those who use the services. This
right to collect does not depend on any expressed or implied power
of the city,. but rather on principles ofcontract law that obligate
one who accepts a service to pay for it. what the city has attempted
t~ do here is to rewr~te those principles to allow collection from.
the owner, even though the services were not ordered, contracted
for, or used by the owner.
The Court held
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An implied power to collect from an owner who had not ordered,
contracted for, or used the service would be unreasonable because
it would create a liability not consistent with principles ofcontract
law. We are not prepared to read this power into these statutes.
In this case, the City of Spirit Lake relies on police powers rather than contract law. A
municipal corporation is granted police powers under Article XII§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution.

Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce,
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the
general laws.
From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it may be said that
there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the authority conferred by
such provision: (1) the ordinance or regulation must bt: confmed to the limits of the
governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of the
state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactrrient. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365,
374 (1965). Police powers must be used to. serve_the public interest. See id

at 375..

No constitutional provision or legisla~ive enactment provides the City of Spirit Lake with
authority to maintain a monopoly over the supply of water through criminal sanctions that could
only be useful to extort people who are not paying their water bill. Once a person has paid for
water, the city has no rational or legitimate reason to hinder their ability to use the water
themselves or elsewhere so long as that person is not using the water to do harm.· Sharing water
cannot harm the person sharing, the person being shared with, the community, or the
municipality. Further, nothing prevents a person or corporate entity from delivering water from
an outside source, or from simply paying for another person's water bill. The ordinance is
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therefore arbitrary and must be struck down;
The Idaho Legislature set out in I. C. 50-1030(t) a limited list of ways in which a
municipality may enforce its claim to payment for services. That· list, while not exhaustive, does
not provide examples that would lead one to read an implication that the municipality has the
authority, in addition to "denial of service for nonpayment of such rates; fees, tolls or charges,"
to criminalize the permission of a person legally in possession of water to deliver it to another.
Similar to the case in Haskin, the matter before this Court involves an ordinance that oversteps
statutory authority and must be struck down.
Further, the ordinance makes no attempt to limit its scope to the City of Spirit Lake.
Every person engaged in any chain of events that leads to the use of Spirit Lake water in a home
not provided that water in accordance with the municipality's ordinances will be in violation of
these laws.
III. The ordinance, even if constitutional on its face. is unconstitutional as applied.

The facts of this case may be in dispute. According to the police reports of Officer Wise
of the Spirit Lake Police Department, .on September 28,2012, he cited Mr. Michael Freitas for
providing water using a hose stretching·fr~m hls outside water faucet to hi~ :neighbor Georg~
..

Adams a."ld the three adults a."ld three children staying there. The city had shut off water to the
dwelling. On October 15,2012, Officer McMillen returned and spoke to Brenda Nash who was
...

staying in Mr. Adams' home, and learned that Mr. Feitas was allegedly still providing water to
the home. Ms. Nash told the officer she had nowhere else to go.
As explained above, the City of Spirit Lake has no reasonable or legitimate interest in

preventing Mr. Freitas from giving water he pays for to his neighbors. Mr. Freitas respectfully
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asks this honorable Court to dismiss this case because the ordinance is unconstitutional as
applied to these facts.
Further, the ordinance, if read properly, has nothing to do with this case. The ordinance
.

.

refers to interfering with, tampering with, turning on or off, permitting connection or delivery of
water to third persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise provided with
water service in accordance with this chapte~. The statute. is best ~e~d to mean that it would be
unlawful for anyone to interfere with, tamper, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of
water to another within a residence or building- through the use of the city's water system. The
water system extends to the "standard service connection" to the "main distribution line.'' See
Ordinances 7-4-3 and 7-4-4. In other words, the ordinance seeks to outlaw acts that would either
do harm to the water system or siphon water from it without paying. It has no application to
water drawn and properly paid for by a citizen. If this is a reasonable reading of the statute it
must also be the correct one. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320~ 325 (1990) ..
IV. The Ordinance is void for vagueness.

Alternatively, Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is void for vagueness on its face an,d as
.

.

.

applied. In order to comport With the notice requirements of due process guaranteed by the .
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution, a law must use language that conveys a sufficiently definite description of the
l?roscribed conduct. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 15, Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 90-3, 1990 WL
. .

.

.

48948 at *2 (Idaho A.G.), citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); H. & V
.

.

.

.

. .

. ..

Engineering v. Board of Professional Engineers, 113 Idaho 646 (1987). As the Court wrote in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468

U.S. 609 (1984),
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The requirement that government articulate its aims with a
reasonable degree ofclarity ensure that state power will be
· exercised only on behalf ofpolicies reflecting an authoritative
choice among competing social values, educes the danger of
caprice and discrimination in the administration ofthe laws,
enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requzrements of
law, and permits meaningful judicial review.
·
Due Process also guarantees that a statute will not be so Written as to allow arbitrary and
capricious enforcement. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 15 at *2 citing LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 589 P .2d
490 (Colo.l979)~ Furthermore, Due Process requires that explicit standards be created for
·individuals or groups tasked to apply basic policy. Id. citing Tuma v. Board ofNursing, 100
Idaho 74 (1979); Saxon Coffee Shop, Inc ..v. Boston Licensing Board, 401 N.E.2d (1980); Chief

of Fire Dept. of Worcester v. Wibley, 507 N.E.2d 256 (Mass. 1987); Wheeler v. State Board of
Forestry, 192 Cal.Rptr. 693 (Cal.App. 1983)..
Ordinance 7-4-10 reads in relevant part

It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or
tamper with, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery ofwater
to third persons for use within a residence or other building not
otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this
chapter...
This ordinance can be broken down to outlaw the following
1. Connect to water for use by a third person ·within a residence or other
. building not otherwise provided with water s.ervice in accordance with this
chapter.
2. Interfere or tamper with water for use by a third person within a residence
or other building not otherWise provided with water service in accordance
with this chapter.
3. Turn on or off water for use by a third person within a residence or other
. ~uilding not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this
chapter.
4. Permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a
residence or other building not otherwise provided with water service in
.J)age 7
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accordance with this chapter.
It is difficult to understand why the city would have concerned itself with those interfering with
the illegal use of water by others, or why the city is not concerned about people who connect
illegally for their own use. One way to correct the absurdity is to remove the "of water to third
persons" language, but that fails to fix the interfering part, while removing the "not otherwise
provided" qualifier makes the connecting part absurd. As it stands, the law is too confusing to
provide either reasonable persons or the government with any idea as to how it is meant to be
enforced. Therefore, it must be struck down.
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument,
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is 10 minutes.
DATED this

t1..

day of December, 2012.
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY

BY:

~~·

Jlivoa6N

DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing
a copy of the same as indicated below on the.
day of December~ 2012, addressed .to:

J::J...

~~

•... l<etenai County.Prosecutor FAX 446-183 3.
. Via Fax
.
·Interoffice Mail
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STATE Of IDAHO
)
COUNTY OF KOOTENAIJSS
FILED:

BARRY McHUGH
Prosecuting Attorney
501 Government Way/Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone: (208) 446-1800
Facsimile: (208) 446-1833

29 12 DEC 31 AH IO: 19

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-2012-18513
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO DISMISS

COMES NOW the State, by and through Laura McClinton, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
and hereby submits its brief in opposition to The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
FACTS

The State expect the evidence to show: on September 28, 2012 Officer Terry Wise cited
Michael J. Freitas ("The Defendant") for providing water to his neighbor George Adams whose
water had been turned off by the City of Spirit Lake. Officer Wise had previously advised the
Defendant he was in violation of Spirit Lake Ordinance § 7-4-10 by running a hose from his
house to his neighbor's house where water had been shut off. The Defendant stated he had talked
to his lawyer about the situation and that he was not "doing anything wrong," and would "take it
to court." Office Wise provided a highlighted copy of the statute, but did not cite the Defendant.
The next day when Officer Wise returned to the Defendant's residence, 5870 Rhode Island
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Street, Spirit Lake Idaho, 83869, Officer Wise observed the hose was still being used to transport
City water to the neighboring residence and The Defendant was cited for violating the ordinance.
On December 12, 2012, The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the charge alleging
Spirit Lake does not have the authority to regulate The Defendant's use of City water once it is
paid for, and that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is unconstitutionally vague.

ARGUMENT
I. The Defendant has not shown a taking has occurred, and assuming a taking
did occur, dismissal is not the appropriate remedy under the Takings Clause.

The "Just Compensation Clause," which is also referred to as the "Takings Clause," is a
"complicated and multi-faceted area of constitutional law. Boise Tower Associates, LLC v.
Hogland, 147 Idaho 774215 P.3d 494, 503-04 (Idaho 2009). A government must provide

compensation if the government's "regulations deprive an owner of' all economically beneficial
us[e]' ofher property." !d. quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538, 125 S.Ct. at 2081, 161 L.Ed.2d at
887 ((emphasis and bracket in original). 1 There is no claim of inverse condemnation, claim under
the Takings Clause, "unless an actual taking of private property is established." Covington v.
Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828, 831 (Idaho 2002) citing Snyder v. State, 92

Idaho 175, 179,438 P.2d 920,924 (1968).
In the present case, whether the City of Spirit Lake has a property interest or not, there is
no taking that requires compensation. The Spirit Lake Ordinance simply denies a person who is
obtaining city water from sharing it with an individual who does not have running water at their
residence. Not orJy is the interference with use ofwater de minimus, but citizens of Spirit Lake

1

A taking may also include where the government physically modifies the property interest of a
party, or where the taking is temporary in nature. Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147
Idaho 774215 P.3d 494, 503-04 (Idaho 2009). Neither ofthese types of taking apply to the
ordinance in question in the present case.
·
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retain almost the entire economic value in the water, and what is lost falls nowhere near "all
economically beneficial use." Further, the appropriate remedy under the Taking Clause is to
provide the compensation for depriving the owner of a property interest, not to dismiss an action
or find a regulation unconstitutional. The Defendant cannot establish that a taking has occurred,
and as such, the Takings Clause has no implication requiring a dismissal.

II. The City of Spirit Lake has the authority to regulate water use as
authorized by the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Legislator.
A municipality may make and enforce "all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. Caesar v. State, 101
Idaho 158, 161, 610 P.2d 517, 520 (Idaho 1980) quoting Idaho Const. art. XII,§ 2. This
constitutional grant of powers is viewed "as a grant of local police powers to Idaho cities." !d.
"The burden falls on the party challenging the validity of a police power to show that it is either
in conflict with the general laws of the state, unreasonable or arbitrary. Potts Canst. Co. v. N
Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678,682, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (Idaho 2005) citing Plummer v. City of
Fruitland, 139 Idaho 810, 813, 87 P.3d 297, 300 (2004). "Generally courts are not concerned
with the wisdom of ordinances and will uphold a municipal ordinance unless it is clearly
unreasonable or arbitrary." !d. Further, "[i]t is well recognized that the social objective of
preventing financial hardship and possible reliance upon the welfare agencies of the state is a
permissible goal of police power action." Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101,416 P.2d
46, 49 (Idaho 1966) citing Home Accident Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 34 Ariz. 201, 269
P. 501 (1928).
The Idaho Legislator has also granted cities the authority to create regulations '"to
maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, commerce and
industry." I.C. § 50-302. I.C. § 50-302 expressly authorizes that a city may enforce these
Page 3 of 7
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ordinances through fines and by incarceration. Id. One such trade, commerce, and industry a city
may conduct is the management of a city water system. I. C.§ 50-323.
The City of Spirit Lake has exercised its authority under the Idaho Constitution and
Legislative Power to pass Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. This statute prohibits an individual from
allowing connection or delivery of city water to third persons for use in a residence that is not
receiving city water. The City of Spirit Lake charges roughly $15.00 a month for 12,000 gallons
ofwater, and then $1.25 for each additionall,OOO gallons of water. The City created this
ordinance in an attempt to prevent unlawful sharing of city water for the use in a residence which
does not have running water. The rate is low, and the City of Spirit Lake is well within its
authority to attempt to avoid a resident from using a large number of gallons of water in an
attempt to pass along free water to a neighbor. The City of Spirit Lake can take action to limit the
chance its residents will seek welfare; and in this case the ordinance is designed to keep water
rates low and allow affordable access to water to the people of Spirit Lake.

II. The City of Spirit Lake Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague on its
face or as applied.
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment ofthe United States Constitution
requires that the laws of the United States and of the several states not be vague when defining
criminal conduct. Idaho v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). The U.S.
Constitution and policy requires that "no [person] ... be required at the peril of loss of liberty to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." I d.
A statute is unconstitutional and therefore void-for-vagueness where "its prohibitions are
not clearly defined." Id. A prohibition is not clearly defined if it "fails to give adequate notice to
people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes ... or if it fails to establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute." Jd. at
Page 4 of 7
Michael Jay Freitas

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
41378

26 of 235

712, 69 P.3d 132. The key to determining whether a statute is void-for-vaguness "is not the
possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it
establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what the fact is." United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 286, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1835 (2008). In cases of constitutional

challenges, the burden is on the challenging party; there is a strong presumption in favor of the
validity of a statute. Idaho v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780,783,992 P.2d 775, 778 (1999).
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague in two, mutually exclusive,
ways. Burton v. Dep 't ofTransp., 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d 933, 935 (2010). First, "[a]
statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face[.]" Id A statute is facially
unconstitutional if'"the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications."' Korsen, 138
Idaho 712, 69 P.3d 132.
Second, a statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague "as applied to the
complainant's conduct." Burton, 149 Idaho 748, 240 P.3d 935. A statute is unconstitutionally
vague as applied if "the statute failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific
conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled
discretion in determining whether to charge the complainant." Id
A. FACIAL CHALLENGE.

A statute is unconstitutionally facially vague if there are no circumstances under which
the statute could be constitutionally applied. Idaho v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 199, 969 P.2d 244,
248 (1998). A statute can survive a constitutional challenge where there is an identifiable
circumstance in "which the statute or ordinance unquestionably could be constitutionally
applied." Id at 247, 969 P.2d 247.
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Spirit Lake Ordinance§ 7-4-10 states in relevant part, "It shall be unlawful for any
person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of
water to third persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise provided with
water service in accordance with this chapter... " Spirit Lake Ordinance§ 7-4-10. The ordinance
is not ambiguous and its language is clear when given its "commonly understood, everyday
meanings." Idaho v. Warriorwoman, 2008 WL 4202272 at *5 (Idaho Dist., 1st Dist., Aug. 15,
2008) (unpublished opinion); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133. A person of ordinary
intelligence can understand that this statute means that a person cannot "connect or deliver"
Spirit Lake water to an individual for the use within a residence that is not paying for Spirit Lake
city water. This is exactly how Defense Counsel has read the statute, "The ordinance makes it
unlawful for a person to permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a
residence not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter."
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss p. 3.

B.

AS APPLIED.

To determine whether a law is void-for-vagueness under an as applied challenge the court
should apply a two prong test. Idaho v. Foelsch, 2009 WL 3287575, at *3 (Idaho Dist., 1st Dist.,
Sept. 17, 2009) (unpublished opinion). The law will be unconstitutionally vague, as applied, if
"(1) the law [does not] create minimum guidelines for police, judges, or juries charged with
enforcement of the statute; and (2) [the law does not] provide a reasonable person with adequate
and fair warning of the proscribed conduct." !d. In other words, a law is unconstitutionally
vague if it gives authorities "unbridled discretion" and it does not put the individual on notice of
what action is required or forbidden. Korsen, 138 Idaho 712, 69 P.3d 132.
As previously noted, the statute prohibits a person to "connect or deliver" Spirit Lake
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water to an individual for the use within a residence that is not paying for Spirit Lake city water.
In the present case the Defendant connected a hose and delivered Spirit Lake water to his
neighbor's residence, which was not paying for Spirit Lake water. This is a clear violation of the
ordinance and the Defendant was sufficiently put on notice that he was in violation of the
ordinance by previous law enforcement contact.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

DATED

this)~ day of December, 2012.

~~-Jlardi:.La

LAURA MCCLINTON
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
~ day of
the foregoing was caused to be faxed as follows:

:J

))c C...

, 2012, a true and correct copy of

JAY LOGSDON
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM10 • 1/3/2013

Page 1 of3

Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael Jay 2013010~
Judge Peterson
(
- ~ A
Clerk Cristine Stokes
C~
Date 1/3/2013

Time

Location

111 K-COURTROOM1 0

J~l

02:41:03 PM Judge
Peterson

Note
calls case

02:56:39 PM

Mr Freitas pres

02:56:46 PM

Ms
pres
McClinton

02:56:49 PM
Mr
Logsdon

pres, this motion includes an applied challenge, state and I have
stipulated to most of the facts accept #28, water had been shut of
by City of Spirit Lake. Stipulation is just for purpose of this hearing
not trial

02:59:41 PM

Ms
calls Barbara Brown
McClinton

03:00:04 PM

swears to oath, states name and spells for record, employed
through City of Spirit Lake, I am the Clerk and Treasurer, been
employed there for 33 years, I over see City's record keeping,
employee's, HR, water and sewer funds, attend all meetings,
record all documents. I see that the ordinances are followed, for
the employees and citizens, for monthy residental acces it is $15
per month for 12k gallons, if a resident uses more than its $1.25
per 1k, those rates have been in place since 2006-2007 maybe.
Ms Brown We try to keep the water prices low, we have a lot of low income,
single income and a lot of people that are financially stressed, we
have to review it every year to make sure we can pay our bills, we
are one of the lowest municipal systems around. If you use the
service we bill you so on 12/31 we bill for the months of
December, we only read meters in the summer, so its just a flat
rate in the winer, water and sewer is $42 but water only is $15,
familiar w/ unlawful act of sharing water. Normally when it does
happen we write a letter and let them know that its a violation

03:04:56 PM

Judge
Peterson

03:05:04 PM

Mr Adam's water was shut off by the city for non payment and
Ms Brown there was a hose run across the alley from Mr Freitas to Mr
Adam's home

03:05:57 PM

Mr
Logsdon

questions Ms Brown

cross

03:06:00 PM
rate for water is based on a base rate, some systems have a base
rate that start at zero gallons, some allow 5, or 10 we allow 12k
Michael Jay Freitas
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gallons for $15 Cities in 10 have an organization of all of the cities
and they do water rate analyses and from looking at those I know
Ms Brown
thats how it is lower than a lot of the cities, that was put out on the
internet about 1-2 years ago.
03:07:36 PM Ms
no other questions
McClinton
03:08:26 PM

Mr
Logsdon

ordinance is 7410 of Spirit Lake, reads out loud in open court, I
am challenging it as an unlawful taking and violated municipalities
to pass laws. Its my contention that this is void for vagueness, if
you look at statute as a whole. Seems that statute seeks to
punish people that are conecting to water system and delivering
water through the system. For this situation this is easy, we can
say none of the front part matters, its not an ordinance that the
state can enforce. He's paid for the water and the question is the
use of sharing of the water is that something cognizable by the
court. I would point the court to Adams vs United States.
Continues to read 10 Code section 50-323 into the record

03:18:58 PM Judge
Peterson

people could set up their own private water deliveries systems
and hook up 30 surounding neighbors?

03:19:31 PM

issue is that when we talk about a list we often say anything that
isn't stated in that list is not allowed, they followed w/ denial of
service. When I read this is shot me back to exmples of L&L,
when you have examples you can't extrapolate from those and
give power to do anything you want, I found City of Grangeville vs
Haskins, made it okay to play Ieins on properties for land owners
that haven't been being paid by their tenants. City of Spirit Lake
can condem a home if their water is shut off. There is a long !ist of
ways a person could not have to purchase through the
municipalities, there does not appear to be any sort of limit for
geographical limitis on this. We are not talking about sale or
marketing water. He purchased the water and provided it for free
to his neighbor, asking for this case to be dismissed

Mr
Logsdon

03:24:40 PM
city of Spirit Lake does have right to make ordinances to maintain
peace, commerce, industry and good government for the people
of Spirit Lake. Allows for punishmet of $1000 or not more than 6
months in jail, this ordinace is not vague when read in context.
Statute is best read, its read exactly how its suppose to be read.
States 10 vs Corsen, I think clearly when read in context you can
understand what this ordinace is prohibiting. This doesn't braden
Ms
spectrum
to not allowing people to bring a glass of water to their
McClinton
neighbor, you would have to know that their water was shut off.
He received noticed of the behavior and then ultimetly cited for it.
They have had problems w/ this issue in the past, they are trying
to keep their costs down for City of Spirit Lake, this ordinance has
a purpose here for general welfare of the community. Sanitary
issues as well. Sharing water through a hose?The state does not
believe that this actions rises to a taking here. City is not taking
Michael Jay Freitas
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and prohibiting economic value, he is able to use it for his own
personal use, just not deliver it to his neighbor, ask the motion to
dismiss be denied

Judge
Peterson

muncipalities have authority to regulate and that can lead to
criminal action - court denies motions as it is to being a taking,
now regarding whether its unconstitutional, court notes strong
presumtion of validity of statutes. I think language w/ in ordinace
which sets forth very clear violations and has a clear meaning.
Find motion to dismiss is denied. I think statute at issue hear is
read very clear. City is sole regulator of their water system.
Defendant received notice that his neighbor was not receiving
water from the system and he provided water himself to this other
individual. Court finds you have failed to meet your burden as
statute applied, deny in its entirety your motion. It is your role to
bring these types of challenges.

Mr
Logsdon

findings as to three reasons why ordinances may have gone
beyond its authroity that I listed in my brief

Judge
Peterson

I have to constrew statute to be constitutional, and I have to read
the statute that way, noted that ordinace here is both reasonable
and not arbotrary

03:29:31 PM

03:34:20 PM
03:34:43 PM

03:35:52

d
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BARRY McHUGH
Prosecuting Attorney
501 Government Way/Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone:
(208) 446-1800
Facsimile:
(208) 446-1833
Assigned Attorney
LAURA MCCLINTON
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR-2012-18513

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION IN LIMINE

MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Laura McClinton, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, to
request that Defense counsel, the Defendant, and/or any defense witness not be allowed to refer
to the Motion to Dismiss that was heard in front of the Honorable Judge Peterson on the 3rd day
of January, 2013 at trial in this matter.
The issues addressed in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss have no relevance in the instant
matter and any reference relating to the constitutionality of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 must be
excluded pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 402. Judge Peterson denied Defendant'sMotion to
Dismiss, thus upholding the constitutionality of said ordinance. As such, the issue that was in
question has already been decided and is irrelevant as to whether Defendant violated the
ordinanGe.
Further, even if relevant, the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss have no probative value
in the matter to betried, but raise a substantial danger of unfair prejudice to the State, and should

Michael Jay Freitas
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be excluded under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. The State is concerned that any reference to the
constitutionality of the Spirit Lake ordinance would serve to improperly mislead or confuse the
trier of fact, possibly having an impact on the Jury's deliberations, and resulting in prejudice to
the State.
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument,
evidence and/or testimony in support. Requested time is ten minutes.

=j~------

DATEDthls _____

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CEriCATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that, on the

/

day~ , ~caused the foregoing to be

transmitted as followed:

0,~

JAYLOGSDON

~-~~·~d~-+-7+-----------------

FAXED
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Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael20130107 Jury Trial Status
Judge Peterson ·
~~
Clerk Shari Rohrbach
Date 1t112o13

I

Time

I

09:16:05 AM

I

Note

I

II Calls, def not present, Mr Logsdo and Mcclint

I

DA

I spoke to him and he wants this left set. He lives in Spirt Lake and
has difficutly with transportation, he's handicapped. He was here
Friday, may have been confusion, ask his absence be excused.

PA

Ask a warrant, he was aware of court today. He hasn't tried to get
here.

09:15:16 AM

09:16:33 AM J

Table this one until the end of the calendar.

I 09:16:51 AM I

Pass.

I 09:54:33 AM I J

REcall.

09:55:03 AM

111 K-COURTROOM7

II Speaker II

Q_9: 15:06 AM IJ

09:54:36 AM

.

L.V\,CI Ll VII

11

DA

This is a strange case and a strange law. We're happy to go to
trial.

PA

Still request a warrant. State has 4 witnesses coming in from Spirit
Lake.

09:55:34 AM J

He was just here last week.

09:55:42 AM

He forgot he had court this morning. The abilty for him to get herehe still wants to go to trial.

DA
J

I

Bump this to 1:30 today.

:...
09:5 .
02:19:35 PM J
02:19:52 PM

I Q2:2o: 15 P

R~=~,..~ll.
II

DA

My client apologizes for not being here this morning, ask to leave
set. State has filed some motions in limine.

J

Leave set, will go tomorrow.
I'll issue a supplemental order. Be here at 8:30 Tues.

I Q2:20:3o P
02:21:19 PM

02:21:19 PM lEnd

I
Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com
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141 001/017

\

'

T ,., '! ·.. :

. ,_ •.. IJ

SJ

Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County
POBox 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8759

~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

v.
MICHAELJAY FREITAS,
Defendant.

CASE NUMBER

CR-12-0018513
'Misd

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

------------------------~~)
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Jay Logsdon,
Deputy Public Defender, and respectfully submits the Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions No.

l

8 ,in addition to the Court's general instructions on the law.
DATED this
7 day of January, 2013.

through

THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY

BY:
LIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing
/
day of January, 2013, addressed to:
a copy of the same as indicated below on the
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833

~ :::~ceMail

..· . . ·~

Michael Jay Freitas
.
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01/07/2013 MON 15:46

FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER

~~~

PETERSON JUDGE

[4J 002/017

Icn 103
REASONABLE DOUBT

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE-REASONABLE DOUBT
DEFENDANTS REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 1
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The
presumption of innocence means two things.
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that burden
throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the
defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all.
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt A reasonable
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt It is a doubt based on reason and common
sense. It may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or from lack of
evidence. If after considering all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's
guilt, you must fmd the defendant not guilty.Comment
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the jury _be instructed on the
presumption of innocence. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1977). Although technically not a
"presumption", the presumption of innocence is a way ofdescribing the prosecution's duty both
to produce evidence of guilt and to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
"The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution
neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a
matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the
defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any
particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof.
Rather, 'taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable
doubt to the jury."' Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. I, 5 (1994) (citations omitted).
The above instruction reflects the view that it is preferable to instruct the jury on the meaning of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This instrUction defines that term concisely while avoiding the
~=~~i~ing fro7me o~er attempts to define this concept. ·
REFUSED
ACCEPTED
MODIFIED
COVERED

JUDGE

Michael Jay Freitas
···:··-~

41378

-----··-:-·-:-"----:----····: -------·-··-···----------- -~-.---~·: ---------:-:·--.--·---;--··--··---~-·---·-

37 of 235
:--~

·--·-·-·

·-~----·-

-----·-··

. ··-·---· ......

-

··---~----

.

. ..... .

- --- .....

-~

...

01/07/2013 MON 15:47

FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER

PETERSON JUDGE

~~~

141 003/017

ICTI 301
EFFECT OF DEFENDANT'S ELECTION NOT TO TESTIFY

~~~~ANTS

INSTRUC

REQUESTED
NO.

2

ant in a criminal trial has a constitutional ·ght not to be compelled to testify. The
decisi whether to testify is left to the defendant, acf with the advice and assistance of the
de ndant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference o guilt from the fact that the defendant
oes not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by yo or enter into your deliberations in any

REFUSED
ACCEPTED

MODIFIED
COVERED

JUDGE
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FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC

DEFENDER~~~

PETERSON JUDGE

~

004/017

ICJI 305
UNION OF ACT AND INTENT

DEFENDANTS REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.

3

In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent.

Comment
I.C. s 18-114. The word "intent" does not mean an intent to commit a crime but merely the
intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence the failure to perform
the required act. State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75; 310 P .2d 1082 (1957); State v. Booton, 85 Idaho
51, 375 P.2d 536 (1962). The term "criminal negligence", means gross negligence, such as
amounts to reckless disregard of consequences and the rights of others. State v. McMahan, 57
·Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937) (construing former I.C. s 17-114 which was identical to s
18-114).
This instruction is unnecessary when the crime charged requires a specific mental element and
the jury is properly instructed regarding that mental element. State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897,
55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002).

GIVEN

/

REFUSED
ACCEPTED

MODIFIED
COVERED
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~~~

PETERSON JUDGE
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DEFENDANTS REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 4

In order for the defendant to be guilty of the charge of unlawful act under the Spirit Lake
Domestic Water Ordinance, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about September 28,2012
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant Michael Freitas permitted the delivery of water the residents of 5822
Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, or
4. the defendant permitted the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, to
connect to water, and
5. the defendant was aware that the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID,
lived in a residence not provided with water by the city of Spirit Lake.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must fmd the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty.
,

Comment
See Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 (2012).
GIVEN
REFUSED
ACCEPTED
MODIFIED
COVERED

JUDGE
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DEFENDANTS REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.

5

In order for the defendant to be guilty of the charge of unlawful act under the Spirit Lake
Domestic Water Ordinance, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about September 28, 2012
2. in the state ofldaho
3. the defendant Michael Freitas permitted the delivery of water from the Spirit Lake city
water system to the residents of 5822 Rhode.Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, or
4. the defendant permitted the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, to
connect to water in the Spirit Lake city water system, and
5. the defendant was aware that the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID,
lived in a residence not provided with water by the city of Spirit Lake.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must fmd the defendant guilty.

-Comment
See Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 (2012).

GIVEN

REFUSED
ACCEPTED
MODIFIED

COVERED

JUDGE
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DEFENDER~~~

PETERSON JUDGE

l4J 007/017

DEFENDANTS REQuESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 6
The Spirit Lake city water system is property of the city up to and including any shutoff valve
and/or meter which may be· installed at or near the property line of any lot.

Comment
See Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 (2012).
GIVEN
REFUSED

I

ACCEPTED
MODIFIED
COVERED

JUDGE

.
·,
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141 008/017

ICJI 1512
NECESSITY DEFENSE
DEFENDANTS REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 7
The defendant cannot be guilty an unlawful act under the Spirit Lake City Water Ordinance if
the defendant acted because of necessity. Conduct which violates the law is justified by
necessity if:
1. there is a specific threat of immediate harm to the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St, Spirit
Lake, ID,
2. the defendant did not bring about the circumstances which created the threat of immediate
harm,
3. the defendant could not have prevented the threatened harm by any less offensive
alternative, and
4. the harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm.
The state m).lst prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act becarise of
necessity. If you have a reasonable doubt orr that issue, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Comnient

State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990).

GNEN
REFUSED

7

ACCEPTED
MODIFIED
COVERED

rLJDGE
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FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC

D~FENDER

~~~PETERSON

~

JUDGE

009/017

1Cll220

-SINGLE COUNT
DEFENDANTS REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
IN THE

ISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

CHAEL JAY FREITAS,
Defendant.

CASE NUMBER

CR-12-0018513

VERDICT

__________________________

).

We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant Michael Jay Freitas:
_ _ _ Not Guilty
_ _ _ Guilty
Dated this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ , 2013.

Comment
Use t ·s verdict form when only on.e offense has been c7arge and there are no included offenses
or spec1 circumstances to be established. Otherwise use I JI 221 and ICll 222 or ICJI 223 and
ICJI224.

GIVEN

REFUSED
ACCEPTED

MODIFIED

COVERED
JUDGE
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01/07/2013 MON 15:53

FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER

~~~

l4l 010/017

PETERSON JUDGE

INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The
presumption of innocence means two things.,
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that burden
throughout the triaL The defendant is never.requiredto prove his innocence, nor does the
defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all.
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt It is a doubt based on reason and common
sense. It may arise froin a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or from lack of
evidence. If after considering all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's
guilt, you must fmd the defendant not guilty.
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141011/017

INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
A defendant in a criminal trial has a conStitutional right not to be compelled to testify. The
decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and assistance of the
defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant
does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any
way.

Michael Jay Freitas
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PETERSON JUDGE

l4l 012/017

INSTRUCTION NO . _ _

In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent.

Michael Jay Freitas

41378

47 of 235

01/07/2013 MON 15:55

FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC

DEFENDER~~~

PETERSON JUDGE

~

013/017

INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
In order for the defendant to be guilty of the charge of unlawful act under the Spirit Lake
Domestic Water Ordinance, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about September 28, 2012 .
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant Michael Freitas permitted the delivery of water the residents of 5 822
Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, or
4. the defendant permitted the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, to
connect to water, and
5. the defendant was aware that the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID,
lived in a residence not provided with water by the city of Spirit Lake.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must fmd the defendant guilty.
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DEFENDER~~~

PETERSON JUDGE

141 014/017

INSTRUCTION NO . _ _
In order for the defendant to be guilty of the charge of unlawful act under the Spirit Lake
Domestic Water Ordinance, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about September 28, 2012
2. in the state ofldaho
3. the defendant Michael Freitas permitted the delivery of water from the Spirit Lake city
water system to the residents of 5822 Rhode "Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, or
4. the defendant permitted the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, to
connect to water in the Spirit Lake city water system, and
5. the defendant was aware that the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID,
lived in a residence not provided with water by the city of Spirit Lake.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above ha~ been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty.
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DEFENDER~~~

PETERSON JUDGE

~

015/017

INSTRUCTION NO . _....,....
The Spirit Lake city water system is property of the city up to and including any shutoff valve
and/or meter which may be installed at or near the property line of any lot.
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FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC

DEFENDER~~~

PETERSON JUDGE

141016/017

INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
The defendant cannot be guilty an unlawful act under the Spirit Lake City Water Ordinance if
the defendant acted because of necessity. Conduct which violates the law is justified by
necessity if:

1. there is a specific threat of immediate harm to the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit
Lake, ID,
2. the defendant did not bring about the circumstances which created the threat of immediate
harm,
3. the defendant could not have prevented the threatened harm by any less offensive
alternative, and
4. the harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm.
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act because of
necessity. If you have a reasonable doubt on that issue, you must find the defendant not guilty .
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIJE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,
Defendant.

CASE NUMBER

CR-12-0018513

VERDICT

__________________________)
We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant Michael Jay Freitas:
______ Not Guilty
______ Guilty

Dated this _____ day

of~___

,2013.
Presiding Officer
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FAXI~:208

17:02

446 1840

P. 002

BARRY McHUGH
Prosecuting Attorney
501 Government Way!Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID '83816-9000
Telephone: (208.) 446-1800
Facsimile~·
(208) 446-1833

I

,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F1RST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2012:.18513

)

) . . . PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
) · JURY IN'STRUCTIONS
vs.
MICHAEL lAY FREITAS, ·
Defendant.

)
)
)

'

The Plaintiffherein respectfully submits the following requested Jury instructions in addition.
to the Court's general instructions on the la~.
DATED this

:1=

day of January, 2013.

BARRY McHUGH
Prosecuting Attorney in andfor

~:;un~ ~~

VIlf&t1«:M!Jt

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
. I 1:?-ereby

~that o~ the

--d---

day .of January, 2013, a true. and con-ect

foregomg was caused to be delivered to.
JAY LOGSDON
.
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE
FAXED 446·1701
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
. JNSTRUCTIONNO._
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED
that. the essential elements of .the crime of UNLAWFUL
.

DEUVERY OF WATER which the Defendant is charged are:
1. On o~ about the _28th day of September, 20 12;
2. in Kootenai County, State of Idaho;

3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection or delivery of city.
water;

4. to third persons;
'
'

.

5. for use \Yithln. a residence;

6. not otherwise provided with water service.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the

defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
:find the defendant guilty.

Citation: Spirit Lake Ordinance 74-10

GIVEN:----REFUSED:---MODIFIED:---COVERED: __~----

JUDGE
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(M 17:02

446

18~0

P. 005

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED.
INSTRUCTION NO._
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged
with the crime of UNLAWFUL DELIVERY OF WATER alleged to have occ1med as follows:
that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28tll day of September, 2012, in

the County of .Kootenai, State of Idaho, did permit connection or delivery' of city water, to third

persons, for us~ within a resi~nce not otherwise provided with water service. To this charge the
i .
i

defendant has plead not guilty.
To this charge the defendant has plead not guilty.

Citation: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4~ 10
GIVEN:· - - - - - REFUSED:.
_ _ _ __

MODIFIED: _ _ __
COVERED:.______
JUDGE
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446 1840

PLAIN11FF'S REQUESTED
lli"STRUCTION,NO._ _
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of. the crime of UNLAWFUL
'

DELIVERY OF WATER whi~h the Defendant is charged are:
1. On or about the 28th September, 201 ~;

2. in Kootenai County, State ofldaho;
3. The Defendant, :MICHAEL JA"¥ FREITAS, permitted ~onnection or delivery of city
water;
4. to third persons;

5. for use wi~ a residence;
6. not otherwise provided with w:ater service.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the

defendant 'not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable. doubt, you must
find the defendant guilty.

CITATION: Spirit Lake Ordinance 74-10

GIVEN:----REFUSED:
MODIFIED-:- - COVERED: _______
JUDGE
.

·.
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P. 007

PLAlNTlFF'S REQUESTED
1NSTRUCTIONNO.

Do not ~em yourself with the subject of penalty or p\lDishment. That _subject must not in any ~ay affect .
your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to determine 1he appropriate penalty 9r p\lDishment.

Citation: Icn 106 ·

GIVEN:
REFUSED=-:----

MODIFIED:._ _ __

covmpm:.____
JUDGE
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P. 008

PLA!NTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. _ __
You have

be~n

instructed as to .aU the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach a verdict.

.

.

'

Whether some of the instru.ctiOlls will apply will depend upOll yow: determination of~ facts. You will disregard

any instruction which applies to a state of fucts ~hich you determine does ~ot exist You must:
.
.

not conclude fro~

the fuct that an instruction ~ been given that the Court is expres~ing any opinion as to the facts.

Citation: ICJI205
Q.IVEN;

REFUSED~:----

MODIFIBP:._ _ __
COVERED:._ _ _ __
niDGE
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PLAJNTlFP'S REQUESTED
:mSTRUCTION NO.
It is alleged that
th~ crime charged was committed "on or about"' a certain date. Ifyou find the crime
was
.
.
.

.

.

committed, the proof need not show· that it was committed on that precise date.

Citation: ICJI 208
GIVEN:

REFUSE.~D~:----

MODJFIED:. _ _ __
<;:OVERED:._ _ __
JUDGE

0

'

'

.
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JNSTRUCTION NO._
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged
with the crime of UNLAWFUL DELIVERY OF WATER alleged to have oc.curred as follows:
.

.

'

that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of September, 2012, in
the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did P.ermi~ connection or delivery of city ~ater, to third
persons, for use witb,in a residence not otherwise provided with water service. To :tJris charge the
defendant has plead not guilty.
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INSTRUCTION NO.~
YOU ARE INS'IRUCTED that the essential. elements of the crime of
UNLAWFUL
'
DELIVERY OF WATER which the Defendant is charged are:
1. On or about the 28th day of September, 2012;

2. in Kootenai County, State of Idaho;
3. The Defendant~ MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection ·or delivery of city
water;

4. to thlrd persons;
5. for use within a residence; ·
6. not otherwise provided with water service.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the

defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond _a reasonable doubt, you must
:find the defendant guilty.
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INSTRUCTION NO._ _
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged
wi~ the

crime ofUNLAWFl.JL DELIVERY O;F W.ATER alleged to have occurred as folio~:

that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of September, 2012, in

the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho~ did penmt connection or delivery of city water, to third
persons, for use witlrin a residence not otherwise provided with water service. To this charge the
defendant has plead not guilty.
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INSTRUCTION NO._ _
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crltrie of UNLAWFUL
DELIVERY OF WATER which the Defendant is charged are:
1. On or about the 28th September, 2012;
2. in Kootenai County, State of Idaho;

3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY ~ITAS, permitted connection ~r delivery of city
water;
4. to third persons;
5. for use within a residence;

6. not otherwise provided with water service.
If any of the above :Q.as not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the

defen4ant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, yo~ rp.ust
:find the defendant guilty.
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JNSTRUCTIONNO.

Do not concern yourself With the subject of penalty or punishment. That subj~ must not in any way affect

your verdi~ 1fyou find the defendant guilty, it will be my .duty to determine the .appropriate penal!¥ or punishment.
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INSTRUCTION NO: _ __
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may. be ne<:essary for you to·reach .a verdict.
Whether some of the instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of'the facts. You will disregard

any instruction which applies to a state of facts which you

det~e

does not exist. You must not conclude :froDl

the fact that an :instruction has been given that the Cot.nt is expressing any opinio1,1 as to the facts.
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ ___;..
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed ''on or about'' a certain date. If you find the crime was

committed, the proof need Dot show that it was committed on that precise date.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF tHE--'''
STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF KeO'fENAI
StATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
.vs.

Case No. CR-2012-18513
VERDICT

).
)

MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,
Defendant.

______________________)
)

We, the Jury, duly empanelled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for our verdici(s)t,
say that we unanimously find the Defendant:
GUJLTYofUNLAWFUL DELIVERY OF WATER
NOTGUILTYofUNLAWFULDELNERYOFWATER

.

..

DATED this _ _ day of January, 2013.

PRESIDING JUROR
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Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael Jay
Judge Peterson
Clerk Cristine Stokes
I

Date 111/8/2013

Time

Speaker

I

I

Location

2013010~~
-

-......._ ~

Jl!!s.-COURTROOM6

Note

I

08:42:50 AM

Judge
Peterson

calls case

08:42:57 AM

Ms
McClinton

pres

8:42:59 AM

Mr Freitas

pres

I

8:43:06 AM I Mr Logsdon I pres
08:43:30 AM

Judge
Peterson

08:44:08 AM

there is a disagreement between myself and the state as to the
name of the crime, ISTARS lists as unlawful tampering of water
Mr Logsdon
system and State is alledging unlawful use, I would prefer
unlawful act relating to water system of spirit lake

08:45:21 AM

we had a discussion about prefered jury procedure off the
record. State has proposed its charging instruction

Ms
McClinton

state doesn't have an objection as to wording, ordinace says
unlawful act, I think it just needs to include the word water
system somewhere.

08:46:06 AM

Judge
Peterson

if you can please prepare clean version indicating unlawful act of
water system

08:46:27 AM

Ms
McClinton

Mr Logsdon is stipulation to states motion in liminie, and we
wont be talking about constitutionality of ordinance

08:47:09 AM IMr Logsdon I that is the stipulation. I will ask for exclusion of witness
08:47:48 AM

Judge
Peterson

I will grant that motion now

Judge
Peterson

recalls case, same parties remain,

Ms
McClinton

I received some information that Officer Wise slipped on some
ice and sh~ was our first witness, advised to be here by 1Oam
today and is transporting one other witness

Judge
Peterson

thanks for keeping us posted

08:48:07 AM
08:48:13 AM
08:50:44 AM

08:51:45 AM

08:51:53 AM !End

I
Produced by FTR Gold™
www. fortherecord. com
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Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael Jay(13010's Jwy T:_)\,_.
Judge Peterson
/\.
Clerk Cristine Stokes
__
Date 11/8/2013

Time

Location

I

111 K-COURTROOM7

I Speaker

I

Note

09:10:30 AM Judge
· Peterson
I

-..,_

calls case

I

09:10:34 AM jMr Freitas pres
09:10:39 AM

I

Ms
pres
McClinton

I

09:10:43 AM Mr
Logsdon

pres

09:11:09 AM Judge
Peterson

introduction to Jury

Ms
Mclinton

introduction

09:15:15 AM Mr
Logsdon

introduction

09:14:29 AM

~~16:04A& Clerk

I

reads citation

09:16:53 AM Judge
Peterson

continues w/ introduction

09:22:30 A I D §

efirst 14

09:23:24 AM Judge
Peterson

thanks panel, begin voir dire process

I 09:26:15 AM I Clerk

administers voire dire oath

I 09:26:21 AM IJudge
Ibegins w/ voire dire
Peterson

I

09:32:54 AM Ms
McLinton lvoire dire
09:41:40 AM

Mr
Logsdon

09:41:44 AM Judge
Peterson
09:41:56 AM

Ms
Mclinton

I

loject

I

go ahead an finish question and I will rule

Icontinues

I

I 09:42:11 AM IJudge
Peterson Iridiculous
I 09:42:30 AM I Ms
Michael Jay Freitas

I

I
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Mclinton

voire dire

09:51:24 AM

Mr
Logsdon

object

09:51:33 AM

Judge
Peterson

permisable

09:51:50 AM

Ms
Mclinton

voire dire, pass for cause

10:00:08 AM

Mr
Logsdon

voire dire , pass for cause

10:03:29 AM

Judge
Peterson

we will no begin preemptory challenges

10:07:05 AM

Judge
Peterson

alright now we will reveal the final 6, excuses remaining jurors

,...

II 1o:10:"'"7 ;~i

vlt::l"

10:11:04 AM

lf;d'ministers try cause oath

Judge
Peterson

reads instruction to jury, excuses panel

Ms
Mclinton

I don't have an update regarding Officer Wise, Ms Brown should
be here and then Ms Nash was getting picked up by our
investigator

10:12:58 AM

Judge
Peterson

calls case, all parties remain, outside presence of the jury

10:32:50 AM

Ms
Mclinton

Officer Wise is getting X-rays done at KMC

10:33:22 AM

Judge
Peterson

10:12:18 AM

Iplease retreive the Jury

I

Jury is now present, explains procedure for hearing, reads
preliminary instructions

10:36:48 AM

Judge
Peterson

10:49:50 AM

Ms
opening statement
McClinton

10:53:20 AM

Mr
Logsdon

10:53:46 AM

Ms
calls Barbara Brown
McClinton

10:53:57 AM

swears to oath, states name and spells, city clerk Treasurer for
City of Spirit Lake, been there for 33 years, I monitor all the
records, finances, take care of Day to Day things that need to be
Ms Brown done. I'm the city record keeper for all records in the City. I
answer the phone, turn new services on, and off. Revs states
proposed exhibt 1, computer program we use to monitor water
and sewer records and payments

j1 0:57:36 AM

I

II

Mr

Michael Jay Freitas

I

Iopening statement

I

I
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Logsdon
10:57:42 AM Judge
Peterson
10:57:50 AM

Ms Brown

·~/2013

Page 3 of7

objection hear say
it has not been introduced
some were made by Deputy Cerk Anne Clapper and some were
made by me, most of the entries are done daily

10:58:45 AM

Ms
move to admit states 1
McClinton

10:58:55 AM

Mr
Logsdon

10:59:05 AM Judge
Peterson

object lack of foundation
over rule, PL 1 is admitted

10:59:26 AM

this residence is for 5822 W Rhode Island St, George Adams,
Ms Brown water was turned off on 7/26/12, water was turned back on
10/18/12 it was off on Sept 28, 2012

11:00:45 AM

Mr
Logsdon

11:00:51 AM Judge
Peterson

objection lack of foundation
over rule

11:00:58 AM

Ms Brown yes it was off on that date

11:01:04 AM

Ms
thats all
McClinton

11:01:09 AM

Mr
Logsdon

11:02:49 AM

Ms
calls Brenda Nash
McClinton

11:02:56 AM

11:05:38 AM

Ms Nash

swears to oath, staes name and spells for record, live at 5822
Rhode Island St, I live w/ a few people. I'm familiar w/ Mr Freitas, I
met him a month and a half ago as a neighbor. I recognize him
today in court, he is wearing a sweater. Darrel Adams owns the
resident, refered to as George too. i moved in about Sept 27,
2012 Mr Adams was still residing there

Mr
Logsdon

objection hearsay

111 :05:43 AM IJudge

. Peterson

11:05:47 AM

11:06:37 AM
111:06:42 AM

nothing from us

sustained

Ms Nash

when I moved in there was running water in the home, I did not
know where the water was coming from, then I found out it was
coming from a neighbor

Mr
Logsdon

no foundation

IJudge

Michael Jay Freitas
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sustained

~"IICl>:>h

I obtained knowledge from Darrel

111:07:15AM I Mr

object leading

Logsdon

!11 :07:20AM II Ms Nash lum
11:07:27 AM

Mr
Logsdon

objection

11:07:38 AM Judge
Peterson

over ruled

11:07:43 AM

11:09:13 AM

Ms Nash

I saw a hose connected to my home, it crossed the alley and
connected to my house, but not sure where it was coming from,
Darrel told me where the house was connected to, thats all I
know. I knew the water was shut off before I moved in, about a
week prior. I eventually asked where it was coming from

Mr
Logsdon

object lack of foundation

11:09:20 AM Judge
Peterson

sustaied

11:09:24 AM

11:10:20 AM

Ms Nash

I received contact from City of Spirit Lake, Jeremy McMillen came
to my house and had me in tears about, no contact w/ Officer
Wise

Mr
Logsdon

object hearsay

11:10:24 AM Judge
Peterson

over ruled

Ms Nash= Jeremy McMillin informed me he was going to
!

11:10:41 AM

Mr
Logsdon

objection

Ms Nash

okay ! was served w/ papers, ! was aware that the water had been
shut off. Me, my exhusband and my mother paid to have it turned
back on

Mr
Logsdon

cross

Ms Nash

my son and his three children and his fiance, Jeremy, Stephanie,
Brookly, Skylar and Auroa moved in w/ me.

11:12:14 AM

Mr
Logsdon

nothing further

11:12:40 AM

Ms
Officer Wise is my remaining witness
McClinton

11:10:46 AM

11:11:19 AM
11 :i 1:22AM

11:13:09 AM
Judge
Michael Jay Freitas

if you can contact your office to see when the witness will be
41378
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Peterson
11:14:44 AM

available, we can be at ease for a moment.

Ms
she will be here, she has a broken leg, but she will be here
McClinton

11:14:58 AM Judge
Peterson
11:16:44 AM

Page 5 of7

we will discharge you for the lunch hour than, I have received both
parties proposed instructions

Lunch
Break

11:16:52A
01:05:34 PM Judge
Peterson

Icalls case, same parties remain

01:05:55 PM

I

I

Ms
offers updated Jury Instructions
McClinton

I

01:08:33 PM Judge
!Jury is now present
Peterson
01:08:41 PM
01:08:46 PM

Officer
Wise

01:18:37PM Mr
Logsdon

I 01:18:44 PM IJudge

. Peterson

I 01:18:48 PM

I

Ms
calls Officer Wise
McClinton

I~~gsdon

I 01:19:44 PM IMs
Michael Jay Freitas

swears to oath, states name, employed by Spirit Lake PD for the
last 3 years, worked 4 years for Bonner County Sheriff's Office
dispatch and 15 yrs as Detention Officer, I went to Mr Freitas door
and gave him a warning, there was a hose running w/ water to his
neighbors and it was overflowing at the junction. I contacted him
at 5870 Rhode Island. The house was connected to an outside
spicket, his residence is a mobile home, I remember at least two,
maybe three hoses. The hose ran about 75ft. In the alley there
were two hoses that were connected and the water was squirting
out of the connections. I handed Mr Freitas a copy of the Spirit
Lake Ordinace, I also gave Brenda Nash a copy of the ordinance
as well. I gave Mr Freitas a copy of the ordinance and he said
thank you and that was pretty much it. I issued him a citation the
next time I came into contact it was Sept 28th, I made contact to
check to see if the hose was still running and if their was a
connection. I filled out a citation and went to his residence and
handed him a citation and had him sign it. Mr Freitas said he
didn't realize there was anything wrong w/ the water that was
running through his meter and he was paying for it. The residence
the water was being provided to is George Adams residence.
objection hear say
thats fine
no questions
state rests
41378
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I McClinton I

I

I 01:19:56 PM I Mr

Logsdon

01:20:02 PM

Judge
Peterson

01:20:42 PM Judge
Peterson
01:20:48 PM
Mr
Logsdon

I need to make a motion
we will take a break
outside presence of jury
move for acquital under 29, seems like we agree that under courts
ruling my client would have had to deliver water to another city?
state has failed to meet that burden, no evidence that it is the
water that is delivered to my clients residence

01:22:25 PM

object to motion, believe state has proven burden here, evidence
presented w/ Officer Wise, Mr Freitas indicated he was paying for
Ms
the city water and that he could do w/ it what he pleased and that
McClinton
he was delivering it to the neighbors residence. The Officer said
she saw the hoses running from Mr Freitas home to Mr Adams

01:24:02 PM

Judge
Peterson

reviews rule 29, court denies rule 29 motion at this time

01:27:35 PM

Mr
Logsdon

my client is not going to be testifying and we have no evidence to
offer

01:28:13 PM

Judge
Peterson

lets talk Jury Instructions then

Judge
Peterson

back on the record, all parties remain, jury is not present, we have
had an informal instructions conference. Charging instruction has
already been given. reviews rest of packet. I will utilize verdict
form. We will finalize packet come back in, and instruct panel

01:28:24 PM

I 01 :28:24

PM

I

01:35:54 PM

01:41:00 PM

lt~8PM

Ms
releases Officer Wise
McClinton
End

01:41:12 PM
Judge
-lA- L-~ s; p.
Peterson
'Bo rr 1Y\~
(J

T

j~,.· c

We are back on the record. Bring in jury panel. Jury panel returns.
Reviews and gives out jury packets to jurors. Reads jury
instructions.

02:07:03 PM

Closing argument. Instruction 11 is the elements instruction.
There are six elements. There was hose connected from his
house to his neighbors house. He was paying for that water and
Ms
he felt he could do what he pleasesd. He admitted to that. The
McClinton
water was shut off in the residence Ms. Nash was living in. This
case is straightforward. He was cited for it. She came back on the
next day and it was still connected. This was a unlawful act.

02:10:58 PM

Closing argument. 9/28/12 people moved into home in Spirit Lake,

Michael Jay Freitas
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water was shut off and she said she had water. Reviews elements
instruction. No one ever testified that it was Spirit Lake water. It
was not proven to be City water. This case is about sharing water.
State has to meet burden. They have not even come close to
proving a crime was committed.

02:14:34 PM Ms.
Rebuttal. Asking you to rely on what you heard and what you
McClinton remembered in testimony today.
Judge

02:15:2
02:1G2-..

,....~v~

02:32:10 PM
02:34:"n f':'v•

ge
Judge
,.,.
vlt::ll\

02:36:29 PM 1Judge

Oathe given to bailiff
Excuses jury panel to dileberation.
We are back on the record. Bring jury panel in for reading of
verdict.
0

"'""'"'~

'

erdict. Guilty.

Excuses jury panel.

02:36:42 PM lEnd
02:37:25 PM Mr.
Logsdon

Asking for stay pending appeal. Rule 545.

02:37:48 PM Judge

Reviews rule 545.

02:38:08 PM Ms.
proceed. 10/10 jail. 300 fine and 1 year unsup prob.
McClinton
02:38:35 PM
Mr.
Logsdon

Very strange law that doesnt allow family to share water. He
shared water. State is requesting a fine, seems at best to do
probation, dont understand a fine. He paid for water and gave it to
those in need.

Judge

Two hill factor of sentencing. This is a unique situation. This is
now a misd. conviction on his record forever. There is not a
possibility of recurrance. Its doubtful. I am NOT going to do
probation. 500 fine and NCO is terminated. Fine only and nothing
further. Nothing further. Stay to be entered.

02:39:57 PM

~~4:12PM

End

02:44:45 PM
Judge
lr=o247:27 PM Judg""
,_

Regarding rule 545. I dont seen need to post bond pending
appeal. Reads rule 545 .. Set for status conference regarding the
apppeal and the stay?
"''"·ait
II'I \AI;u -··

the stay .

02:47:55 PM End
Produced by FTR Gold™
www.fortherecord.com

Michael Jay Freitas

41378

file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\Magistrate\Crirninal\Peterson\CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael...

76 of 235

1/8/2013

s;:
FilLED

\~~·\3

AT

§·.aa ~.

IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

B~~._.DEPUTY

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS
Defendant.
DOB:
DL or SSN:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

0

Case No: CR-2012-0018513

JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN

Attached hereto are the jury instructions given on the trial of the above
matter.
Copies have been given to counsel of record.

<"'\

rnf'\C t.

f'~\f'- /

-;lr---' 20 13.

DATED this ----==----- day of ----'0=--U;::,.._\_\\....J-.----'\J"'-~-~

Michael Jay Freitas
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged
with the crime of UNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM alleged to have
occurred as follows: that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of
September, 2012, in the County of Kootenai, State ofldaho, did permit connection or delivery of
city water, to third persons, for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water service.
To this charge the defendant has plead not guilty.
To,this charge the defendant has plead not guilty.

Citation: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10
GIVEN: _ _ _ _ __
REFUSED:- - - - MODIFIED:_ _ _ __
COVERED: _ _ _ __
JUDGE

Michael Jay Freitas

41378

78 of 235

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crime of UNLAWFUL

ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM which the Defendant is charged are:
1. On or about the 28th September, 2012;

2. in Kootenai County, State ofldaho;
3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection or delivery of city
water;
4. to third persons;

5. for use within a residence;
6. not otherwise provided with water service.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
find the defendant guilty.

CITATION: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10
GIVEN: __________
REFUSED: ________
MODIFIED: _ _ _ __
COVERED: ________
JUDGE

Michael Jay Freitas
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INSTRUCTION NO.
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged
with the crime of UNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM alleged to have
occurred as follows: that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of
September, 2012, in the County of Kootenai, State ofldaho, did permit connection or delivery of
city water, to third persons, for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water service.
To this charge the defendant has plead not guilty.

Michael Jay Freitas
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INSTRUCTION NO.
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crime of UNLAWFUL
ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM which the Defendant is charged are:

1. On or about the 28th September, 2012;
2. in Kootenai County, State ofldaho;
3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection or delivery of city.
water;
4. to third persons;
5. for use within a residence;
·6. not otherwise provided with water service.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
find the defendant guilty.

Michael Jay Freitas
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject must not in any way affect
your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment.

Michael Jay Freitas

41378

82 of 235

INSTRUCTION NO. _ __

You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach a verdict.
Whether some of the instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of the facts. You will disregard
any instruction which applies to a state of facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from
the fact that an instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts.

Michael Jay Freitas
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INSTRUCTION NO.

It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If you fmd the crime was

committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that precise date.

Michael Jay Freitas
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged
with the crime of UNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM alleged to have
occurred as follows: that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of
September, 2012, in the County of Kootenai, State ofldaho, did permit connection or delivery of
city water, to third persons, for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water service.
To this charge the defendant has plead not guilty.

Citation: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10

j

GIVEN:
REFUSED: _ _ _ __
MODIFIED: _ _ _ __
COVERED: _ _ _ __
JUDGE

Michael Jay Freitas
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crime of UNLAWFUL
ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM which the Defendant is charged are:

1. On or about the 28th day of September, 2012;
2. in Kootenai County, State ofldaho;
3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection or delivery of city
water;
4. to third persons;
5. for use within a residence;
6. not otherwise provided with water service.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
find the defendant guilty.

Citation: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-1 0

I

GIVEN: - - - - - REFUSED: ________
MODIFIED: _ _ _ __
COVERED: ________
JUDGE

Michael Jay Freitas
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.

Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject must not in any way affect
your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment.

Citation: ICTI 106j

J____

GIVEN: _ _
REFUSED: _ _ _ __
MODIFIED: _ _ _ __
COVERED: _ _ _ __

JUDGE

Michael Jay Freitas
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. _ __

You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach a verdict.
Whether some of the instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of the facts. You will disregard
any instruction which applies to a state of facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from
the fact that an instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts.

Citation: ICJI 205

j___

GIVEN:_ _ _
REFUSED: _ _ _ __
MODIFIED:_ _ _ __
COVERED:_ _ _ __
JUDGE

Michael Jay Freitas
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO.

It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If you fmd the crime was
committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that precise date.

Citation: ICn 208
GIVEN:_ _ _}_ __
REFUSED: _ _ _ __
MODIFIED:. _ _ _ __
COVERED: _ _ _ __
JUDGE

Michael Jay Freitas
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

vs.
JAY FREITAS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

VERDICT

1

---f---------------------)

We, the Jury, duly empanelled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for our v rdict( s )/,V
that we unanimously find the Defendant:
GUlLTY ofUNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATERS STEM
NOT GUILTY of UNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING

ATER

SYSTEM
DATED this _ _ day of January, 2013.

PRESIDING JUROR

\

Michael Jay Freitas
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State v. Tadlock, 1361daho 413 (200tJ

34 P.3d 1096

view of the evidence that would support the
theory.

136 Idaho 413

Court of Appeals of Idaho.
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

[4]

v.
Kathleen TADLOCK, Defendant-Appellant.

Elements of necessity defense are: (1) a specific
threat of immediate harm; (2) the circumstances
which necessitate the illegal act must not have
been brought about by the defendant; (3) the same
objective could not have been accomplished by
a less offensive alternative available to the actor;
and (4) the harm caused was not disproportionate
to the harm avoided.

No. 26063.
Aug. 27,2001.
I Review Denied Nov. 27, 2001.
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth Judicial District Court,
Twin Falls County, Nathan W. Higer, J., of felony possession
of marijuana with intent to deliver. She appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Lansing, J., held that: (1) necessity was not a
viable defense; (2) at sentencing, defendant's right to free
speech was not violated when her political views were
considered; and (3) unified sentence of five years with one
year determinate was not excessive.

[5]

1 Cases that cite this headnote

West Headnotes (11)

Criminal Law
®- Instructions

[6]

Criminal Law
~ Construction and Effect of Charge as a
Whole
On appeal, jury instructions are viewed as a
whole, not individually, to determine whether the
jury was properly and adequately instructed on
the applicable law.

[7]

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

Criminal Law
®- Sentencing
When a sentence is imposed within the maximum
permitted for the offense, the Court of Appeals
reviews the sentence for an abuse of discretion.

Criminal Law
®- Necessity of Instructions
A defendant in a criminal action is entitled to
have his legal theory of defense submitted to the
jury through an instruction if there is a reasonable

Sentencing and Punishment
®- Dangerousness
At sentencing for felony possession of marijuana
with intent to deliver, defendant's right to
free speech was not violated when sentencing
court considered defendant's public advocacy of
legalization of marijuana as a factor that weighed
against placing her on probation; defendant's
political views were relevant to the likelihood that
she would repeat crime. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
1; Const. Art. 1, § 9; l.C. § 37-2732(a)(l)(B).

The question whether a jury was properly
instructed is one of law over which the Court of
Appeals exercises free review.

[2]

Controlled Substances
®- Medical Necessity
Necessity is not a viable defense to felony
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.
l.C. § 37-2732(a)(l)(B).

Affirmed.

[1]

Criminal Law
®- Compulsion or Necessity; Justification in
General

[8]

Criminal Law
F Burden of Showing Error

Vv'estlavi'Nexr@ 2013 Thomson Routers. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Michael Jay Freitas
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State v. Tadlock, 1361daho 413 (200• 1
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Criminal Law
~ Sentencing
If the sentence is not illegal, the defendant has the
burden to show that it is unreasonable, and thus a
clear abuse of discretion.

**1097 *414 Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General;
Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for
respondent.
Opinion
LANSING, Judge.

[9]

Sentencing and Punishment
~ Deterrence
Sentencing and Punishment
~ Protection of Society
Sentencing and Punishment
~ Retribution
Sentencing and Punishment
~ Actual or Potential Rehabilitation
A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it
appears that the confinement is necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution
applicable to a given case.

[10]

Controlled Substances
~ Extent of Punishment
Unified sentence of five years with one
year determinate was not excessive for felony
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.
I.C. § 37-2732(a)(l)(B).

[11]

Criminal Law
~ Sentencing
If reasonable minds might differ as to whether a
sentence is excessive, the Court of Appeals is not
free to substitute its view for that of the trial court.

Attorneys and Law Firms
**1096 *413 Ronaldo A. Coulter, State Appellate
Public Defender; Sara B. Thomas, Deputy Appellate Public
Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Kathleen Tadlock appeals from the judgment of conviction
entered after a jury found her guilty of felony possession of
marijuana with the intent to deliver, Idaho Code§ 37-2732(a)
(l)(B). On appeal, Tadlock asserts that the district court
erred by not instructing the jury regarding the common law
necessity defense. Tadlock also asserts that the district court
violated her First Amendment right to free speech when,
at the sentencing hearing, it considered her prior political
advocacy of legalizing marijuana. Finally, Tadlock asserts
that her sentence is excessive.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Executing a warrant, police officers searched Tadlock's house
and discovered 260 grams of marijuana, $5,000 in cash, a
pair of finger scales and a notebook containing notations of
weights and dollar amounts. Tadlock was charged with felony
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, I.C. §
37-2732(a)(l)(B). At trial, Tadlock presented testimony that
she used marijuana to alleviate pain she suffers from a number
of ailments including osteoporosis, hyperparathyroidism,
depression, hip and knee pain, endometrial-hyperplasia,
uterine fibroid, and back pain. She testified that although
she was prescribed medications, including pain relievers,
for these ailments, she found the medications difficult to
take because they are in pill form and she has difficulty
swallowing pills. According to Tadlock's testimony, she used
just enough marijuana to relieve her pain and allow her to
function. Tadlock requested that the jury be instructed on
the medical necessity defense or, alternatively, the general
common law necessity defense. The district court declined to
give either instruction because, in the court's view, there was
insufficient evidence to meet the elements of those defenses.
In particular, the district court noted an absence of evidence
that Tadlock lacked adequate legal medical alternatives to the
use of marijuana.
The jury was instructed on the elements of the charged
offense, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and
also on the lesser included offense of simple possession. The

WesttawNexr@ 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Michael Jay Freitas
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State v. Tadlock, 136ldaho 413 (2001)

jury returned a verdict finding Tadlock guilty of possession
of marijuana with the intent to deliver. The district court
thereafter imposed a unified sentence of five years with one
year determinate.

ANALYSIS

Supreme Court held that although medical necessity is not
a recognized defense in Idaho, the common law necessity
defense may be invoked. The Court held in Hastings that a
defendant who claimed to use marijuana to combat pain and
muscle spasms from rheumatoid arthritis was entitled to have
the jury instructed on the necessity defense.
We conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether the

A. Necessity Defense Jury Instruction
evidence was sufficient in Tadlock's case for presentation
[1]
[2]
[3]
As her first issue on appeal, Tadlock of the necessity defense, for even if the district court erred
in failing to instruct the jury on this defense, the error was
challenges the district court's denial of her request for a
harmless.
This is so because the necessity defense could have
necessity defense instruction. The question whether a jury
applied
only
to simple possession of marijuana, which was
was properly instructed is one of law over which this Court
the lesser included offense on which the jury was instructed.
exercises free review. State v. Buckley, 131 Idaho 179, 182,
The
defense cannot logically apply to the charged offense
953 P.2d 619, 622 (Ct.App.l997), affd, 131 Idaho 164, 953
of
which
Tadlock was found guilty, possession of marijuana
P.2d 604 (1998). On appeal, jury instructions are viewed
with
intent
to deliver. Admittedly, Tadlock's evidence of
as a whole, not individually, to determine whether the jury
medical need may have been relevant to controvert the mens
was properly and adequately instructed on the applicable law.
rea element of intent to deliver by showing that Tadlock
State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 646, 945 P.2d 1390, 1392
possessed
the drug only for her own personal use. However,
(Ct.App.l997). A defendant in a criminal action is entitled to
medical necessity could not be a viable justification for
have his legal theory of defense submitted to the jury through
possession with intent to deliver because Tadlock's own
an instruction if there is a reasonable view of the evidence
medical need for marijuana could not justify her possession
that would support the theory. State v. Howley, 128 Idaho
of the drug with the intent to deliver it to others. Only
874, 878-79, 920 P.2d 391, 395-96 (1996); State v. Johns, 112
if the jury had first acquitted Tadlock of the intent to
Idaho 873, 880-81, 736 P.2d 1327, 1334-35 (1987); State v.
deliver
charge and considered the lesser included offense
Arrasmith, 132Idaho 33, 43,966 P.2d 33, 43 (Ct.App.1998).
of simple possession would the necessity instruction have
[4]

The necessity defense is based on the premise that "a

person who is compelled to commit an illegal act in order to
prevent a greater harm should not be punished for that act."
State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 855, 801 P.2d 563, 564
(1990). The elements of the defense are: (1) a specific threat of
immediate harm; (2) the circumstances which necessitate the
illegal act must not have been brought about by the defendant;
(3) the same objective could not have been accomplished
by a less offensive alternative available to the actor; and
(4) the harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm
avoided. State v. Kapsa, 126 Idaho 512, 520, 887 P.2d 57,
65 (Ct.App .1994); Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1512.
When the defense of necessity has been demonstrated, "it
justifies **1098 *415 the defendant's conduct in violating
the literal language of the criminal law and so the defendant is
not guilty of the crime in question." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE
& AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 5.4 at 630.
[5] Tadlock argues that she presented sufficient evidence
from which a jury could have found all the elements of the
necessity defense. She relies upon Hastings, where the Idaho

been applicable. Because the jury found Tadlock guilty of
possession with the intent to deliver, any error in the denial of
her requested jury instruction on common law necessity was
harmless.

B. Sentence
1. First Amendment
[6] Tadlock next asserts that the district court violated her
right of free speech under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, § 9 of the Idaho Constitution
when it considered her public advocacy of legalization of
marijuana as a factor that weighed against placing her on
probation. In a supplement to the presentence investigation
report (PSI), the State submitted printouts of Tadlock's web
page, which expressed her belief that marijuana should be
legalized for medicinal purposes. Tadlock's attorney objected
to the inclusion of this information and moved to strike it from
the PSI, but the district court denied the motion, concluding
that Tadlock's attitude about the use and sale of marijuana
was relevant to the court's determination whether she should
be placed on probation. In explaining his decision not to
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represents a future danger to
society. A defendant's membership
in an organization that endorses the
killing of any identifiable group,
for example, might be relevant to
a jury's inquiry into whether the
defendant will be dangerous in the
future. Other evidence concerning
a defendant's associations might be
relevant in proving other aggravating
circumstances.

grant probation, the district judge stated, "I don't believe
that probation is going to be successful, for the same facts
that I've previously mentioned; that you're likely to continue
to use marijuana, based upon your belief that it's helpful
to you medically, and that it should be legalized." Tadlock
contends that the court's decision not to grant probation, based
in part upon her advocacy of the legalization of marijuana,
constituted an unconstitutional imposition of punishment for
her exercise of free speech.
We are not persuaded that a constitutional violation occurred
here. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court provide
guidance on this issue. In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939,
103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983), a plurality of the
Court held that the defendant's racial motive for a murder (as
indicated by his membership in the Black Liberation Army,
which advocated indiscriminate killing of white people and
the initiation of a race war) was properly considered by the
sentencing court because it was relevant to several statutory
aggravating factors in sentencing./d. at 949-50, 103 S.Ct. at
3424-25, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1143-44. By contrast, in Dawson v.
Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309
(1992), the Supreme Court said that the First Amendment
prevents **1099 *416 a state "from employing evidence
of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when
those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried." /d.
at 168, 112 S.Ct. at 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d at 319. The Court
held that the admission at sentencing of a stipulation, offered
in lieu of presentation of evidence, that the defendant was a
member of the Aryan Brotherhood, was improper, but only
because "the narrowness of the stipulation left the Aryan
Brotherhood evidence totally without relevance to Dawson's
sentencing proceeding." /d. at 165, 112 S.Ct. at 1097, 117
L.Ed.2d at 317. The Court noted that if admissible evidence
had been presented that the Aryan Brotherhood is a white
racist prison gang that is associated with drugs and violent
escape attempts and that advocates murder of fellow inmates,
"we would have a much different case." /d. The Court
continued:
Because the prosecution did not
prove that the Aryan Brotherhood had
committed any unlawful or violent
acts, or had even endorsed such
acts, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence
was ... not relevant to help prove any
aggravating circumstance. In many
cases, for example, associational
evidence might serve a legitimate
purpose in showing that a defendant

~VestlawNeA't'

/d. at 166, 112 S.Ct. at 1098, 117 L.Ed.2d at 318. (Emphasis

added.)
Unlike the situation in Dawson, the information regarding
Tadlock's expressions of political views on the legalization
and use of marijuana was relevant to the sentencing decision,
for it bore upon the likelihood that she would repeat her crime.
This relevance was appropriately explained by the district
court:
[Idaho Criminal] Rule 32 provides for the court to consider
a broad range of information. In that also includes the
psychological and mental makeup of the defendant. I
interpret the rule to provide to the court information
regarding the defendant's ability or likelihood that you
might do a successful probation.

I am cognizant, as pointed out, that her expressions of
the-her support or activism for legalizing marijuana is an
expression of her free speech right; [but] it is also an
expression of her belief about the use and the likelihood
of her-or not of her using marijuana in the future after
sentencing by this court.
The district court was careful to explain that Tadlock was
not being punished for her expressions or belief about the
legalization of marijuana:
Now, as far as the sentence itself is concerned, Ms.
Tadlock, the court has heard a lot and you put forth a lot of
testimony at the trial and during the sentencing proceedings
about the legalization and the use of marijuana. I know you
have strong beliefs in that respect. And in my view, this trial
was not about your beliefs on the legalization of marijuana.
I do not believe that it would be appropriate to try you for
your beliefs. That is your right to express those views. It
is also your right to follow the-a legal process to obtain
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legalization of that drug in this state. It's been done in other
states, as you know, like in California and Arizona, they
passed those. But until such time as that happens and you
follow those legal procedures, or the legislature determines
in this state that it's going to be allowed, you have the
obligation, like everybody else in this room and this county,
to follow the laws as established by the legislature, whether
we agree with them or not.

And I say this to assure you that although I disagree
with your ideas about the legalization of marijuana, I do
not disagree with your right to express those opinions.
And the sentence that I will be imposing is not for your
views. You're being sentenced for the actions that you were
convicted of by a jury in this county; that is possession with
the intent to deliver.
**1100 *417 The record demonstrates that the district
court also took multiple other factors into consideration when
crafting Tadlock's sentence. Furthermore, the sentencing
transcript and the PSI disclose that Tadlock herself introduced
much information, including her own statement in allocution,
regarding her political view on the legalization of marijuana.
After having done so, it is inconsistent for Tadlock to now
complain on appeal that the district court erred by considering
evidence, the subject matter of which she herself presented.
We conclude that the district court did not violate Tadlock's
First Amendment rights by considering the information on
Tadlock's website as the court evaluated the likelihood that
Tadlock would obey the law if placed on probation.

is reasonable if it appears that the confinement is necessary
"to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society
and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case."
Toohill, supra.
[10]
[11] As indicated above, the district court took
multiple factors into consideration when sentencing Tadlock.
Among these factors were the likelihood she would commit
more crimes, whether correctional treatment is necessary,
deterrence effect, the protection of society, and Tadlock's
lack of remorse and denial that she committed a crime. The
district court also took into consideration Tadlock's minimal
prior criminal record. The issue presented to this Court is not
whether the sentence is one that we would have imposed,
but whether the sentence is plainly excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271,
279, 1 P.3d 299, 307 (Ct.App.2000). If reasonable minds
might differ as to whether the sentence is excessive, this
Court is not free to substitute its view for that of the trial
court. Having examined the PSI and the transcript from the
sentencing hearing, we conclude that the district court acted
within its discretion when it imposed upon Tadlock a unified
sentence of five years with one year determinate.

CONCLUSION

Any error by the district court in failing to instruct the jury as
to the common law necessity defense was harmless in light of
the jury verdict finding Tadlock guilty of possession with the
intent to deliver. The district court did not violate Tadlock's
constitutional right of free speech when it considered at
sentencing Tadlock's expressions of belief that marijuana
2. Excessive sentence
.
.
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use
should be legal. Finally, we conclude that the distnct
[7] [8] [9] F ma11y, we cons1 er a oc s con en ton a
court acted within its discretion when it sentenced Tadlock
her sentence is excessive. Our standards for appellate review
to a unified term of five years' imprisonment with one year
of a sentence are well settled. When a sentence is imposed
determinate. The judgment of conviction and sentence are
within the maximum permitted for the offense, we review
therefore affirmed.
the sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Too hill, 103
Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct.App.l982). If the sentence is
not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is
unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion. State v.
Chief Judge SCHWARTZMAN and Judge PERRY concur.
Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A
Parallel Citations
sentence may represent such an abuse if it is shown to be
unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103
34 P.3d 1096
Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982). A sentence of confinement
End of Document
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR-2012-18513

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER IN LIMINE

MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,
Defendant.

_In Custody
_Out of Custody

The Court having before it the State's Motion in Limine, and good cause thus appearing,
now therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any reference to the issues raised in the Motion to
Dismiss by Defense counsel, the Defendant, and/or defense witnesses is excluded and prohibited.
ENTERED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2012.

JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of
, 2012 copies of the foregoing
document(s) were mailed, postage prepaid, or sent by facsimile or inter office mail to:
____ Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County FAX 208-446-1833
_ _ _ Defense Counsel Kootenai County Public Defender FAX 208- 446-1701
- - - Defense Counsel FAX- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Derend~t._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
_ _ _ Kootenai County Sheriffs Department FAX 208-446-1407
_ _ _ Idaho Probation & Parole FAX 208-769-1481
_ _ _ Idaho Department of Correction FAX 208-327-7445
_ _ _ CCD Sentencing Team FAX 208-658-2186
____ Idaho Department of Tr~sportation FAX 208-334-8739
____ Community Service Interoffice Mail or FAX 208-446-1193
____ Auditor Interoffice Mail or FAX 208-446-1662
____ BCI (Bureau of Criminal Investigation) FAX 208-884-7193
_ _ _ Kootenai County Law Library/Tr~scription FAX 208-446-1187

CLIFFORD T. HAYES
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
By: ___________________
Deputy Clerk
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BARRY McHUGH
Prosecuting Attorney
501 Government Way/Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone:
(208) 446-1800
Facsimile:
(208) 446-1833

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR-2012-18513

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,
Defendant.

ORDER

The above matters came on for a hearing before the Honorable CLARK PETERSON,
Judge, on the 3rd day of January, 2013. The State was represented by LAURA MCCLINTON,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for Kootenai County, Idaho.

The defendant was present,

represented by JAY LOGDSON, Attorney for the Defendant. After argument from all parties,
the Court enters its order as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Dismisss is denied.
ENTERED this _ _ _ day of January, 2013.

JUDGE PETERSON

ORDER
Michael Jay Freitas
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of
, 2013, copies of the foregoing
document(s) were mailed, postage prepaid, or sent by facsimile or inter office mail to:
____ Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County FAX 208-446-1833
____ Defense Counsel Kootenai County Public Defender FAX 208- 446-1701
- - - Defense Counsel FAX~------------ - - - Derendant._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
_ _ _ Kootenai County Sheriff's Department FAX 208-446-1407
_ _ _ Idaho Probation & Parole FAX 208-769-1481
_ _ _ Idaho Department of Correction FAX 208-327-7445
_ _ _ CCD Sentencing Team FAX 208-658-2186
_ _ _ Idaho Department of Transportation FAX 208-334-8739
_ _ _ Community Service Interoffice Mail or FAX 208-446-1193
_ _ _ Auditor Interoffice Mail or FAX 208-446-1662
_ _ _ BCI (Bureau of Criminal Investigation) FAX 208-884-7193
_ _ _ Kootenai County Law Library/Transcription FAX 208-446-1187
CLIFFORD T. HAYES
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Deputy Clerk

ORDER
Michael Jay Freitas

41378

2 of2

99 of 235

INSTRUCTION NO. 1

Now that you have been sworn as jurors to try this case, I want to go over with you what
will be happening. I will describe how the trial will be conducted and what we will be doing. At
the end of the trial, I will give you more detailed guidance on how you are to reach your decision.
Because the state has the burden of proof, it goes first.

After the state's opening

statement, the defense may make an opening statement, or may wait until the state has presented
its case.
The state will offer evidence that it says will support the charge against the defendant.
The defense may then present evidence, but is not required to do so. If the defense does present
evidence, the state may then present rebuttal evidence. This is evidence offered to answer the
defense's evidence.
After you have heard all the evidence, I will give you additional instructions on the law.
After you have heard the instructions, the state and the defense will each be given time for
closing arguments. In their closing arguments, they will summarize the evidence to help you
understand how it relates to the law. Just as the opening statements are not evidence, neither are
the closing arguments. After the closing arguments, you will leave the courtroom together to
make your decision. During your deliberations, you will have with you my instructions, the
exhibits admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in court.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

"t-

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged
with the crime of UNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM alleged to have
occurred as follows: that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of
September, 2012, in the County of Kootenai, State ofldaho, did permit connection or delivery of
city water, to third persons, for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water service.
To this charge the defendant has plead not guilty.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The
presumption of innocence means two things.
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that burden
throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the defendant
ever have to produce any evidence at all.
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It
may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or from lack of evidence. If
after considering all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must
find the defendant not guilty..
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4

Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow my instructions
regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what either side may state the
law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The
order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance. The
law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence before you. Neither sympathy
nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these
duties is vital to the administration of justice.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At
times during the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a witness, or to a witness'
answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked to decide a particular rule of
law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed to aid the Court and are not to be
considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I sustain an objection to a question or to an
exhibit, the witness may not answer the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not
attempt to guess what the answer might have been or what the exhibit might have shown.
Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of
your mind, and not refer to it or rely on it in your later deliberations.
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which should
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apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will excuse you
from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any problems. Your are
not to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from time to time and help the
trial run more smoothly.
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct evidence"
and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to consider all the
evidence admitted in this trial.
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole judges of
the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you attach to it.
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with you
to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much weight you
attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in
making these decisions are the considerations which you should apply in your deliberations.
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more witnesses
may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the testimony of each
witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness had to say.
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on that
matter.

In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the

qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You are not
bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5

If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am inclined to
favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any
such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, any
opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine
seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it.
I may at times use the word "victim" in these instructions or in the course of this trial.
This word is used only to refer to a person or persons who are alleged to have been victimized,
and is used only for convenience. It does not indicate any opinion on my part that a person is a
victim, or that the defendant has committed an offense. Whether a person is a victim, and
whether the defendant is guilty of any offense, are matters for you alone to determine based on
the evidence presented at trial.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6

Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject must not
in any way affect your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to determine
the appropriate penalty or punishment.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7

If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you do
take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury room to
decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear other answers
by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury room.
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and not
be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one person the
duty of taking notes for all of you.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following instructions at
any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during the day or when you
leave the courtroom to go home at night.
Do not discuss this case during the trial with anyone, including any of the attorneys, parties,
witnesses, your friends, or members of your family. ''No discussion" also means no emailing, text
messaging, tweeting, blogging, posting to electronic bulletin boards, and any other form of
communication, electronic or otherwise.
Do not discuss this case with other jurors until you begin your deliberations at the end of the
trial. Do not attempt to decide the case until you begin your deliberations.
I will give you some form of this instruction every time we take a break. I do that not to
insult you or because I don't think you are paying attention, but because experience has shown this is
one of the hardest instructions for jurors to follow. I know of no other situation in our culture where
we ask strangers to sit together watching and listening to something, then go into a little room
together and not talk about the one thing they have in common: what they just watched together.
There are at least two reasons for this rule. The first is to help you keep an open mind. When
you talk about things, you start to make decisions about them and it is extremely important that you
not make any decisions about this case until you have heard all the evidence and all the rules for
making your decisions, and you won't have that until the very end of the trial. The second reason for
the rule is that we want all of you working together on this decision when you deliberate. If you have
conversations in groups of two or three during the trial, you won't remember to repeat all of your
thoughts and observations for the rest of your fellow jurors when you deliberate at the end of the
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trial.
Ignore any attempted improper communication. If any person tries to talk to you about this
case, tell that person that you cannot discuss the case because you are a juror. If that person persists,
simply walk away and report the incident to the bailiff.

Do not make any independent personal investigations into any facts or locations connected
with this case. Do not look up any information from any source, including the Internet. Do not
communicate any private or special knowledge about any of the facts of this case to your fellow
jurors. Do not read or listen to any news reports about this case or about anyone involved in this
case, whether those reports are in newspapers or the Internet, or on radio or television.
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for information on-line and to "Google"
something as a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting for jurors to do their own
research to make sure they are making the correct decision. You must resist that temptation for our
system of justice to work as it should. I specifically instruct that you must decide the case only on the
evidence received here in court. If you communicate with anyone about the case or do outside
research during the trial it could cause us to have to start the trial over with new jurors and you could
be held in contempt of court.
While you are actually deliberating in the jury room, the bailiff will confiscate all cell phones
and other means of electronic communications. Shouid you need to communicate with me or anyone
else during the deliberations, please notify the bailiff.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9

You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to the law.
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some and
ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some ofthe rules, you are
bound to follow them. If anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell you, it is my
instruction that you must follow.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10

In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and
intent.
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INSTRUCTION No._li_
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crime of UNLAWFUL
ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM which the Defendant is charged are:
1. On or about the 28th day of September, 2012;

2. in Kootenai County, State of Idaho;
3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection or delivery of city
water;
4. to third persons;
5. for use within a residence;
6. not otherwise provided with water service.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
find the defendant guilty.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If you

find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that precise
date.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13

A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify.
The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and assistance of
the defendant's lawyer.

You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the

defendant does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your
deliberations in any way.
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INSTRUCTION N0.14
As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those facts
to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the evidence presented in
the case.
The evidence you are to consider consists of:
1.

sworn testimony of witnesses;

2.

exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and

3.

any facts to which the parties have stipulated.

Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including:
1.

arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not
witnesses. What they say in their opening statements,
closing arguments and at other times is included to help you
interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts as
you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have
stated them, follow your memory;

2.

testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you
have been instructed to disregard;

3.

anything you may have seen or heard when the court was
not in session.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15

I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of some
of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few
minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will retire to the jury
room for your deliberations.
The arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence. If you remember the
facts differently from the way the attorneys have stated them, you should base your decision on
what you remember.
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are important. It
is rarely productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of your opinion on the
case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the beginning, your sense of pride
may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your position even if shown that it is wrong.
Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can
be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before making
your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all of the evidence
you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together with the law that relates to
this case as contained in these instructions.
During your deliberations, you each have a right to re-examine your own views and
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest discussion
that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw and heard during
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the trial and the law as given you in these instructions.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the objective
of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or effect of
evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of the jury feels
otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 16

You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach
a verdict. Whether some of the instructions will apply depend upon your determination of the
facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of facts which you determine
does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an instruction has been given that the
Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17

The original instructions will be with you in the jury room. They are part of the official
court record. For this reason please do not alter them or mark on them in any way. The
instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18

Upon retiring to the jury room, select one of you as a presiding officer, who will preside
over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; that the issues
submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every juror has a chance to
express himself or herself upon each question.
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you all arrive at a verdict, the
presiding juror will sign it and you will return it into open court.
Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise.
If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully
discussed the evidence before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to communicate with
me, you may send a note by the bailiff. You are not to reveal to me or anyone else how the jury
stands until you have reached a verdict or unless you are instructed by me to do so.
A verdict form suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you with
these instructions.
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STATE OF IDAHO

FILED:

.....,~-l£_

INSTRUCTION NO. 19

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

vs.
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CRM-2012-18513
VERDICT

We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant MICHAEL JAY FREITAS:

_ _ NOT GUILTY ofUNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM

V

GUILTY ofUNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM

Dated this

/-- ~--IJ

day of January 2013.

.~

Ju<TJ
~.
~o/h
~
Prdiding Juror

Michael Jay Freitas
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FIRST JUDICI
DISTRICT COURT, ST ATEOF IDAHO,
UNTY OF KOOTENAI
324 W. GAR:t.c.~ AVENUE, P.O. BOX 9000, COEUR D' ALI!.NE, IDAHO 83816-9000
STATE OF IDAHO V
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS
5870 W RHOADE ISLAND STREET
SPIRIT LAKE, ID 83869
DL#
ID
DO
AGENCY: SPIRIT LAKE POLICE DEPT

PUTY

CASE# CR-2012-0018513 CITATION# 7813
CHARGE: M291-7.4.10-SL UNLAWFUL TAMPERING WllH WATER SYSTEM
AMENDED:---------------------------------------------------------------------The defendant having been fully advised of his/her statutory and constitutional rights including the right to be represented by counsel, and
D Been advised of right to court appointed counsel if indigent
D Defendant waived right to counsel
D Judgment-Not Guilty
~ Defendant represented by counsel
)(!Judgment on Trial-Guilty
D Judgment, Plea of Guilty I Rights Waived
tJ Judgment for Defendant I Infraction
D Withheld Judgment D Accepted
D Judgment for State I Infraction
D Dismissed _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D Bond Forfeited I Conviction Entered - Case Closed
D Bond Forfeited I Dismissed
MONIES ORDERED PAID:
A $2.00 handling fee will be imposed on each installment.
Suspended$ _ _ _ _ _ __
IE Fine I Penalty$ S"DO
which includes costs, and probation fee if applicable.
~Pay within 30 days of today, or enroll in time payment program BEFORE due date.
D Community Service
hours by
Setup Fee $_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Insurance Fee $ _ _ _ _ _ __
Must sign up within 7 days.
D Reimburse _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
D Restitution - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~Bond Exonerated, provided that any deposit shall first be applied pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2923 in satisfaction of outstanding fines, fees
and costs with any remainder to be refunded to the posting party. D Authorization from defendant to pay restitution and/or infractions from bond.
t!lNo Contact Order, as condition of bond, terminated.
INCARCEFfATION ORDERED:
D Jail
days, Suspended
days, Credit
days, Discretionary Jail
days are imposed & will
be scheduled by the Adult Misdemeanor Probation Office, or Court, for violations of the terms below or on the attached addendum.
D Report to Jail
Release
D Work Release Authorization (if you qualify).
D Sheriff's Community Labor Program in lieu of Jail (if you qualify)
hours by
Must sign up within 7 days.
Follow the Labor Program schedule and policies.
0 ______________________________~--------------------------------------DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED
days commencing~---------------------REINSTATEMENT OF DRIVING PRIVILEGES MUST BE AC MPLISHED before you can drive. Apply to DRIVER'S SERVICES, P.O. Box 7129,
Boise, ID 83707-1129.
D Temporary Driving Privileges Granted commenci
To, from and for work purposes I required m ical care I court ordered alcohol program I community service. Must carry proof of work
schedule and liability insurance at all time . Not valid if insurance expires.

1{<ih1 cf tt1

PROBATION ORDERED FOR
YEAR(S)
THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
0 Supervised - See Addendum
D Violate no federal, state or local laws
D Commit no similar offenses.
D Maintain liability insurance on any icle that you drive.
D Do not operate a motor vehicle w· any alcohol or controlled substances in your bloodstream.
D You must submit to any blood coho I concentration test requested of you, with reasonable cause, by a peace officer.
D Obtain a Substance Abuse/ ery Evaluation, and file proof of evaluation, within
days.
D Enroll in & complete
program. File proof of completion within
days.
~ Notify the court, in wri · g, of any address change within 10 days. Agrees to accept future service by mail at the last known address.
D Interlock ignition de ce required on vehicle for
year(s). To be installed per attached addendum.
D Other _____________________________________________----:::::;:=;=:::=----------------

THE SUSPENDED PENALTIES ARE SUBJECT TO YOUR COMPLIANCE WITH ALL
THE DEFENDANT HAS THE RIGHT TO APPEAL
THIS JUDGMENT WITHIN 42 DAYS

Michael Jay Freitas

41378

122 of 235
KC001 Rev. 6/11

ORIGINAL

I Cf

I

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTENA!/ss
FIL£0:

Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender
The Law Office of the Public Defender Kootenai County
POBox 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8759
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/
Respondent,

v.
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,

Defendant/
Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NUMBER

CR-12-0018513
Misd

NOTICE OF APPEAL

--------------------------~)
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
1.

The above named Appellant hereby appeals against the above named Respondent, the

State of Idaho, to the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Kootenai, the Judgment entered in the Magistrate's Division of said District Court in the
above entitled matter on or about January 8, 2013, the Honorable Clark Peterson, Magistrate,
presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Kootenai County District Court, and the

judgment described in paragraph one above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 54.l{a).

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Michael Jay Freitas
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3.

That this appeal is taken upon matters oflaw and fact.

4.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then intends to

assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal, is/are:
(a)

Did the Magistrate Court err in denying the defendant's Motion to Dismiss?

(b)

Did the Magistrate Court err in denying the defendant's Motion for Judgment of

Acquittal?
(c)

Did the Magistrate Court err in denying the defendant's proposed jury instruction six?

(d)

Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient for conviction?

5.

No portion ofthe record is sealed.

6.

Reporter's Transcript.

Pursuant to I.C.R. 54.6(a) and I.A.R. 25(a) and (c)(5)

as they apply to this appeal under I.C.R. 54.7(d), Appellant requests the preparation of the entire
reporter's transcript of the hearing on Appellant's Motions to Dismiss held on January 3, 2013, and
the trial held on January 8, 2013. The proceedings were digitally recorded by the Clerk, and the
recording is in the possession of the Clerk.
7.

Clerk's Record.

The appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to

I.C.R. 54.8. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record
pursUfuJ.t to I.C.R. 54.18 and I.A.R. 28(c), in addition to those automatically included under I.C.R.
54.8:
(a)

Any exhibits.

(b)

A copy ofthe defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed December 12,2012.

(c)

A copy of the plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed December

3, 2012.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Michael Jay Freitas
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(d)

A copy of the defendant's requested jury instruction six.

7.

I certify:

(a)

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon the court reporter

(transcriptionist).
(b)

The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because the

Appellant is an indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender.
(c)

The Appellant is exempt from paying the filing fee because the Appellant is an

indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender.
(d)

The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of the

record because the Appellant is an indigent who is represented by the Office of the

Kootenai

County Public Defender.
(e)

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho

Criminal Rule 54.4, to wit: the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney.

DATED this _j_ day of January, 2013.
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY

BY:

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Michael Jay Freitas
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Cf

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this
day of January, 2013, served a true and
correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL via interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon
the parties as follows:
c

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney via
_y}_ Fax 208-446-1833
Kootenai County Transcript Department FAX

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender
· The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8759
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/
Respondent,

v.
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,

Defendant/
Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NUMBER

CR-12-0018513
Misd

ORDER TO STAY SENTENCE PENDING
APPEAL

------------------------~)
The Court having before it the Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal, having heard
argument on January 8, 2013, and good cause appearing, now, th~refore
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that sentence in the above entitled matter be stayed pending
the resolution of the defendant~s appeal in district court.

ORDERED this

.ik day of January, 2013.

~ u~ Mttit>J C:
.

CLARK TERSON
MAGISTRATE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/
Respondent,

v.
MICHAEL J. FREITAS,

Defendant/
Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NUMBER

CR-12-0018513
Misd.

BRIEF SUPPORTING APPEAL

_____________________________)

Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai County.
Honorable Clark Peterson presiding.
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ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT:
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature ofthe Case

This is an appeal from a judgment of guilty. The state alleged that the defendant had
violated Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. The Magistrate Court heard argument and found that I.C.
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-1 0 on its face did not violate the requirements of procedural due
process embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Further, the
Court heard argument and found that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 did not violate Article I§ 13,
Article XII§ 2, and Article XV§§ 1, 4, and 5 ofthe Idaho Constitution on its face or as applied.
The Court interpreted Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10, and the defendant was tried under the
Court's interpretation. At trial, the Court allowed over the defense's objection the state to ask the
jurors on voir dire whether they thought the ordinance was "ridiculous" and to inquire as to the
importance of the rule of law. The Court later denied the defendant's motion for acquittal. The
Court further rejected the defendant's requested instruction as to the limits of the city's property.
The jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant now appeals the judgment.
B.

Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts

On September 27,2012, Brenda Nash moved into the home of George Darrell Adams in
Spirit Lake, Idaho. Tr Vol. II, p. 68, L. 8-16, p. 69, L. 13-25. With her came her son, his three
children and fiancee Jeremy Lombardi, Stephanie Savage, Brooklyn Savage, Skylar Lombardi,
and Aurora Lombardi. Tr Vol. II, p. 75, L. 13-20. The home had running water, but on July 26,
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2012, the city of Spirit Lake had shut offthe water and had not turned it back on until October
18,2012. Tr Vol. II, p. 65, L. 2-21, p. 70, L. 16-21.
Also on September 27, 2012, Officer Terry Wise of the Spirit Lake Police Department
visited the mobile home of Michael Freitas. Tr Vol. II., p. 83, L. 6-9, p. 84, L. 7-21, p. 85, L. 2224. The officer had noticed that Mr. Freitas, who was the neighbor of Ms. Nash, had a hose
running from the spigot on his home to some point on Ms. Nash's home. Tr Vol. II, p. 84, L. 2225, p. 85, L. 1-21. The officer believed water to be running due to water escaping at the
connection point between separate hoses being used to stretch between the homes. Tr Vol. II, p.
86, L. 1-20. The officer warned Mr. Freitas that she believed he was in violation of a Spirit Lake
Ordinance, and gave him a copy of it. Tr Vol. II, p. 85, L. 1-5. She cited him the following day
for violating Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr Vol. II, p. 87, L. 20-21.
On January 3, 2013, the Magistrate Court of Kootenai County held a hearing on Mr.
Freitas' Motion to Dismiss the charge against him. Tr. Vol. I, p. 1, L. 1, p. 22, L. 22-23. Mr.
Freitas and the state stipulated to the factual summary in the state's Brief in Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss for purposes of the hearing to provide the Court with a factual basis for the as
applied challenge. Tr. Vol. I, p. 1, L. 8-25; p. 2, L.l-16. Additionally, the state called Barbara
Brown, clerk-treasurer ofthe City of Spirit Lake. Tr Vol. I, p. 3, L. 15-16, p. 4, L. 15-19.
Ms. Brown testified that the City of Spirit Lake charged residential properties $15 a
month for 12,000 gallons of water and $1.25 for every thousand thereafter. Tr Vol. I, L. 16-22.
The rates had been in place since either 2006 or 2007. Tr Vol. I, p. 5, L. 23-25. Ms. Brown
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testified that the city tried to keep the prices low, and further, that at least as of a few years ago,
Spirit Lake's water rates were "fairly low" as compared to a lot of cities in Idaho. Tr Vol. I, p. 6,
L. 5-11, p. 9, L. 3-25, p. 10, L. 1-7. The city bills based on meters in the summer, and simply
charges a flat rate in the winter. Tr Vol. I, L. 18-23. Ms. Brown could not state how much water
the average household uses. Tr Vol. I, p. 6, L. 12-15. She testified that Mr. Freitas had paid for
the water that came to his home and that he had provided to his neighbor. Tr Vol. I, p. 8, L. 1-18.
Ms. Brown testified that Ordinance 7-4-10 has been enforced prior to this case for sharing water,
because
it's not appropriate, it's against the rules, and no matter where you
live, there are rules.
Tr Vol. I, p. 7, L. 9-16.
The state argued that this criminalization was necessary to keep the cost of water down
and for sanitary reasons. Tr Vol. I, p. 25, L. 6-7, 11-12. After hearing argument and reviewing
the parties' motions and memorandums, the Court made the following findings as to the
procedural due process challenge:
THE COURT: I certainly can't find that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications. I think there's language within the ordinance which sets forth some very
clear meaning. So as a result, I'll find that uh, the motion to dismiss is- on its void for
vagueness challenge on its face is denied.
Tr. p. 26, L. 15-20.
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THE COURT: It has to create minimum guidelines for uh, those persons in the law
enforcement and judicial community to be able to enforce the statute, also provide people
with reasonable notice, adequate fair warning the prescribed conduct. I think the statute
at issue here is clear. I think it can be read in its many parts given a common sense
reading. It's unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, turn on or
off, permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or
other building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter,
or to operate or introduce any substance into any part of the City water system.
Essentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connect to the city water system,
improperly interfering with or tampering with that system, uh, improperly connecting and
delivering water to third persons under certain circumstances, and then improperly
operating or introducing a substance into any part of the water system, again under certain
circumstances.
Tr Vol. I, p. 26, L. 22-25, p. 27, L. 1-17.
The Court went on and appeared to find that the statute also passed rational scrutiny:
THE COURT: Those all seem to be very clear and-- and uh, reasonable. The city
certainly has an interest in uh, being the sole regulators of their water system, and to
permit tampering in the way it's gone on here would essentially be to permit persons to
set themselves up as their own private water delivery services to other individuals, and
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then the State or the municipality of the states would lose its regulatory control over those
persons.
Tr Vol. I, p. 27, L. 18-25, p. 28, L. 1.
The Court stated as to the as applied challenge:
THE COURT: It seems clear that the defendant received notice that uh, his neighbor was
not receiving water from the city and that essentially what happened here is in direct
contravention of the statute, which is uh, the defendant deciding that he was going to
circumvent the water delivery system of the municipality and provide water himself to
this other residence, which prohibits the City in this case from having its valid regulatory
concerns regarding the delivery of water, making sure that it's clean, making sure it's
appropriate, billing and restricting its use, and all the other issues that arise from the
delivery of water. So as a result, the Court finds you've failed to meet your burden
regarding the demonstrating the statute as applied is unconstitutional.
Tr Vol. I, p. 28, L. 2-16.
Counsel for the defendant requested further findings as to the limits of the ordinance,
whether it conflicted with the general laws, and whether it was not either unreasonable or
arbitrary. Tr Vol. I, p. 29, L. 9-14. The Court stated:
THE COURT: I think I have to construe statutes to be constitutional. Obviously, the
statute has to be confined to the limits of the jurisdictional limits of the body enacting the
law. Uh, and I have to read the statute that way. I don't find it to be in conflict with other
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general laws of the State. In fact, I think the State statutes we reviewed specifically
empower municipalities to make these types of uh, enactments. And then that it's not an
unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. I think in my prior recitation I noted that I think that
the uh, ordinance here is both reasonable and not arbitrary. And so I-- I find that neither
ofthose three factors are applicable here, at least on the information that's before the
Court here today.
Tr Vol. I, p. 29, L. 15-25, p. 30, L. 1-4.
Thus, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. Then, on January 8, 2013, the Court
held a trial in this matter. During voir dire, the prosecutor began asking the jurors about the law
in the case.
MS. MCLINTON: So, like you heard earlier, basically what this case is about is a Spirit
Lake Ordinance that limits how residents can use their water. It permit- it prohibits
residents from permitting - MR. LOGSDON: Your Honor, I'm gonna object at this point. We're not supposed to be
discussing any law.
THE COURT: All right. Well, I haven't heard the whole question, but go ahead and
finish up your question and then I'll rule on your objection.
MS. MCLINTON: Basically, as I stated earlier, it prohibits residents from permitting
people from using their water in another residence that isn't otherwise provided with

- 6-

Michael Jay Freitas

41378

140 of 235

water. Basically, what I'm wondering is if anyone thinks that that ordinance is simply
ridiculous.
THE COURT: I'll overrule your objection. That's an appropriate question.
Tr Vol. II, p. 23, L. 24-25, p. 24, L. 1-14.
The prosecutor continued asking about the opinion of jurors as to the validity of the law.
Tr Vol. II, p. 24, L. 15-25, p. 25, L. 1-22. Later, the prosecutor began asking whether there were
any laws that the jury thought were disagreeable.
MS. MCLINTON: Now, we were talkin' a little bit about that Spirit Lake ordinance.
And in general I'm just wondering has anyone ever felt like you disagreed with a law that
has made some sort of conduct criminal?
Tr Vol. II, p. 29, L. 6-12.
Such questions continued until the prosecutor switched over to why people follow rules. Tr Vol.
II, p. 29, L. 9-25, p. 30, L. 1-25.
MS. MCLINTON: How many of you feel like generally you abide by rules? Or you try
to. You gues can raise your hands. Somebody - - somebody out here. Why do you - Why do you abide by rules?
TrVol.II,p.31,L.l-4.
These questions continued until defense counsel objected. Tr Vol. II, p. 31, L. 4-21.
MS. MCCLINTON: So what happens if people start picking and choosing what laws or
what rules that they are going to follow?
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MR. LOGSDON: Your Honor, I'm gonna object. We are way off and we are talking
about essentially things like rule of the law, et cetera, and so forth.
THE COURT: All right. I think we're close, Ms. McClinton, but I think that's a
permissible-- I think she's' inquiring of the jury's attitudes about uh, how one should
behave if they have a law that they don't agree with, and I think that's an appropriate
mqmry.
Tr Vol. II, p. 31, L. 18-25, p. 32, L. 1-3.
Such questions then continued. Tr Vol. II, p. 32, L. 4-21.
After openings, the state called Barbra Brown, the Sprit Lake City Clerk. Tr Vol. II, p. 60,
L. 1-25. Ms. Brown testified that the records of the city showed that the water at 5822 West
Rhode Island St., residence of George Adams, was shut off on July 26, 2012, and turned back on
on October 18, 2012. Tr Vol. II, p. 64, L. 20-25, p. 65, L. 1-21.
The state then called Brenda Nash, who at the time of the incident had lived in George
Adams' home. Tr Vol. II, p. 67, L. 1-2, p. 69, L. 13-25. Ms. Nash testified that she had been told
that the water coming to her house came from the defendant and that she used it within the
residence. Tr Vol. II, p. 70, L. 16-21, p. 71, L. 18-23.
The state then called Officer Terry Wise of the Spirit Lake Police Department. Tr Vol. II,
p. 82, L. 3-4, p. 83, L. 8-9. She testified that on September 27, 2012, she visited the mobile
home of Michael Freitas. Tr Vol. II., p. 83, L. 6-9, p. 84, L. 7-21, p. 85, L. 22-24. The officer had
noticed that Mr. Freitas, who was the neighbor of Ms. Nash, had a hose running from the spigot
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on his home to some point on Ms. Nash's home. Tr Vol. II, p. 84, L. 22-25, p. 85, L. 1-21. The
officer believed water to be running due to water escaping at the connection point between
separate hoses being used to stretch between the homes. Tr Vol. II, p. 86, L. 1-20. The officer
warned Mr. Freitas that she believed he was in violation of a Spirit Lake Ordinance, and gave
him a copy of it. Tr Vol. II, p. 85, L. 1-5. She cited him the following day for violating Spirit
Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr Vol. II, p. 87, L. 20-21. When asked whether she had had a
conversation with the defendant, she also testified that at the time she gave him the citation, Mr.
Freitas said that
"it was something to the effect that urn, he didn't really realize-- he didn't think that
there was anything wrong as far - - as long as the water was going through his meter and
he's paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with his
water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor."
Tr Vol. II, p. 89, L. 19-25, p. 90, L. 1-3.
After Officer Wise the state rested. Defense counsel moved for an acquittal under I.C.R.
29. The Court denied the motion.
THE COURT: Well, Rule 29 governs motions for judgment of acquittal for insufficiency
of the evidence. The test is whether there's substantial evidence on which rational triers
of fact could find the defendant guilty. And uh, I have to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, keeping in mind that it's the jury that eventually has the job
to determine credibility and weigh the evidence.
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The Court's mindful that where inculpatory evidence is so insubstantial that jurors could
not help but have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of that element, a judgment of an
acquittal should be entered. However, the prosecution need not have offered direct
evidence on every element of the crime if there is otherwise a sufficient basis for the jury
to find an element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Keeping in mind all the facts that have been presented in adopting the argument of uh,
Ms. McClinton, the Court will deny your Rule 29 motion at this time.
Tr Vol. II, p 95, L. 6-24.
The prosecutor had argued that
[Officer Wise] indicated, when I asked that it was in fact city water, he said he was
paying for it and he could do with it what he pleased.
Tr Vol. II, p. 94, L. 7-10.
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that the prosecutor had inquired of her witnesses
whether the water the defendant was providing was from the City of Spirit Lake.
The Court then held a hearing on jury instructions. The defendant accepted that the
state's elements instruction fit the law of the case and the earlier holding of the Court and did not
object. Tr Vol. II, p. 98, L. 1-3. The defendant offered proposed jury instruction six, requesting
that the Court instruct the jury that
The Spirit Lake City water system is property of the City up to and including any shut-off
valve and/or meter which may be installed at or near the property of any lot.
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Tr Vol. II, p. 99, L. 11-14.
The Court denied the instruction.
THE COURT: The Court determined it would not give that as it's not a clarifying uh,
legal instruction that relates to any of the facts in dispute. While the elements certainly
includes uh, delivery of water, there is just no factual dispute here regarding what is the
property of what, what is the city water system, et cetera.

(inaudible) ... persist in my ruling and not give that instruction.
Tr Vol. II, p. 99, L. 16-22, p. 100, L. 12-13.
The jury found the defendant guilty. Tr Vol. II, p. 117, L. 22-24. The Court then
sentenced the defendant but ordered his sentence be stayed pending the resolution of his appeal
pursuant to I.C.R. 54.5. Tr Vol. II, p. 122, L. 16-23, p. 124, L. 11-14. The defendant timely filed
a notice of appeal under I.C.R. 54.1(a), et.seq. from the judgment ofthe Court.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

The Magistrate Court erred in finding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-1 0 is
constitutional on its face.

II.

The Magistrate Court erred in not finding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is
constitutional as applied to the facts of this case.
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III.

Even if the Magistrate Court did not err in holding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-410 is constitutional, the Magistrate Court misinterpreted the statute and thus the
defendant was tried under the wrong elements.

IV.

Even if the Magistrate Court did not err in holding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-410 is constitutional or in its interpretation of the ordinance, then the Court erred in
denying the defendant's motion for acquittal.

V.

Even if the Magistrate Court did not err in holding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-410 is constitutional or in its interpretation of the ordinance, then the Court erred in
refusing to give the defendant's proposed jury instruction six.

VI.

The Magistrate Court erred in overruling the defendant's objections to the state's
improper questions during voir dire.
ARGUMENT
I.

A.

Introduction
The Constitution "protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of

noblesse oblige. [The Supreme Court] would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely
because the Government promised to use it responsibly." United States v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct.
1577, 1591 (2010) citing Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
The Magistrate Court erred when it found Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 constitutional in spite of
the fact that it lacks sufficient clarity, is not limited to the municipality, criminalizes everyday
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behaviors of Idahoans for either arbitrary or monopolistic purposes, and conflicts with the
General Laws.
B.

Standard for Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Idaho v. Button, 134

Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997).
C.

The Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is unconstitutionally vague and thus violates the notice
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is void for vagueness on its face. In order to comport with

the notice requirements of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, a law must use language that
conveys a sufficiently definite description of the proscribed conduct. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen.
15, Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 90-3, 1990 WL 48948 at *2 (Idaho A.G.), citing Keyishian v. Board

of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); H & V Engineering v. Board of Professional Engineers, 113
Idaho 646 (1987). As the Court wrote in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984),

The requirement that government articulate its aims with a
reasonable degree of clarity ensure that state power will be
exercised only on behalf ofpolicies reflecting an authoritative
choice among competing social values, educes the danger of
caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws,
enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of
law, and permits meaningful judicial review.
Due Process also guarantees that a statute wiH not be so written as to ailow arbitrary and
capricious enforcement. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 15 at *2 citing LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 589 P.2d
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490 (Colo.1979). Furthermore, Due Process requires that explicit standards be created for
individuals or groups tasked to apply basic policy. !d. citing Tuma v. Board ofNursing, 100
Idaho 74 (1979); Saxon Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Boston Licensing Board, 407 N.E.2d (1980); Chief
of Fire Dept. of Worcester v. Wibley, 507 N.E.2d 256 (Mass. 1987); Wheeler v. State Board of
Forestry, 192 Cal.Rptr. 693 (Cal.App. 1983).
Ordinance 7-4-1 0 reads in relevant part
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, any
shutoff valve and/or meter, which may be installed at or near the
property line of any lot, is the property of the city. It shall be
unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with,
turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to third
persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise
provided with water service in accordance with this chapter, or to
operate or introduce any substance into any part of the city water
system unless that person is acting under the direct supervision of
a qualified employee of the city or first obtains express written
permission from the mayor.
This ordinance can be broken down to outlaw the following
1. Connect to water for use by a third person within a residence or other
building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this
chapter.
2. Interfere or tamper with water for use by a third person within a residence
or other building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance
with this chapter.
3. Turn on or off water for use by a third person within a residence or other
building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this
chapter.
4. Permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a
residence or other building not otherwise provided with water service in
accordance with this chapter.
It is difficult to understand why the city would have concerned itself with those interfering with
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the illegal use of water by others, or why the city is not concerned about people who connect
illegally for their own use. One way to correct the absurdity is to remove the "of water to third
persons" language, but that fails to fix the interfering part, while removing the "not otherwise
provided" qualifier makes the connecting part absurd. However, this Court may not correct
absurdity, but must construe the statute as written. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011).
Further, the ordinance begins by stating what parts of the water system are the property of
the city, and ends by prohibiting putting things into the water system. Therefore, strictly
construed, the "water" referred to the operative language is a reference to the water system and
the water that still belongs to the city of Spirit Lake.
As it stands, the law is too confusing to provide either reasonable persons or the
government with any idea as to how it is meant to be enforced. Therefore, it must be struck
down.
D.

The City of Spirit Lake has no claim of ownership over water once it has been drawn.
The City of Spirit Lake owns and operates a municipal water system. See Ordinance 7-4-

2, 7-4-3. The service sells water for use by residents in a propriety capacity. Skaggs Drug
Centers v. City of Idaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 7 (1965) citing Gilbert v. Village of Bancroft, 80
Idaho 186 (1958); Hooton v. City of Burley, 70 Idaho 369 (1950).
The city's relationship with its citizens as regards the water service is contractual. City of
Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535 (1989). Once the water has been drawn, the resident owes
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the municipality for that water which is recorded by a meter so that the city may collect using a
monthly bill. See Ordinances 7-4-4, 7-4-5. Municipalities are granted the power to own,
maintain, and operate a water system by the Idaho Legislature. See I. C.§ 50-323. No
constitutional provision, law, or Spirit Lake ordinance allows the Spirit Lake to retain a
possessory interest in the water once it has been drawn.
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 violates the limits set on municipal power under Article XII
§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution.

E.

The City of Spirit Lake has no authority to pass laws criminalizing the delivery of
water.
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the General Laws of Idaho by
1.
claiming powers outside the scope ofthose provided by I. C. § 50-1 030(f).

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that municipalities may exercise only
those powers granted to them or necessarily implied from the powers granted." City of
Grangeville, 116 Idaho at 538 citing Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160 (1980); Hendricks v.
City of Nampa, 93 Idaho 95, 98 (1969). If there is a fair, reasonable, substantial doubt as to the
existence of a power, the doubt must be resolved against the city. O'Bryant v. City ofIdaho Falls,
78 Idaho 313, 320 (1956), Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, 83 Idaho 62,
65 (1960).
A city acts in a proprietary capacity when it owns, maintains, and operates a water system
for the benefit of its inhabitants. Skaggs Drug Centers, 90 Idaho at 7 citing Gilbert, 80 Idaho;
Hooton, 70 Ida..lJo. Municipalities are gra.11ted the power to own, maintain, and operate a water
system by the Idaho Legislature. See I. C. § 50-323. The Legislature further provided that
municipalities may
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.. .prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the
levy or assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges against
governmental units, departments or agencies, including the state of
Idaho and its subdivisions, for the services, facilities and
commodities furnished by such works, or by such rehabilitated
existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide methods of
collections and penalties, including denial ofservice for
nonpayment ofsuch rates, fees, tolls or charges; ...
I.C. 50-1030(f)
The City of Spirit Lake passed local ordinances 7-4-2 and 7-4-3 making the city the
owner and operator of its municipal water system. The city also provided for fees and denial of
service. See Ordinance 7-4-4, 7-4-8. Once service is denied, the city may declare the residence
or building unfit for habitation and a public nuisance. See Ordinance 7-4-9.
The city took an extra step to consolidate its power over water by passing ordinance 7-410. The ordinance states
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, any
shutoff valve and/or meter, which may be installed at or near the
property line of any lot, is the property of the city. It shall be
unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with,
turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to third
persons for use within a residence or other building not
otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this
chapter, or to operate or introduce any substance into any part of
the city water system unless that person is acting under the direct
supervision of a qualified employee of the city or first obtains
express written permission from the mayor. (emphasis added)
While unclear, the ordinance arguably makes it unlawful for a person to permit connection or
delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water
service in accordance with this chapter. While this leads to the absurd result that a person
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commits a misdemeanor by filling a water bottle with tap water in Spirit Lake and later sharing
that tap water with a person that does not live in their home while both are in either a home or
building without water from Spirit Lake, criminal laws must be strictly construed, and the
Supreme Court will not change or strike down a law for absurdity. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895;
State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325 (1990).

The ordinance so interpreted, however, conflicts with the powers granted the municipality
by I. C. 50-1 030(f). In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 357 (2003), the
Idaho Supreme Court found that a liquor license transfer fee imposed by the city went beyond its
statutory authority. In comparing the city ordinance with state law, the Court found:
The plain language ofI C. § 23-916 provides cities with authority
to impose a license fee, not a transfer fee. The license fees from
section 23-904, titled "License fees," are the fees to which the
statute plainly refers. I C. § 23-916 predates the statute allowing
the state to collect transfer fees. Therefore, I C. § 23-916 could not
have been drafted to include transfer fees, since they were nonexistent when I C. § 23-916 was passed. The legislature has not
changed the relevant language of the statute granting cities
authority to collect a "license fee" since the passage of the
transfer fee statute in 1980. The state legislature has not granted
cities the authority to impose a transfer fee. The City exceeded its
power in collecting the transfer fee. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 358.

In this case, the City of Spirit Lake's authority is limited by I.C. 50-1030(f). The City
seeks to expand the list of possible actions it may take regarding its water system to include
criminalizing the delivery of water to third persons in a building or residence that is not provided
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with water by the city water system. See Ordinance 7-4-10; Tr Vol. I, p. 26, L. 22-25, p. 27, L. 117. The wording ofl.C. 50-1030(f) creates a nonexhaustive list of possibilities through use of
the word "including." See Federal Lank Bank ofSt. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95,
100 (1941 ). However, the list "including" creates is illustrative. Richardson v. National City
Bank of Evansville, 141 F.3d 1228, 1232 (7th Cir. 1998).
In City of Grangeville, 116 Idaho at 539, the Idaho Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance allowing a municipality to place a lien for nonpayment of utilities on a property owner
when his tenants failed to pay. The Court found that
the city may collect the charges for the water, sewer and garbage
services provided by the city from those who use the services. This
right to collect does not depend on any expressed or implied power
of the city, but rather on principles of contract law that obligate
one who accepts a service to pay for it. What the city has attempted
to do here is to rewrite those principles to allow collection from
the owner, even though the services were not ordered, contracted
for, or used by the owner.

!d. at 538-39.
The Court held
An implied power to collect from an owner who had not ordered,
contracted for, or used the service would be unreasonable because
it would create a liability not consistent with principles of contract
law. We are not prepared to read this power into these statutes
[referring to I C.§§ 50-323 and 50-1030(/)}.

!d. at 539.
In other words, though not providing an exhaustive list, I. C. § 50-1 030(f) does not grant
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municipalities plenary authority to do whatever they wish to their citizenry for the good of the
water system.
The City of Spirit Lake relies on its police powers expressed in Article XII § 2 of the
Idaho Constitution.

Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce,
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the
general laws.

The City also relies on I. C. § 50-302 which states in pertinent part:

(1) Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules,
regulations and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the
state of Idaho as may be expedient, in addition to the special
powers in this act granted, to maintain the peace, good
government and welfare of the corporation and its trade,
commerce and industry. Cities may enforce all ordinances by fine,
including an infraction penalty, or incarceration; provided,
however, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, that
the maximum punishment of any offense shall be by fine of not
more than one thousand dollars ($1, 000) or by imprisonment not
to exceed six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

Neither the constitutional section nor the statute, however, can submerge the narrowing of
authority provided in I.C. § 50-1030(f). See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148,
153 (1976) ("It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statue dealing with a narrow,
precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more
generalized spectrum."); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) ("Where this is no
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clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one,
regardless of the priority of enactment.").
And so this Court is left with deciding whether criminal penalties are allowable under I.C.

§ 50-1 030(t). This question is comparable, if not the same, as the one confronted by the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003). In that case

[the Court] addressed whether touching or kissing the chest of a
prepubescent girl constituted lewd conduct. [The] Court held that
it did not because the type of conduct included in the phrase
"including but not limited to" must be the conduct of a like or
similar class or character to the types of conduct specifically
listed
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 528 (2011) citing Kavajecz. 139
Idaho at 486-87.
Thus, in the case before this Court, the municipality has been granted powers of a like or
similar class or character to

.. .prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the
levy or assessment ofsuch rates, fees, tolls or charges against
governmental units, departments or agencies, including the state of
Idaho and its subdivisions, for the services, facilities and
commodities furnished by such works, or by such rehabilitated
existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide methods of
collections and penalties, including denial of service for
nonpayment ofsuch rates, fees, tolls or charges; ...
I.C. 50-1030(±)
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The list clearly consists only of civil penalties. An ordinance may not "classify conduct more
harshly than a state statute." State v. Reyes, 146 Idaho 778, 781 (Ct. App. 2008). As the Reyes
Court
note[d,} [there are} important policy implications of allowing
cities and counties to criminalize matters the legislature has
specifically chosen to decriminalize. Allowing cities and counties
to reclassify infractions as misdemeanors would lead to an
inconsistent application and enforcement of the laws across the
state. A motorist stopped for an infraction such as speeding in one
city would be issued a citation and subjected to the infraction
procedures and penalties, while the same motorist stopped for
speeding in a city that has reclassified speeding as a misdemeanor
may be arrested and taken to jail, request and receive an attorney
and a jury trial, and potentially serve jail time in addition to
paying a substantial fine. Such inconsistent treatment ofsimilarlysituated defendants is not what the legislature intended or what the
law allows.

Id
Therefore, Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the General Laws of Idaho, and must be struck down.
2.

Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is not confined to the limits of Spirit Lake.

A municipal corporation is granted police powers under Article XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution.
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce,
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the
general laws.
From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it may be said that
there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the authority conferred by
such provision: (1) the ordinance or regulation must be confined to the limits of the
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governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of the
state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365,
374 (1965). Police powers must be used to serve the public interest. See id at 375.
The ordinance makes no attempt to limit its scope to the City of Spirit Lake. Every
person engaged in any chain of events that leads to the use of water in a home not provided that
water in accordance with the municipality's ordinances will be in violation of these laws. That
would of course be most ofldaho. The Magistrate Court held that the statute must be construed
to be constitutional, however, no such imperative exists. State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410,
439 (2012) quoting Aptheker v. Secretary ofState, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) ("It must be
remembered that '[a]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it
against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the
purpose of a statute ... ' or judicially rewriting it." (quoting Scales v. US., 367 U.S. 203, 211
(1961))); Tr Vol. I, p. 29, L. 15-25.
In Blaha v. Board ofAda Count Com 'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 777 (2000) the Court found that
[b] eyond the corporate limits of a city, the county has jurisdiction
by statute to accept and approve subdivision plats. See 1 C. § 501308. For the City of Eagle to be allowed to exercise co-equal
jurisdiction with Ada County in the impact area lying beyond the
city limits would not only be in conflict with the statute but also
inconsistent with constitutional/imitations placed on a city's
powers. Article XIL § 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides that any
county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within
its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as
·are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. This
Court has held that the power of cities and counties only exists
within the sovereign boundaries of the cities and the counties
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respectively. See Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville
County, 69 Idaho 505 (1949) (valid county regulation enforceable
so far as territory embraced in county was concerned, exclusive of
municipalities where the regulation was without force and effect);
Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789 (1977) (To give effect to a
county permit within city limits would be to violate the separate
sovereignty provisions ofIdaho Canst., art. XIL § 2.); Hobbs v.
Abrams, 104 Idaho 205 (1983) (ordinance or regulation must be
confined to the limits of the governmental body enacting the same).
Therefore, any reading of the implementing ordinances granting
the City the power to restrict development in the impact area by
denying approval of a subdivision application made to the County
would be an extraterritorial exercise ofjurisdiction by the City and
an infringement on the constitutional right of the County.
(footnotes omitted).

Ordinance 7-4-10 does not limit itself to the City of Spirit Lake and is therefore in violation of
the Idaho Constitution.

3.

Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is improper, unreasonable and/or arbitrary.

A municipal corporation is granted police powers under Article XII § 2 of the Idaho
Constitution.
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce,
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the
general laws.

From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it may be said that
there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the authority conferred by
such provision: (i) the ordinance or reguiation must be confined to the iimits of the
governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of the
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state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho at
374. Police powers must be used to serve the public interest. See id. at 375.
Ordinance 7-4-1 0 is argued by the state to make it illegal to provide water being paid for
in one place to a person in a residence or building not provided with water by the City of Spirit
Lake. The state argued that this criminalization was necessary to keep the cost of water down
and for sanitary reasons. Tr Vol. I, p. 25, L. 6-7, 11-12. The Court found that the city has an
interest in being the sole regulator ofwater delivery. Tr Vol. I, p. 27, L. 18-25, p. 28, L. 1.
As to the state's first contention and the Court's finding oflegitimate purpose, the city's
interest in being sole regulator of water delivery and its need to prevent competition fails to be
proper. The municipality's attempt at monopolization runs afoul of§ 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45, and§ 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15
U.S.C. § 18. "Because municipalities and other political subdivisions are not themselves
sovereign, state-action immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), does not apply to
them directly." FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., No. 11-1160. --- S.Ct. ----,2013
WL 598434 at *6 (U.S.2013) citing Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365,
370 (1991); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,411-413 (1978) (plurality
opinion). "At the same time, however, substate governmental entities do receive immunity from
antitrust scrutiny when they act 'pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation
or monopoly public service."' !d. citing Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S., at 413.
In order for a Court to find that Spirit Lake's monopoly does not violate federal law, it
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must be able to find that the state clearly articulated its intention that the city could consolidate
power over water delivery by criminalizing the act if done by others. See Phoebe Putney Health
System, Inc., 2013 WL 598434 at *7. In Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court found that the act of a Georgia municipality in buying out its competition was not
protected from the anti-trust act as there was no clear articulation from the state government that
municipalities could behave in such an anticompetitive manner. !d. at *7. The Court found
Our case law makes clear that state-law authority to act is
insufficient to establish state-action immunity; the substate
governmental entity must also show that it has been delegated
authority to act or regulate anticompetitively. In BoulderL we held
that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment allowing municipalities to
govern local affairs did not satisfy the clear-articulation test.
There was no doubt in that case that the city had authority as a
matter of state law to pass an ordinance imposing a moratorium
on a cable provider's expansion ofservice. But we rejected the
proposition that "the general grant ofpower to enact ordinances
necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific
anticompetitive ordinances" because such an approach "would
wholly eviscerate the concepts of 'clear articulation and
affirmative expression' that our precedents require. " We explained
that when a State's position "is one of mere neutrality respecting
the municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive, " the State
cannot be said to have " 'contemplated' " those anticompetitive
actions.
The principle articulated in Boulder controls this case. Grants of
general corporate power that allow substate governmental entities
to participate in a competitive marketplace should be, can be, and
typically are used in ways that raise no federal antitrust concerns.
As a result, a State that has delegated such general powers "can
hardly be said to have 'contemplated' " that they will be used
anticompetitively. Thus, while the Law does allow the Authority to
acquire hospitals, it does not clearly articulate and affirmatively
express a state policy empowering the Authority to make
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acquisitions of existing hospitals that will substantially lessen
competition.
!d. citing Omni, 499 U.S., at 372; Community Communications Co.
v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 45-46, 55-56 (1982); 1A P. Areeda & H.
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ~ 225a, p. 131 (3d ed.2006) ("When a
state grants power to an inferior entity, it presumably grants the
power to do the thing contemplated, but not to do so
anticompetitively").
The City of Spirit Lake is granted authority to run a water system by I. C. 50-323 which
states
[c]ities are hereby empowered to establish, create, develop,
maintain and operate domestic water systems; provide for
domestic water from wells, streams, water sheds or any other
source; provide for storage, treatment and transmission ofthe
same to the inhabitants of the city; and to do all things necessary
to protect the source of water from contamination. The term
"domestic water systems" and "domestic water" includes by way
of example but not by way of limitation, a public water system
providing water at any temperature for space heating or cooling,
culinary, sanitary, recreational or therapeutic uses.

I. C. § 50-323 is a "general grant of power" and does not give cities the right to create

monopolies or act in anticompetitive ways. Ordinance 7-4-10 clearly goes beyond this grant of
authority. Even assuming the ordinance does nothing to prevent a person or corporate entity
from delivering water from an outside source, nothing the state legislature has enacted would
lead one to conclude that they meant for municipalities to establish a stranglehold on the delivery
of water from their own water supply. The statute is unlawful and harms the welfare of the
community by being anticompetitive in violation of Article XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution and
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I. C. § 50-302. It must be struck down.

In addition to violating our national policy of competition, the law is arbitrary. Sharing
water cannot harm the person sharing, the person being shared with, the community, or the
municipality. Further, nothing prevents a person or corporate entity from simply paying for
another person's water bill. The state's proffered sanitary issue is irrelevant- the city has no
ordinance controlling how the water is delivered to those paying- it has made no attempt to
interdict those who would drink from the hose at their own home or would use rusty lead pipes.
Ordinance 7-4-10 is clearly not related to sanitary issues. The ordinance is utterly arbitrary and
must be struck down.

II.
A.

Introduction
The Magistrate Court erred in not finding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is

unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. The Court was provided with a summary of
the facts and the testimony of Ms. Brown and found no issue with the application of the statute.
Criminalizing the act of charitably gifting water one has paid for to another goes beyond the
boundaries of our national values and this Court should find Ordinance 7-4-10 unconstitutional
as applied to this case.
B.

Standard of Review

An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Idaho v. Button, 134
Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997).
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C.

Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Article I §§ 1, 4, 14, Article XII§ 2, and Article XV §§ 1, 4, and 5 ofthe
Idaho Constitution as applied to the facts of this case.
This case is about a man who took pity on a neighbor and gave her, her children, and her

grandchildren water to use at home. No reasonable person could read Ordinance 7-4-10 to have
intended this as a consequence of its unclear language. See Argument I.C, supra.
Further, it is well-established that free alienation is a property right. See Bruno v. First

Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Boise, 115 Idaho 1104 (1989). But charitable giving is something
more profound; it is a value that predates and is part and parcel of our rights.

'There was a statute in Bologna that whoever drew blood in the
streets should be severely punished, and yet it was held not to
apply to the case of a barber who opened a vein in the street. It is
commanded in the decalogue that no work shall be done upon the
Sabbath, and yet giving the command a rational interpretation
founded upon its design the Infallible Judge held that it did not
prohibit works of necessity, charity, or benevolence on that day. '
In 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 91, the learned author observes
with reference to the construction ofstatutes:
'If there arise out of them any absurd consequences manifestly
contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those
collateral consequences, void * * * When some collateral matter
arises out of the general words, and happen to be unreasonable,
then the judges are, in decency, to conclude that the consequence
was not foreseen by the Parliament, and, therefore, they are at
liberty to expound the statute by equity and only quoad hoc
disregard it. '
Discargar v. City ofSeattle, 171 P.2d 205,209 (Wash.1946) citing
Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189 (N.Y. 1889).
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Writing in concurrence in Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 151 (1943) Justice
Murphy wrote

[a]s construed by the state courts and applied to the case at bar,
the Struthers ordinance prohibits door to door canvassing of any
kind, no matter what its character and purpose may be, if attended
by the distribution of written or printed matter in the form of a
circular or pamphlet. I do not believe that this outright prohibition
is warranted. As I understand it, the distribution of circulars and
pamphlets is a relatively minor aspect of the problem. The primary
concern is with the act of canvassing as a source of inconvenience
and annoyance to householders. But if the city can prohibit
canvassing for the purpose of distributing religious pamphlets, it
can also outlaw the door to door solicitations of religious
charities, or the activities of the holy mendicant who begs alms
from house to house to serve the material wants of his fellowmen
and thus obtain spiritual comfort for his own soul.
Prohibition may be more convenient to the law maker, and easier
to fashion than a regulatory measure which adequately protects
the peace and privacy of the home without suppressing legitimate
religious activities. But that does not justify a repressive enactment
like the one now before us. Freedom ofreligion has a higher
dignity under the Constitution than municipal or personal
convenience. In these days free men have no loftier responsibility
than the preservation of that freedom. A nation dedicated to that
ideal will not suffer but will prosper in its observance. (emphasis
added).
!d. citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1937).
According to Marriarn-Webster, the word charity originated in the 13th Century. MarriamWebster, charity, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/charity (last accessed March 7,

2013). The Bible makes many references to charity, for example:
And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I
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give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me
nothing. Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not;
charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up. And now stays faith,
hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.
1 Corinthians 13:3-13
Thus it is hard to believe that the expression of kindness that is charity is without
constitutional protection. Whether that protection comes from the First, Fifth, Ninth, or
Fourteenth Amendment, or a conglomeration of the four, the fact remains that a law that punishes
giving water to the poor and thirsty is abominable. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution protects from governmental intrusion

those personal activities and decisions that this Court has
identified as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so
fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that
they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.FN19
FN19. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 US. 494, 503 (1977)
("[T}he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition" (emphasis added)); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 485-486 (1965) (intrusions into the
"sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" offend rights "older than
the Bill of Rights"); id., at 495-496 (Goldberg, J, concurring) (the
law in question "disrupt fed} the traditional relation of the familya relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization");
Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1, 12 (1967) {"The freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness"); Turner v. Safley,
482 US. 78, 95 (1987) ( "[T}he decision to marry is a
fundamental right"); Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113 (1973) (stating
that at the founding and throughout the 19th century, "a woman
enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy");
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 US. 535, 541 (1942)
("Marriage and procreation are fundamental"); Pierce v. Society
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ofSisters, 268 US. 510,535 (1925); Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 US.
390, 399 (1923) (liberty includes "those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men'').

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727-28 n.l9 (1997).
Moreover, if Article I § 1 of the Idaho Constitution, which states

[a]ll men are by nature free and equal, and have certain
inalienable rights, among which are enjoying and defending life
and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property;
pursuing happiness and securing safety
is to be deemed to have any meaning whatsoever, it should be read to protect a person's right to
freely give of themselves to those less fortunate.
There is a practical reason for courts to acknowledge this. No matter how it tries, the
government will likely never be able to stop the American people from doing good. Outlawing
charity will only breed martyrs. This is not a path that the government of this municipality, state,
or nation wants to go down. This ordinance goes beyond the boundaries of protecting to actually
harming our society's welfare. It must be struck down.

III.
A.

Introduction
If the Magistrate Court did not err in dismissing the case because Spirit Lake Ordinance

7-4-10 is constitutional, then the Court erred in its interpretation of the statute. Due to the
Court's error, the defendant was tried under the wrong elements, and the finding of guilt must be
reversed.
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B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Idaho v. Button, 134

Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997).
C.

The Magistrate Court's reading of the statute was incorrect, and therefore the defendant
was tried under the wrong elements.
The Magistrate Court construed Ordinance 7-4-1 0 to mean

[e}ssentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connect to the city water system,
improperly interfering with or tampering with that system, uh, improperly
connecting and delivering water to third persons under certain circumstances,
and then improperly operating or introducing a substance into any part of the
water system, again under certain circumstances.
Tr Vol. I, p. 27, L. 10-17.
However, the ordinance, ifread properly, has nothing to do with this case. The ordinance
refers to interfering with, tampering with, turning on or off, permitting connection or delivery of
water to third persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise provided with
water service in accordance with this chapter. The statute is best read to mean that it would be
unlawful for anyone to interfere with, tamper, tum on or off, permit connection or delivery of
water to another within a residence or building- through the use of the city's water system. The
water system extends to the "standard service connection" to the "main distribution line." See
Ordinances 7-4-3 and 7-4-4. In other words, the ordinance seeks to outlaw acts that would either
do harm to the water system or siphon water from it without paying- such as digging up the water
line and making a new connection to it. It has no application to water drawn and properly paid
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for by a citizen through standard and acceptable piping. If this is a reasonable reading of the
statute it must also be the correct one. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325 (1990). Therefore, the
elements instruction was incorrect at trial and the judgment must be reversed.
IV.
A.

Introduction
If the Magistrate Court did not err in dismissing the case because Spirit Lake Ordinance

7-4-10 is constitutional, and the Court was correct in its interpretation of the ordinance, the state
failed to provide sufficient evidence for all the elements.
B.

Standard of Review
On review, this Court must determine whether "the evidence is sufficient to sustain a

conviction ofthe crime charged." State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 930 (1994). This Court
examines the evidence to determine whether a reasonable mind could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant's guilt as to each material element of the offense was proven.

State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352, 355 (1996).
C.

The state failed to produce sufficient evidence for a conviction.
Under the state's elements instruction, the state had to prove that the water the defendant

provided his neighbors came from the City of Spirit Lake. The state introduced only the
following evidence as to this element- when asked whether she had had a conversation with the
defendant, Officer Wise also testified that at the time she gave him the citation, Mr. Freitas said
that
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"it was something to the effect that urn, he didn't really realize-- he didn't think that
there was anything wrong as far - - as long as the water was going through his meter and
he's paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with his
water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor."
Tr Vol. II, p. 89, L. 19-25, p. 90, L. 1-3.
The officer had previously given him a copy of the text of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr Vol.
II, p. 85, L. 1-5. As discussed in Argument I.C, the Ordinance is not a model of clarity. It is
therefore impossible to draw a conclusion as to where the defendant received his water. He
could very well have been simply arguing about the ordinance. He may have water from a
different water system that goes through a meter. The jury was not instructed that only one
possible source of water could have a meter attached. The facts in this case do not allow a
reasonable person to conclude the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court
should reverse the jury's finding.

v.
A.

Introduction
If the Magistrate Court did not err in dismissing the case because Spirit Lake Ordinance

7-4-10 is constitutional, then the Court erred in refusing the defendant's proposed jury instruction
that the city's property did not extend beyond the meter.
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B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Idaho v. Button, 134

Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997).
C.

The defendant was entitled to his proposed jury instruction.
The defendant requested that the jury be instructed as to the language at the start of the

ordinance. The City of Spirit Lake thought it was important to include it, and the defendant
believe it is as well. The Idaho Supreme Court held, in State v. Lanliford, 113 Idaho 688, 694
(1987):
Where the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly state the
law and are not inconsistent, but may be reasonably and fairly
harmonized, it will be assumed that the jury gave due
consideration to the whole charge and was not misled by any
isolated portion thereof
Due to the difficult of deciphering what Ordinance 7-4-10 intends, it is difficult to know whether
or not the language requested is necessary to understand it, but because it is a criminal charge, the
defendant argues that the jury should have been able to view all of the law- particularly since an
element of the crime required the defendant to be using the city's water.
VI.
A.

Introduction
The Court erred in overruling the defendant's objections to the prosecutor's voir dire

questions dealing with law.
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B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Idaho v. Button, 134

Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997).
C.

The prosecutor's questions as to the opinions of the jury as to the law were improper.
The goal ofvoir dire is to assure retention of a fair and impartial jury. State v. Hart, 112

Idaho 759, 761 (Ct.App.1987). Attorneys are given wide latitude in asking questions to
determine whether there are grounds to challenge a juror, either for cause or peremptorily. State
v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 819 (1967); State v. Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310,312 (Ct.App.1984).
However, the questions must be designed to address the venirepersons' qualifications to sit as
jurors. Idaho Criminal Rule 24(b) specifies that "[a]ny question propounded by an attorney to a
prospective juror which is not directly relevant to the qualifications of the juror, or is not
reasonably calculated to discover the possible existence of a ground for challenge, or has been
previously answered, shall be disallowed by the court.... " Thus, questions that are designed not to
elicit factual information from the juror, but to inquire into a juror's personal knowledge or
understanding ofthe law are impermissible. State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239,244 (1969); State v.
Hoagland, 39 Idaho 405, 417 (1924).
As the Court found in State v. Severance, 132 Idaho 637, 639 (Ct.App.1999):

If a query into a potential juror's personal knowledge ofexisting
and applicable law is not relevant to the jury selection process, the
prosecutor's inquiry here, asking the venireperson's beliefs about
how the law should be changed, is even further afield The only
law applicable to Severance's guilt or innocence was that which
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was in effect at the time of the alleged offense and upon which the
jurors were obligated to take instruction from the trial court. The
prosecutor's request for disclosure of a prospective juror's attitude
toward lowering the BAC limit was not designed to reveal
anything about the individual's ability to sit as a fair and unbiased
juror.
In this case, the prosecutor asked about the jurors' opinion of the law at hand, of laws
they believed ridiculous in general, and of the importance oflaw in general. Tr Vol. II, p. 23, L.
24-25, p. 24, L. 1-25, p. 25, L. 1-22, p. 29, L. 6-12,9-25, p. 30, L. 1-25, p. 31, L. 1-25, p. 32, L.
1-21. None of these were proper subjects for the prosecutor's voir dire. The judge's ruling was
in error. If such questions are going to be allowed, then certainly defense counsel should be
allowed to ask the very same questions at any trial. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
305-6 (2004).
CONCLUSION
The case before this Court requires it to review an ordinance that violates the values of
the community by being both anticompetitive and anticharity. The ordinance is first, extremely
difficult to read, second, goes beyond the powers vested in the municipality that passed it, and
most of all, an improper and arbitrary abuse of power. This Court must strike it down and
reverse the judgment.
Even if this Court does find a way to save the ordinance from nullification, the
interpretation of the statute by the lower Court was faulty, the jury was tainted by improper voir
dire questions by the state, and the whole law was hidden from the jury's view. The judgment
cannot stand, and this Court should reverse it and remand.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature ofthe Case

This is an appeal from a verdict entered by the Magistrate Court fmding Michael J.
Freitas (Appellant) guilty of misdemeanor violation of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10Unlawful Act Regarding a Water System. A six-person jury found Appellant guilty of violation
of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 after a trial. The Magistrate Court previously denied
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and held that the ordinance in question was constitutional.
B.

Facts and Procedural History

On or about September 28, 2012, Officer Terry Wise, of the Spirit Lake Police
Department, cited Michael J. Freitas (hereinafter Appellant) for providing water to his neighbor's
residence in violation of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 89, L. 7-18). The
neighboring residence in question is located at 5822 West Rhode Island Street, in Spirit Lake,
Idaho and was owned by George Adams at the time this incident occurred. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 64, L.
20-25). City records indicated that water service to Mr. Adams' residence had been turned off by
the City of Spirit Lake on July 26, 2012. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 65, L. 2-13). Further, city records
indicated that water service had been turned back on to the above mentioned residence on
October 18, 2012. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 65, L. 14-21). On September 27, 2012, Officer Wise had
advised Appellant that he was in violation of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 by running a hose
from his trailer to his neighbor's residence where water service had been shut off. (Tr. Vol. II, p.
84, L. 7-25, p. 85 L. 1-13). Officer Wise could actually see that water was freely flowing from
the hose, as water was squirting out at a point where the two hoses were connected. (Tr. Vol. II,
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p. 86, L. 13-20). Officer Wise provided a highlighted copy of the City ordinance 7-4-10 to the
Appellant and issued a verbal warning to discontinue the delivery of water, but did not cite
Appellant for the offense at that time. Tr. Vol. II, p. 87, L. 13-17, p. 88 L. 2-4). The next day,
September 28, 2012, when Officer Wise returned to the Appellant's residence, located at 5870
Rhode Island Street, in Spirit Lake Idaho, Officer Wise observed the hose was still being used to
transport City water to the neighboring residence and Appellant was cited for violating said
ordinance. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 89, L. 7-25).
After Appellant was handed a copy of the citation, he indicated that he didn't believe he
was doing anything wrong, so long as he was paying for the water that was going through his
meter. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 89, L. 2-21). Appellant further indicated that he was in fact providing water
to his neighbors, at George Adams' residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 90, L. 4-24).
On January 3, 2013, the Magistrate Court heard Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. The
Court denied the Motion to Dismiss and held that the statute was constitutional. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 28,
L. 7-25). This case then went to trial on January 8, 2013.

Appellant was found guilty of

Unlawful Act Regarding Water System, a violation of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10, and
sentence was imposed by the Court at that same date and time. Sentence was subsequently
stayed, pending appeal.
Appellant subsequently filed this appeal, alleging that the Magistrate Court erred in
holding that Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 was constitutional, that the Court erred in
refusing to give Appellant's proposed jury instruction #6, that the Court erred in denying
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Appellant's Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal, and finally that the Court erred in not overruling
Appellant's objections to the State's line of questioning during voir dire.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

The Magistrate Court did not err in upholding the constitutionality of Spirit Lake
City Ordinance 7-4-10.

II.

The Magistrate Court did not err in refusing to give Appellant's proposed Jury
Instruction #6.

Ill.

The Magistrate Court did not err in denying Appellant's Motion for Acquittal
under Idaho Criminal Rule 29.

IV.

The Magistrate Court did not err by not overruling Appellant's objections to the
State's line of questioning in voir dire.

3
Michael Jay Freitas

41378

182 of 235

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Criminal Rules provide that all appeals from a magistrate court not involving a trial
de novo shall be heard by the district court as an appellate proceeding 1• An appellate court
exercises free review over questions of law. Powers v. Sellers, 130, 132, Idaho 122, 125
(Ct.App.1997). However, Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope.
See State v. Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170, 172, 244 P.3d 1256, 1258 (Ct.App.2010). A judgment of

conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on appeal where there is
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution
sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Herrera-Brita, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998); State v.
Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.1991). We will not substitute our

view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at
104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct.App.1985).
Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. HerreraBrita, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001.

1

ICR54.17(a)
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.

Appellant alleges that the city of Spirit Lake does not have the authority to regulate
Appellant's use of City water once it is paid for, and that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is
unconstitutionally vague and should be struck down. However, the State of Idaho through its
Constitution and Legislature, has specifically authorized municipalities to make and enact
ordinances and other laws, and to enforce such laws by way of criminal sanctions. Such laws
must be upheld unless found to be in conflict with the general laws of the State, or found to be
unreasonable and arbitrary. The burden is placed on the challenging party to prove that such laws
are in conflict with general state laws, or that they are unreasonable or arbitrary. Further, there is
a strong presumption that statutes are constitutional unless shown to be impermissibly vague on
its face or as it is applied. Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 must be upheld, as it has a clear
meaning as to what it prohibits and can clearly be applied to Appellant's case at hand.

A. Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 is Not Unconstitutionally Vague on its Face or as
Applied.
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment ofthe United States Constitution
requires that the laws of the United States and of the several states not be vague when defining
criminal conduct. Idaho v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,711,69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). The U.S.
Constitution and policy requires that "no [person] ... be required at the peril ofloss ofliberty to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." I d.
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A statute is unconstitutional and therefore void-for-vagueness where "its prohibitions are
not clearly defined." !d. A prohibition is not clearly defined if it "fails to give adequate notice to
people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes ... or if it fails to establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute." !d. at
712, 69 P.3d 132. The key to determining whether a statute is void-for-vaguness "is not the
possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it
establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what the fact is." United

States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285,286, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1835 (2008). In cases of constitutional
challenges, the burden is on the challenging party; there is a strong presumption in favor of the
validity of a statute. Idaho v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780,783,992 P.2d 775,778 (1999).
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague in two, mutually exclusive,
ways. Burton v. Dep 't ofTransp., 149 Idaho 746, 748,240 P.3d 933, 935 (2010). First, "[a]
statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face[.]" !d. A statute is facially
unconstitutional if "'the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.'" Korsen, 13 8
Idaho 712, 69 P.3d 132.
Second, a statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague "as applied to the
complainant's conduct." Burton, 149 Idaho 748, 240 P.3d 935. A statute is unconstitutionally
vague as applied if "the statute failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific
conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled
discretion in determining whether to charge the complainant." !d.
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1. FACIAL CHALLENGE.
A statute is unconstitutionally facially vague if there are no circumstances under which
the statute could be constitutionally applied. Idaho v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 199, 969 P.2d 244,
248 (1998). A statute can survive a constitutional challenge where there is an identifiable
circumstance in ''which the statute or ordinance unquestionably could be constitutionally
applied." !d. at 247, 969 P.2d 247.
Spirit Lake Ordinance § 7-4-1 0 states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, turn on or off,
permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or other
building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter... "
This ordinance is not ambiguous and its language is clear when given its "commonly understood,
everyday mea.nlngs." Idaho v. Warriorwoman, 2008 WL 4202272 at *5 (Idaho Dist., 1st Dist.,
Aug. 15, 2008) (unpublished opinion); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133. A person of
ordinary intelligence can understand that this statute means that a person cannot "connect or
deliver" Spirit Lake water to an individual for the use within a residence that is not otherwise
provided with Spirit Lake city water. Basically, the City of Spirit Lake is seeking to keep private
homeowners from acting as private regulatory entities and providing water service to other
residents who have decided not to pay for their own water service. This is exactly how Defense
Counsel has read the statute, "The ordinance makes it unlawful for a person to permit connection
or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water
service in accordance with this chapter." Defendant's Motion to Dismiss p. 3. As such, there is a
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specific and identifiable circumstance where this ordinance can be constitutionally applied, and
the void for vagueness challenge for the facial prong should fail.
2.

AS APPLIED.

To determine whether a law is void-for-vagueness under an as applied challenge, the
court should apply a two prong test. Idaho v. Foelsch, 2009 WL 3287575, at *3 (Idaho Dist., 1st
Dist., Sept. 17, 2009) (unpublished opinion). The law will be unconstitutionally vague, as
applied, if "(1) the law [does not] create minimum guidelines for police, judges, or juries charged
with enforcement ofthe statute; and (2) [the law does not] provide a reasonable person with
adequate and fair warning of the proscribed conduct." ld. In other words, a law is
unconstitutionally vague if it gives authorities ''unbridled discretion" and it does not put the
individual on notice of what action is required or forbidden. Korsen, 138 Idaho 712, 69 P.3d 132.
As mentioned above, the statute prohibits a person from connecting to or delivering Spirit
Lake water to an individual for the use within a residence or building, which is not otherwise
being provided with water service. In the present case the Defendant connected and used a hose
to deliver water from his trailer to his neighbor's residence. (Tr. Vol. II., p. 90, L. 4-23). His
neighbor's residence had previously had its water service shut off on July 26, 2012. (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 65, L. 7-13). Appellant's conduct in this matter is exactly what the ordinance sought to
prohibit. Further, Appellant was previously put on notice that his conduct was in violation of said
ordinance on September 27,2012. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 84, L. 7-25). Officer Wise made contact with
Appellant and handed him a copy of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-1 0, also issuing him a
verbal warning to discontinue providing water to his neighbor's residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 88, L.
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7-25). A reasonable person reading the above portion of the ordinance in question would
understand the conduct that it seeks to prohibit.
In this case, Appellant was sufficiently placed on notice that his conduct violated said
ordinance, but he chose to ignore the verbal warning he received on September 27, 2012 and
continued providing his water to his neighbor's residence via a hose. As applied to the facts of
this case, Appellant's conduct clearly violates said ordinance. Said ordinance puts an individual
on notice of what conduct is forbidden and provides law enforcement and Judges guidelines for
how to enforce it. As such, the ordinance can be constitutionally applied to the facts of this
particular case and the void for vagueness challenge under the "as applied" prong should fail.

B. Appellant has not Shown that the Implication of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10
Amounts to a Taking.
The "Just Compensation Clause," which is also referred to as the "Takings Clause," is a
"complicated and multi-faceted area of constitutional law. Boise Tower Associates, LLC v.

Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 215 P.3d 494, 503-04 (Idaho 2009). A government must provide
compensation if the government's "regulations deprive an owner of ' all economically beneficial
us[e]' ofher property." !d. quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538, 125 S.Ct. at 2081, 161 L.Ed.2d at
887 (2005). ((emphasis and bracket in original). 2 There is no claim of inverse condemnation,
claim under the Takings Clause, "unless an actual taking of private property is established."

2

A taking may also include where the government physically modifies the property interest of a
party, or where the taking is temporary in nature. Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147
Idaho 774215 P.3d 494, 503-04 (Idaho 2009). Neither of these types of taking apply to the
ordinance in question in the present case.
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Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777,780,53 P.3d 828, 831 (Idaho 2002) citing Snyder
v. State, 92 Idaho 175, 179, 438 P.2d 920, 924 (1968).
In the present case, whether the City of Spirit Lake has a property interest or not in City
water, there is no taking that requires compensation. The Spirit Lake City Ordinance simply
denies a person who is paying for city water from sharing it with an individual who does not
have running water at their residence. Not only is the interference with use of water de minimus,
but citizens of Spirit Lake retain almost the entire economic value in the water, and what is lost
falls nowhere near "all economically beneficial use." Further, the appropriate remedy under the
Taking Clause is to provide the compensation for depriving the owner of a property interest, not
to dismiss an action or find a regulation unconstitutional. Appellant therefore cannot establish
that a taking has occurred, and as such, the Takings Clause has no implication requiring the
conviction to be overturned.
C. The City of Spirit Lake has the Lawful Authority to Pass Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-410, and to Enforce it via Criminal Sanctions.
A municipality may make and enforce "all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. Caesar v. State, 101
Idaho 158, 161, 610 P.2d 517, 520 (Idaho 1980) quoting Idaho Const. art. XII,§ 2. This
constitutional grant of powers is viewed "as a grant oflocal police powers to Idaho cities." !d.
"The burden falls on the party challenging the validity of a police power to show that it is either
in conflict with the general laws ofthe state, unreasonable or arbitrary. Potts Canst. Co. v. N

Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 682, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (Idaho 2005) citing Plummer v. City of
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Fruitland, 139 Idaho 810, 813, 87 P.3d 297, 300 (2004). "Generally courts are not concerned
with the wisdom of ordinances and will uphold a municipal ordinance unless it is clearly
unreasonable or arbitrary." !d. Further, "[i]t is well recognized that the social objective of
preventing fmancial hardship and possible reliance upon the welfare agencies of the state is a
permissible goal of police power action." Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101,416 P.2d
46,49 (Idaho 1966) citing Home Accident Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 34 Ariz. 201, 269
P. 501 (1928).
The Idaho Legislator has also granted cities the authority to create regulations "to
maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, commerce and
industry." I.C. § 50-302. I.C. § 50-302 provides:
(1) Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and resolutions not
inconsistent with the laws of the state of Idaho as may be expedient, in addition to the
special powers in this act granted, to maintain the peace, good government and
welfare of the corporation and its trade, commerce and industry. Cities may enforce
all ordinances by fine, including an infraction penalty, or incarceration; provided,
however, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, that the maximum
punishment of any offense shall be by fine of not more than one thousand dollars
($1,000) or by imprisonment not to exceed six (6) months, or by both such fme and
imprisonment.
This Statute expressly authorizes that a city may enforce these ordinances through fmes and by
incarceration. !d.
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Further, one such trade, commerce, and industry a city may regulate under§ I.C. 50-302
includes the management of a city water system. See I. C. §50-323. Specifically, I. C. §50-323
provides that:
Cities are hereby empowered to establish, create, develop, maintain and operate domestic
water systems; provide for domestic water from wells, streams, water sheds or any other
source; provide for storage, treatment and transmission of the same to the inhabitants of
the city; and to do all things necessary to protect the source of water from contamination.
The term "domestic water systems" and "domestic water" includes by way of example
but not by way of limitation, a public water system providing water at any temperature
for space heating or cooling, culinary, sanitary, recreational or therapeutic uses.
The City of Spirit Lake has exercised its lawful authority under the Idaho Constitution
and Legislative Powers to pass Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10. This statute prohibits an
individual from allowing connection or delivery of city water to third persons for use within a
residence that is not receiving city water. The City created this ordinance in an attempt to prevent
unlawful sharing of city water for the use in a residence which does not have running water. The
City of Spirit Lake is well within its authority to develop, maintain, and operate its domestic
water system as the sole regulator of such a system.
Appellant argues that I.C. § 50-1030(±) acts to limit a municipalities' authority to provide
criminal sanctions in order to enforce ordinances. However, I. C. § 50-1030(±) provides that "In
addition to the powers which it may now have, any city shall have power under and subject to
the following provisions" which include:
To prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the levy or assessment of
such rates, fees, tolls or charges against governmental units, departments or agencies,
including the state ofldaho and its subdivisions, for the services, facilities and
commodities furnished by such works, or by such rehabilitated existing electrical
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generating facilities, and to provide methods of collections and penalties, including denial
of service for nonpayment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges.
I. C. § 50-1 030(f) does not act as a limitation on what municipalities are authorized to do in order
to enforce such ordinances in relation to maintaining a cities' water system, but indicates that "in
addition to the powers which it may now have" the city may also have the power to "prescribe
and collect rates, fees ... and to provide methods of collections and penalties, including denial of
service for nonpayment of such rates ... See Jd This statute simply gives municipalities further
powers, in addition to powers already granted, to charge for services and to provide for civil
penalties, including denial of services should such fees not be paid. This cannot be read to
prohibit a municipality from enforcing such laws and ordinances by way of criminal penalties,
but should be read to give municipalities further powers to regulate/maintain a cities' water
system.
As such, the City of Spirit Lake certainly has been granted the power by the State
Legislature to regulate, maintain, and operate the city's water system and to create ordinance 74-10, which provides for criminal sanctions and monetary penalties, as an enforcement
mechanism.
II.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION #6.
A. Appellant's Proposed Jury Instruction #6 was not a Clarifying Instruction that
Related to any of the Elements of the Offense Charged and Thus the Court's
Refusal to Give it as an Instruction was not Improper.
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When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole, and not
individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942,
866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct.App.1993).
Appellant argues that it was in error for the Magistrate Court not to utilize Appellant's
Proposed Jury Instruction #6 which stated:
The Spirit Lake city water system is property of the city up to and including any shutoff
valve and/or meter which may be installed at or near the property line of any lot.
The State did not object to the Instruction being admitted. However, the Magistrate Court's
refusal to use Appellant's Proposed Jury Instruction #6 was not in error, as it didn't help to
clarify any of the elements of the crime the State had to prove. The fact that any shutoff valve or
meter at or near a property line is property of the city, was not clarifying information that needed
to be included in jury instructions. The instructions that were given, fairly and accurately
depicted the applicable law. The Proposed Instruction was not necessary, as all the State had to
prove was that Appellant permitted connection or delivery of city water to third persons.
III.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
RULE 29 MOTION.
A. The Evidence Presented at Trial was Sufficient so that a Reasonable Trier of
Fact could have Concluded that Every Element of the Offense Charged was
Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, Thus Sustaining a Conviction.

Idaho Criminal Rule 29 states:
The court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of
judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information or
complaint after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.
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When the defendant moves under I.C.R. 29, or a judgment of acquittal, the trial court, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, must determine whether the inculpatory
evidence presented as to any essential element ofthe crime is so insubstantial that jurors could
not help but have a reasonable doubt. State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 492, 988 P.2d 715, 718.
(Ct.App.1999) citing to State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 480, 482, 776 P.2d 1199, 1201
(Ct.App.1989). Upon review, this Court must determine whether the evidence presented at trial
was sufficient to sustain a conviction of the crime charged. See State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927,
930, 877 P.2d 898, 901 (1994).
Appellant argues that the State failed to prove Element #3 beyond a reasonable doubt;
that the water being provided from Appellant's home to his neighbor's residence was city water.
Here, the State presented evidence that when Officer Wise issued the citation to Appellant, he
indicated that "as long as the water was going through his meter and he's paying for it, that he
should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with his water, that he could put it in his yard or
give it to a neighbor." Tr. Vol. II, p. 89 L. 21-25, p. 90 L. 1-3. Appellant further indicated that he
was paying for the water he was receiving at his home and that it "went through his meter." Tr.
Vol. II, p. 89 L. 21-25, p. 90 L. 4-20. The State argued during the Rule 29 Motion, that when
Officer Wise was asked whether Appellant indicated that he was paying for city water, she
indicated that he said he was. Tr. Vol. II, p. 94 L. 1-11. In this case, there is substantial
circumstantial evidence, if not direct evidence, that Appellant was in fact paying for the City of
Spirit Lake water service. As such, the evidence as presented, viewed in light most favorable to
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the non-moving party, was not so insubstantial that jurors could not help but to have a reasonable
doubt as to proof of Element #3. As such, Appellant's Rule 29 Motion was properly denied.
IV.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING
APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS DURING THE STATE'S QUSTIONS DURING
VOIR DIRE.
A. Appellant's Objections During Voir Dire were Properly Overruled.

I.C.R. 24 (b) provides in part that:
Any question propounded by an attorney to a prospective juror which is not directly
relevant to the qualifications of the juror, or is not reasonably calculated to discover the
possible existence of a ground for challenge, or has been previously answered, shall be
disallowed by the court upon objection or upon the court's own initiative.
The goal of voir dire is to assure retention of a fair and impartial jury. To this end, the trial judge
is vested with broad discretion in establishing the boundaries beyond which the voir dire
examination will not extend. State v. Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310,678 P.2d 102 (Ct.App.1984).
The imposition of limitations will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Camarillo, supra; State v. Merrifield, 109 Idaho 11, 704 P.2d 343 (Ct.App.1985). However, if

improper questions were allowed during voir dire, not every trial error calls for reversal of a
judgment, however; a conviction may not be disturbed for an error that did not affect the
substantial rights ofthe parties. See I.C.R. 52. A trial error will be deemed harmless if the
appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the
same result in the case had the error not occurred. State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 821, 839 P.2d
1223, 1235 (Ct.App.1992).
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In this case, the State asked questions regarding prospective jurors thoughts on the Spirit
Lake City Ordinance in question, in order to determine if any jurors thought the law was
something that shouldn't be taken very seriously. The State's intentions were to see ifthere were
any preconceived notions about the validity of the law, and if prospective jurors would be able to
try the case fairly. The State was not asking questions regarding the prospective jurors'
understanding of the law, but whether or not they had any problem in applying an ordinance that
likely most of the jurors had never heard of before. The State also asked questions relating to the
importance of rules and laws, all of which were designed to illicit the juror's attitudes regarding
what to do if they disagree with a law. These questions were proper, as they were relevant to the
prospective jurors' qualifications. For example, if these questions brought out a juror's belief that
he or she didn't have to abide by rules and laws, this would be cause for the State to exercise a
for cause challenge. The Magistrate Court properly allowed such a line of questioning. However,
if this Court found that such line of questioning was improper, such an error should be deemed
harmless, as it did not affect the substantial rights of the Appellant.
CONCLUSION

The State asserts that the Magistrate Court did not err in denying Appellant's Motion to
Dismiss, and thus the constitutionality of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-1 0 should be upheld.
Further, the State argues that the Magistrate Court did not err in denying Appellant's Rule 29
Motion, and the District Court should not overturn such a ruling. The State does not believe the
Magistrate Court erred by allowing the State's line of questioning during voir dire, and finally
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

The state errs in all of its argument regarding the constitutionality of the
ordinance.
ARGUMENT
I.

A.

The state incorrectly states the test for a void for vagueness challenge.
The state quotes State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195 (1998), for the incorrect analysis for a void

for vagueness challenge to a criminal statute. The defendant asks this Court to recognize that, in
light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent that so holds, and despite Idaho Supreme Court precedent
to the contrary, in the context of criminal laws a Fourteenth Amendment, facial-vagueness
challenge does not require a showing that the law is unconstitutionally vague in all its
applications.
Generally, the doctrine of stare decisis requires a court to follow controlling precedent
unless there is a compelling reason to depart from such precedent. See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 131
Idaho 239, 240 (1998). Such reasons include where the controlling precedent is manifestly
vnong; where it has proven over time to be unwise or unjust; or where overruling the precedent is
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. !d. Prior
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court concludes that, in order for a facial vagueness challenge
to a criminal law to be successful, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003)
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abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069 (U.S.Mich.2013); State v.
Hellickson, 135 Idaho 742, 745 (2001); State v. Prather, 135 Idaho 770, 773 (2001); State v.
Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 784 (1999); Cobb, 132 Idaho at 199; State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 587
(1990).
These decisions have universally relied upon the United States Supreme Court decision in
Village ofHoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982), as the source of this rule. Korsen, 138
Idaho at 712; Leferink, 133 Idaho at 784; Cobb, 132 Idaho at 199; Bitt, 118 Idaho at 587.1
However, reliance upon the specific standard from Village ofHoffman Estates is misplaced as it has
been expressly stated by the United States Supreme Court to be an improper standard in the context
of a Fourteenth Amendment, facial-vagueness challenge to a criminal law. Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 358 (1983); see also City ofChicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (plurality
opinion).
The United States Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates was called upon to
address the issue of whether a local civil ordinance requiring businesses to obtain a license in
order to sell certain classes of products was unconstitutionally vague on its face. Village of
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 491-492. In the context ofthis regulatory statute, the Court held
that, "a 'facial' challenge, in this context, means a claim that the law is 'invalid in toto- and
therefore incapable of any valid application."' !d. at 495, n.5 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 474 (1974)). The Court in Village of Hoffman Estates proceeded to clarify that this

1 While Hellickson and Prather cite to Cobb as the legal authority in support of this standard, the Court in Cobb
cites to Village of Hoffman Estates as the legal authority for this rule. Hellickson, 135 Idaho at 746, 24 P.3d at 63;
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rule was a "less strict vagueness test" than would normally be applied because the ordinance was
an economic regulation and that the "degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates"
depends upon the nature of the enactment. Id. at 498.
The United States Supreme Court has subsequently specifically articulated that the
standard from Village of Hoffman Estates that required a showing that the statute was vague in
all of its applications is not the correct standard when the law at issue imposes criminal penalties.

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, n.8 (1983). In Kolender, the Court articulated several
reasons why this standard was inapplicable where the law being challenged is a criminal law.
Importantly, the Court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that, where a law imposes criminal
penalties, "the standard of certainty is higher." Id. In other words, the Court will require more
definiteness to the language of criminal laws in order to pass constitutional muster, and will
correspondingly impose greater scrutiny to claims that a criminal law is unconstitutionally void
for vagueness. As the Court noted, "this concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal
statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application." ld.
The Court in Kolender also went on to note that the standard articulated in Village of

Hoffman Estates was a "iess strict vagueness standard" applied because, "the ordinance in
Hoffman Estates 'simply regulates business behavior,' and that 'economic regulation is subject to
a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow."' ld. (quoting Village

of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499).

Prather, 135 Idaho at 773,25 P.3d at 86.
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In addition, in Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court relied upon United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 745 (1987). However, just as in Hoffman Estates, in Salerno the United States
Supreme Court addressed a regulatory statute, not a statute which imposes criminal punishment:
Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive due process
because the pretrial detention it authorizes constitutes impermissible
punishment before trial. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, and
n. 16 (1979). The Government, however, has never argued that
pretrial detention could be upheld if it were "punishment." The Court
of Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act
is regulatory, not penal, and we agree that it is.

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746. Thus, application of the standards articulated in Salerno is inappropriate
when the statute at issue authorizes criminal penalties, i.e. punishment.
As shown above, prior Idaho precedent requiring a showing that a criminal law is
impermissibly vague in all its applications is directly contrary to the express holding of the
United States Supreme Court in Kolendar, which articulates the proper standard for a Fourteenth
Amendment based facial-vagueness challenge to a law which imposes criminal penalties. As
such, the line of Idaho cases which apply the "less strict vagueness standard" from cases
addressing regulatory statutes to claims to federal constitutional claims addressing criminal
statutes is manifestly wrong and was expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court as
such. Rather, because the defendant brings his claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the ordinance at issue imposes
criminal penalties, the proper analysis to be applied is that articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Kolender, which allows a law which imposes a criminal penalty to be
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invalidated on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application. 461
U.S. at 358.
B.

The state fails to provide authority for its illogical argument that the defendant by making
any other argument against a law that requires him to interpret it somehow provides proof
that the law is not vague.
The state apparently argues that because defense counsel stated an interpretation of the

ordinance within the context of an argument as to its validity the statute cannot possibly be void
for vagueness. The state seems to be arguing that if a defendant makes an argument against a
vague statute besides challenging its vagueness he has waived his argument by conceding that the
statute is not vague. The state's reasoning would be infallible if not for the fact that the
defendant's argument exists within the context of the state's application of the statute to his
conduct. Thus, obviously the defendant may both challenge the adequacy of the state's
interpretation as well as point out that the law itself is so vague as to offend the Constitution.
Further, the state cites no authority for its assertion that the defendant has somehow
conceded the clarity of a statute by using the state's interpretation for an argument. When issues
on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be
considered. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). A party waives an issue cited on appeal
if either authority or argument is lacking. I d. This Court should not consider arguments made
without authority. See State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 288 P.3d 840, 845 (Ct.App.2012).
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C.

The state's argument that because a police officer told the defendant the executive's
interpretation of the ordinance the law cannot be vague as applied to his actions is a
complete misunderstanding of our judicial system.
The state makes the argument that because a police officer told the defendant to stop

providing water to his neighbor he was "on notice" as to what the law was. The state seems to
think that the executive has the authority to interpret the law, and that review of a law for
vagueness under the constitution is merely reviewing whether a police officer was able to charge
someone with violating the executive's interpretation of it. However, it is actually the judiciary
that is charged with the task of saying what the law is. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803). In addition, the question in a void for vagueness claim is whether the ordinance as
written is vague, not whether a police officer was able to formulate an interpretation and apply it
to the conduct at issue. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
D.

The state misinterprets I.C. § 50-1030.
The state argues that because I.C. § 50-1030 begins with "[i]n addition to the powers

which it may now have, any city shall have power under and subject to the following provisions,"
that the city of Spirit Lake was granted the power to criminally punish conduct involving its
water system. Prior to I. C. § 50-1030, however, a city would have a difficult time criminalizing
the use of a water system it had no power to build, operate or maintain. See I. C. § 50-1 030(a) &
(d). Certainly, any such law would have been irrational and arbitrary, much like outlawing a
person from transforming into a duck in the middle of town or speaking in tree.
A far better reading would be that in addition to powers already granted, the state
legislature further granted the municipality certain new, though limited, powers to create and
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maintain waterworks. Rather than read I.C. § 50-323 as granting cities the ability to provide
water however they choose to their residents and brand them as criminals for any deviation, with
I.C. § 50-1030 as merely suggestions as to sane methods for maintaining control, this Court
should read I.C. § 50-1030 as providing the means the legislature saw fit for the survival of
municipal waterworks.
The defendant would point out that the state appears to admit that Spirit Lake's ordinance
is for the purpose of creating a monopoly in violation of§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45, and § 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S. C. § 18.
DATED this "l_(
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STATE OF IDAHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
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OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR 12-18513

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
OPINION

Intermediate Appeal from the Magistrate's Division of the District Court of the First
Judicial District, State ofldaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Clark Peterson, Magistrate.
Judgment of conviction for Unlawful Act Regarding Water System, affirmed.
Jay Logsdon, Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender's Office, appeared and
argued for Defendant-Appellant.
Eileen McGovern, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, appeared and argued
for Plaintiff-Respondent.
I. Statement of the Case

This matter is a criminal appeal from the Magistrate's Division of the District
Court involving a misdemeanor conviction from a Spirit Lake City ordinance relating to
the City's water system. A jury found Defendant-Appellant Michael Jay Freitas (Freitas)
guilty of Unlawful Act Regarding Water System. The magistrate entered a judgment of
conviction and ordered Freitas to pay a fine. Freitas now appeals to this Court.
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II. Factual and Procedural History

Freitas lived next door to a residence located at 5822 West Rhode Island Street,
Spirit Lake, Idaho; said residence owned by George Adams. 1 Water service to that
residence had been turned off by the City on July 26, 2012, for non-payment of service
fees.
On September 27, 2012, Spirit Lake Police Officer Terry Wise advised Freitas
that he was in violation of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 (the Ordinance) because he had
water hoses running from Freitas's residence to Adams's. Officer Wise provided Freitas
with a copy of the Ordinance and issued a verbal warning to discontinue delivery of
water. Also on September 27, 2012, Brenda Nash (Nash), her son, his three children and
his fiance moved into the residence with Adams. 2
On September 28, 2012, Officer Wise cited Freitas for providing city water to his
neighbor's residence in violation of the Ordinance. On October 18, 2012, the water
service to Adams's residence was restored.
On December 12, 2012, Freitas filed his Motion to Dismiss.

In his motion,

Freitas argued that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, and even if the Ordinance was
constitutional, it was unconstitutionally applied. In the alternative, Freitas argued that the
Ordinance was void for vagueness. The state opposed the motion, and on January 3,
2013, the matter came on for hearing. After hearing argument, the magistrate orally
denied the Motion to Dismiss. 3

George Adams was also referred to at trial as Darrell Adams. Trial Transcript, p.69 at ~~ 17-19.
Freitas asserts that six individuals were residing in the residence at the time. The trial transcript provides
that Adams was also residing in the residence as well, totaling seven individuals. Id at p. 70, ~~ 2-4.
3
The appellate record does not contain a written order denying the Motion to Dismiss.
1

2
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On January 8, 2013, the jury trial commenced. At the conclusion of the state's
case, Freitas moved for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. The jury returned a
guilty verdict finding Freitas guilty ofUnlawful Act Regarding Water System. Also, on
January 8, 2013, the parties agreed to proceed to sentencing and Judgment was entered
ordering Freitas to pay a fine of $500.00 within 30 days; no jail or probation was
ordered. 4
On January 9, 2013, Freitas timely filed his Notice of Appeal. On January 16,
2013, this Court entered its Order to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal.
On March 12, 2013, Freitas filed his Appellate Brief. On May 20, 2013, the state
filed its Respondent's Brief. On May 22, 2013, Freitas filed his Reply Brief.
On July 1, 2013, this Court heard oral argument on appeal and deemed the matter
fully submitted.

III. Standards
I.C.R. 54.17 provides:
All appeals from a magistrate shall be heard by the district
court as an appellate proceeding unless the district court
orders a trial de novo as provided in these rules. The scope
of appellate review on appeal to the district court shall be
as follows:
(a) Upon an appeal from a magistrate to the district court,
not involving a trial de novo, the district court shall review
the case on the record and determine the appeal as an
appellate court in the same manner and upon the same
standards of review as an appeal from the district court to
the Supreme Court under the Idaho appellate rules.
In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, we "will uphold a judgment of
conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence upon which
4

Although I. C. § 50-302 provides the maximum fme for violation of an ordinance as up to $1,000.00, City
of Spirit Lake Ordinance 1-4-l(A) provides that the maximum penalty for violation of a Spirit Lake
ordinance is only $300.00. This has not been raised or mentioned by either party on appeal.
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a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d
414, 432 (2009). "Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and
rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been prove[n]." Id. On
appeal, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003). Further, we "will not
substitute our own judgment for that of the jury on matters such as the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given to certain evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence." Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432.
When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity
over the magistrate division, Idaho appellate courts review the magistrate court's decision
independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate
decision. Further, Idaho appellate courts will uphold the magistrate court's findings of
fact if they are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. See Swanson
v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000); Balderson v. Balderson, 127
Idaho 48, 51, 896 P.2d 956, 959 (1995). With respect to conclusions of law, appellate
courts exercise free review. Id.

IV. Discussion
Freitas asserts that the magistrate erred by: (1) finding the ordinance
constitutional; (2) finding that the ordinance is constitutional under the facts of this case;
(3) misinterpreting the statute resulting in Freitas being tried under the wrong elements;
(4) denying Freitas's Motion for Acquittal; (5) refusing to give Freitas's proposed jury
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instruction No. 6; and (6) overruling Freitas's objections to the state's vmr dire
questioning.

A. Is the ordinance vague on its face?
Freitas first argues that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face and
thus violates the notice requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution.

Freitas asserts that the

Ordinance has so many elements to it that it is "too confusing to provide either
reasonable persons or the government with any idea as to how it is meant to be enforced."
Appellant's Brief at p. 15.

The State argues that the Ordinance is not ambiguous and its language is clear
when given its commonly understood every day meanings. The Ordinance, the State
asserts, prohibits a person from connecting or delivering Spirit Lake water to an
individual for the use within a residence that is not otherwise provided with Spirit Lake
city water. Therefore, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that this is what
the Ordinance states.

City of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 provides:
UNLAWFUL ACT:
Every part of the city water system up to, and including,
any shutoff valve and/or meter, which may be installed at
or near the property line of any lot, is the property of the
city. It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to,
interfere or ta.•nper with, tum on or off, permit connection
or delivery of water to third persons for use within a
residence or other building not otherwise provided with
water service in accordance with this chapter, or to operate
or introduce any substance into any part of the city water
system unless that person is acting under the direct
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supervision of a qualified employee of the city or first
obtains express written permission from the mayor.
(Ord. 430, 8-22-1998).
City of Spirit Lake Ordinance 4-7-11 provides:
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION:
Any person found to be guilty of a violation of this chapter
shall be guilty of committing a misdemeanor offense. Each
and every violation and each and every day or part of a day
a violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense.
The penalty for misdemeanor offenses is that prescribed by
the most current Spirit Lake city ordinance prescribing the
penalty for misdemeanor offenses. (Ord. 430, 8-22-1998).
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires
that the laws of the U.S. and of the several states not be vague when defining criminal
conduct. See, Idaho v. Korsen, 138 Ida4o 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003), abrogated

on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 185 L.Ed.2d 124 (2013). The
U.S. Constitution and policy requires that no [person] ... be required at the peril ofloss of
liberty to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. !d. A statute is unconstitutional
and therefore void-for-vagueness where its prohibitions are not clearly defined. !d.
This Court finds that Ordinance 7-4-10 can be understandably broken down to
provide:

1. The City of Spirit Lake owns the water system up to a shut off valve and/or water
meter;
2.

It is unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with the City's

water system unless allowed to do so by City ordinance;
3. It is unlawful to turn on/off the City's water system unless allowed to do so by
City ordinance;
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4. It is unlawful to allow someone to connect to the City water system unless
allowed;
5. It is unlawful to deliver water provided by the City's water system to someone
who is not receiving City water when that water is to be used inside a residence or
building that is not receiving City water; and
6. It is unlawful to put any substance into the City's water system without
permission from a qualified City employee or the mayor of Spirit Lake.
Therefore, this Court finds that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague on
its face because its prohibitions are clearly defined and a person of ordinary intelligence
would understand the Ordinance. As such, the magistrate did not err by denying Freitas's
Motion to Dismiss.
B. Is the Ordinance unconstitutionally vague when applied to the facts?

Freitas argues that "criminalizing the act of charitably gifting water one has paid
for to another goes beyond the boundaries of our national values .... " Appellant's Brief at
p. 28. Further, Freitas argues that the Ordinance is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Article I §§ 1, 4, 14; Article XII § 2, and Article
XV §§ 1, 4 and 5 of the Idaho Constitutions. Lastly, Freitas argues that because the
ordinance goes beyond the boundaries of protecting to actually harming our society's
welfare[,] the Ordinance must be struck down. Appellant's Briefat p. 32.
The State argues that Freitas connected and used a hose to deliver water from his
hose to his neighbor's residence, which is exactly the conduct that the Ordinance
prohibits. Further, Officer Wise informed Freitas of the violation of the Ordinance,
provided Freitas with a copy of the Ordinance and gave him a warning to stop providing
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the water to Adams' residence. This sufficiently provided Freitas with notice and the
Ordinance provides courts and law enforcement guidelines for enforcement. Therefore,
the State asserts that the Ordinance is not unconstitutional when applied to the facts of
this case.
A statute may be unconstitutionally vague as applied to the complainant's
conduct. Burton v. Dep't ofTransp., 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d 933, 935 (2010). A
statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied if the statute failed to provide fair notice
that the complainant's specific conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient
guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge the
complainant. Id.
A municipality may make and enforce "all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. Caesar v.

State, 101 Idaho 158, 161, 610 P.2d 517 (1980) (quoting Idaho Const. Art. XII, §2). This
constitutional grant of powers is viewed as a grant of local police powers to Idaho cities.
Id. The burden falls on the party challenging the validity of a police power to show that

it is in conflict with the general laws of the state, unreasonable or arbitrary. Potts Canst.

Co. v. N Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 682, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (2005) (citations
omitted). Generally courts are not concerned with the wisdom of ordinances and will
uphold a municipal ordinance unless it is clearly unreasonable or arbitrary. Id. Further, it
is well recognized that the social objective of preventing financial hardship and possible
reliance upon the welfare agencies of the state is a permissible goal of police power
action. Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101, 16 P.2d 46, 49 (1966) (citations
omitted).
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Article XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides:
Local police regulations authorized. Any county or
incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its
limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations
as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general
laws.

I.C. § 50-302 provides:
Promotion of general welfare -- Prescribing penalties.
(1) Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules,
regulations and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of
the state of Idaho as may be expedient, in addition to the
special powers in this act granted, to maintain the peace,
good government and welfare of the corporation and its
trade, commerce and industry. Cities may enforce all
ordinances by fine, including an infraction penalty, or
incarceration; provided, however, except as provided in
subsection (2) of this section, that the maximum
punishment of any offense shall be by fine of not more than
one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment not to
exceed six (6) months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
(2) Any city which is participating in a federally mandated
program, wherein penalties or enforcement remedies are
required by the terms of participation in the program, may
enforce such requirements by ordinance, to include a
criminal or civil monetary penalty not to exceed one
thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisonment for criminal
offenses not to exceed six (6) months, or to include both a
fine and imprisonment for criminal offenses.

The Idaho Legislature has specifically addressed various trades, commerce, and
industries a city may regulate under I.C. § 50-302(a), e.g., transit atid domestic water
systems.
I.C. § 50-323 provides:
Domestic water systems.
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Cities are hereby empowered to establish, create, develop,
maintain and operate domestic water systems; provide for
domestic water from wells, streams, water sheds or any
other source; provide for storage, treatment and
transmission of the same to the inhabitants of the city; and
to do all things necessary to protect the source of water
from contamination. The term "domestic water systems"
and "domestic water" includes by way of example but not
by way of limitation, a public water system providing water
at any temperature for space heating or cooling, culinary,
sanitary, recreational or therapeutic uses.

I.C. § 50-1030(f) provides:
Powers.
In addition to the powers which it may now have, any city
shall have power under and subject to the following
provisions:
(f) To prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges,
including the levy or assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or
charges against governmental units, departments or
agencies, including the state of Idaho and its subdivisions,
for the services, facilities and commodities furnished by
such works, or by such rehabilitated existing electrical
generating facilities, and to provide methods of collections
and penalties, including denial of service for nonpayment
of such rates, fees, tolls or charges;

Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-9 provides:
DWELLING WITHOUT WATER SERVICE DECLARED
A HEALTH HAZARD AND A PUBLIC NUISANCE:
The human habitation of any residence or use of any other
building or structure for purposes other than warehousing
or storage of nonperishable goods or commodities where no
workers regularly labor without a ready supply of mnn.ing
potable water whether from the city system or other
authorized source, inside of such dwelling or other
structure shall constitute a health hazard and a public
nuisance. In such circumstances the city may cause
proceedings to be brought for the abatement of the
occupancy or use of such a place.
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A. Habitation Of Dwelling Without Water Service
Unlawful: The human habitation of any residential
dwelling or other building or structure without a required
source of running potable water as required by this chapter
shall be unlawful and subject to the penalty described in
section 7-4-11 ofthis chapter. (Ord. 430, 8-22-1998).

Freitas argues that I. C. § 50-1 030(f) limits a city to only collecting fees for a
service provided by the city, and it also limits penalties to denial of services, but not to
criminal prosecution.
This Court disagrees. I.C. § 50-302 grants cities the right to create and maintain
domestic water systems. I.C. § 50-1030(f) provides that a city may penalize a user,
including denying service. The including language is what Freitas argues limits Spirit
Lake from making a violation of the Ordinance a criminal penalty. However, Article XII
§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution and I.C. § 50-302 provide that a city may create ordinances

to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade,
commerce and industry. Further, cities may enforce all ordinances by fine, including an
infraction penalty, or incarceration.
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-9 shows that the City is attempting to maintain the
welfare of its citizens by ensuring that residences have running, potable water to prevent
health hazards. Further, the remaining sections of Chapter 4, Domestic Water Ordinance,
show that the City is attempting to maintain the welfare of its trade, commerce, and
industry, i.e. the City's water system. Spirit Lake Ordinance 4-7-11 provides the penalty
for violation of Ordinance 7-4-10, as allowed by the Idaho Legislature pursuant to I.C. §
50-1030(f) and Article XII§ 2 ofthe Idaho Constitution.
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Freitas also asserted that it is not proper to criminalize charitable acts. That may
be true in a generalized way, but in this situation, Freitas could have assisted the Nash
family by numerous "legal" methods, e.g., paying the re-connection fee, paying the
Nash's water bill, or allowing the Nash family to utilize Freitas' water inside his home
(showers, toilets, etc.).
Therefore, the Ordinance is constitutional on its face and as applied to the facts of
this case. As such, the magistrate did not err by denying Freitas' Motion to Dismiss.

C. Did the magistrate instruct the jury with the correct elements?
Freitas argues that the Magistrate did not properly read the Ordinance and
instructed the jury with the wrong elements.

Specifically, Freitas asserts that the

Ordinance relates to doing harm to the City's water system or illegally connecting to the
water system; however, the magistrate provided elements relating to delivering water to
third persons.
Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325,
806 P.2d 413, 418 (1990). In State v. Gleason, the Idaho Supreme Court provided, "[o]n
the issue of the jury instruction, we review the same to determine whether it charges the
jury with all matters necessary for their information with respect to the nature and
elements of the crime charged." 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691,694 (1992) (citation
omitted).
The record shows that at the January 3, 2012, hearing on Freitas' Motion to
Dismiss, the magistrate stated in his oral ruling:
Essentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connecting
to the City water system, improperly interfering with or
tampering with that system, uh, improperly turning on or
off the water system, uh, improperly connecting and
Page 12 of21
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delivering water to third persons under certain
circumstances, and then improperly operating or
introducing a substance into any part of the water system,
again under certain circumstances.
Motion Hearing Transcript (Vol. 1), p. 27 at ll. 10-17 (emphasis added).
The magistrate's understanding of the Ordinance's elements at the Motion to
Dismiss are sufficiently accurate. 5
The trial transcript contains a record of the elements instruction, which provides:
You're instructed that the essential elements ofthe crime of
unlawful act regarding water system which the defendant is
charged are: One, on or about the 28th of September 2012;
two, in Kootenai County, State of Idaho; three, the
defendant, Michael J. Freitas, permitted connection or
delivery of city water; four, to third persons; five, for use
within a residence; six, not otherwise provided with water
service. If any of the above has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.
If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.
Trial Transcript, p. 104, ll. 17-25; p. 105, ll.l-3.
This Court finds that these are the applicable elements for the crime charged in
this matter under the Ordinance, and as alleged by the state.
Therefore, Freitas was tried under the appropriate elements of the Ordinance, for
the criminal act he was alleged to have committed.

The magistrate did not err in

instructing the jury.

D. Did the Magistrate properly deny Freitas's Motion for Acguittal?
Freitas argues that the only evidence presented at trial relating to the source of the
water was provided by Officer Wise, which is insufficient to show that the water at issue

5

Freitas only requested proposed instruction No.6 to be included with the standard Clerk's Record.
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was provided by the City of Spirit Lake's water system. Freitas asserts that the water
may have come from some other source that is attached to the water meter.
The State argues that Freitas's I.C.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal was
properly denied because Officer Wise testified that at the time of issuing the citation
Freitas stated he was paying for the water running through his meter and he could do with
it what he wanted. As such, the state asserts, there is substantial circumstantial evidence,
if not direct evidence, when viewed in light most favorable to the state, that Freitas was
paying for the City's water.
I.C.R. 29(a) provides:
Motion before submission to jury. The court on motion of
the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of
judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in
the indictment, information or complaint after the evidence
on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. If a
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of
the evidence offered by the state is not granted, the
defendant may offer evidence. In the event the court
dismisses the charged offense, the court must consider
whether the evidence would be sufficient to sustain a
conviction on a lesser included offense.
In reviewing a denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court
must independently consider the evidence in the record and determine whether a
reasonable mind could conclude that a defendant's guilt as to each material element of
the offence was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827, 828,
933 P.2d 116, 117 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted). The test of sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a conviction is whether there is substantial evidence upon which
rational triers of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rodriguez, 106
Idaho 30, 674 P.2d 1029 (Ct. App. 1983). When a motion for judgment of acquittal has
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been denied, and the defendant stands convicted, all reasonable inferences on appeal are
taken in favor of the prosecution. State v. O'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct.
App. 1982).
The record shows that there was testimony by several witnesses as to the elements
relating to date of commission of the crime and the location. As to elements four, five
and six, the record shows that there was substantial and competent evidence that Nash
and her family (third persons) were receiving water at Adams's residence.

Further,

Officer Wise testified that she observed a water hose attached to Freitas's residence and
Adams's residence that was leaking enough water to form a puddle. There was also
testimony from Barbara Brown that the Adams residence did not have water service at
the time.
As to the third element (connection to or delivery of city water) the record shows
that Officer Wise testified to her interaction with Freitas on September 28, 2012.
Q. Okay. And did you have any conversation with Freitas at that point?

A. I did have - it was a short one. And Mr. Freitas said that - it was something
to the effect that urn, he didn't really realize - he didn't think that there was
anything wrong as far- as long as the water was going through his meter and he's
paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with
his water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor.
Q. Okay. So Mr. Freitas said that he was paying for the water he was receiving at
this home?
A. Um-hmm.

Trial Tra..11script at p. 89, 11. 19-25; p. 90, 11. 1-6.
Q. So the statement, if I'm- understood you correctly that Mr. Freitas said was
that he could do whatever he wanted with his water.

A. Yes. As long as he was paying for it; it went through his meter.
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Id at p. 90, 11. 16-20.
As to the acquittal motion, the magistrate provided the I.C.R. 29 standards and
then stated:
Court: Keeping in mind all the facts that have been presented in adopting the
argument of uh, Ms. McClinton, the Court will deny your Rule 29 motion at this
time. Anything further outside the presence of the jury? I do think the most
interesting element there was whether or not this was city water, and I think Ms.
McClinton's argument that he acknowledged having paid for it, uh, even if not
expressly stated, certainly by implication, suggests that it is uh-it is uh, the city
provided water.

Id at p. 95, 11. 22-25; p. 96, 11.1-6.

Therefore, there was substantial and competent evidence as to whether Freitas
delivered "city" water to the Adams residence.
There was other evidence presented about the City's water system (Barbara
Brown, City Clerk/Treasurer and water service record keeper) Adams's water being
turned off. Brenda Nash testified that there was a hose connected to her residence, but
she didn't really know where it was attached to. Further, Nash testified that Freitas was
providing the water, according to Adams, because the water was turned off.
Therefore, the Court finds Officer Wise's testimony as to Freitas's statement
sufficient to establish that the source of the water was the City water system and through
Freitas's meter to the Adams residence. As such, the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
was properly denied.
E. Did the Magistrate properiy refuse Freitas's proposed jury instruction
No.6?

Freitas asserts that his proposed jury instruction number six included the first
portion of the Ordinance, which provided that the City of Spirit Lake owns the water
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system up to the meter and/or shut off valve. This instruction was refused. As such,
Freitas argues that because the Ordinance is so confusing, the entire Ordinance should
have been given.
The State argues that all it needed to prove was that Freitas permitted connection
or delivery of city water to third persons, and Freitas's proposed instruction No. 6 did not
help in clarifying the elements of the criminal violation.
"The issue of whether a particular jury instruction is necessary and whether the
jury has been properly instructed is a matter of law over which this Court exercises free
review." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472, 272 P.3d 417, 444 (2012) (quoting State

v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,264,923 P.2d 966,971 (1996)).
Jury instructions must correctly inform the jury as to the elements of the crime
charged. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 181, 191 P.3d 1098, 1101 (2008). The
question of whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which
we exercise free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430
(2009). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole,
and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124
Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct. App. 1993). Jury instructions that fail to require
the State to prove every element of the offense violate due process and, therefore, rise to
the level offundamental error. Hickman, 146 Idaho at 182, 191 P.3d at 1102.
Freitas's Jury Instruction No. 6 provided:
The Spirit Lake city water system is property of the city up
to and including any shutoff valve and/or meter which may
be installed at or near the property line of any lot.
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The record shows that at trial, Freitas's counsel argued that the instruction should
be given because of Officer Wise's testimony as to Freitas's belief that the water
belonged to him.

Counsel asserted that Instruction No. 6 would help clarify the

ownership issue for the jury.
The record also shows that the state did not object to the giving of Instruction No.
6, but the magistrate nevertheless refused the instruction. The magistrate provided:
The Court determined it would not give that as it's not a
clarifying uh, legal instruction that relates to any of the
facts in dispute. While the elements certainly includes uh,
delivery of water, there is just no factual dispute here
regarding what is the property of what, what is the city
water system, et cetera.
Trial Transcript at p. 99, 11. 16-22.

While this portion of the Ordinance may have been relevant to a charge involving
tampering with the City's water system, damaging piping in Freitas's front yard or
damaging piping outside of Freitas's property line, it does not speak to the pertinent
charge of unlawful delivery of water. The jury only needed to determine if Freitas
delivered water to a third person for use in a residence that did not have City water
service. The ownership of the water system was irrelevant, and the Magistrate did not err
by refusing Freitas's proposed jury instruction No.6.
F. Did the Magistrate err by overruling Freitas's objections to the state's
voir dire questioning.

Freitas argues that during voir dire the prosecuting attorney asked the potential
jurors their opinions about the Ordinance, laws that they might believe to be ridiculous
and the importance of laws in general.

Freitas asserts that the magistrate erred by

permitting the state to continue with this type of questioning after he objected.
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The State argues that it asked questions regarding prospective jurors' thoughts on
the Ordinance in order to determine if any jurors thought the law was something that
should not be taken very seriously in order to root out pre-conceived notions about the
validity of the Ordinance and whether jurors would be able to try the case fairly. Further,
even if the questions were improper, the state asserts, such error was harmless because
the questioning did not affect Freitas's substantial rights.
I.C.R. 24(b) provides in pertinent part:
The voir dire examination shall be under the supervision of
the court and subject to such limitations as the court may
prescribe in the futherance of justice and the expeditious
disposition of the case. Any question propounded by an
attorney to a prospective juror which is not directly relevant
to the qualifications of the juror, or is not reasonably
calculated to discover the possible existence of a ground for
challenge, or has been previously answered, shall be
disallowed by the court upon objection or upon the court's
own initiative.

Placing limits beyond which the voir dire examination may not properly go is a
matter which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court; the exercise of such
discretion will not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of discretion.

State v.

Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310, 678 P.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1984). In determining whether the
trial court abused its discretion, appellate courts inquire: (1) whether the trial court
correctly perceived the issue as a discretionary one; (2) whether the trial court acted
within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal
standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989); State v. Ortiz, 148
Idaho 38, 41, 218 P.3d 17, 20 (Ct. App. 2009).
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Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded. I.C.R. 52. In determining whether an error has affected substantial
rights or is harmless, the inquiry is whether it appears from the record that the error
contributed to the verdict, leaving the appellate court with a reasonable doubt that the
jury would have reached the same result had the error not occurred. State v. Bussard, 114
Idaho 781, 760 P.2d 1197 (Ct. App. 1988).
The magistrate, in his discretion, allowed the questioning. This court finds no
abuse of discretion because the state's questioning was relevant as to the charge alleged.
Further, even if the state's particular questioning as to the jurors' thoughts about the
Ordinance was allowed in error, such error is harmless because it does not appear from
this record that the particular questions asked of potential jurors led to Freitas'
conviction.
V. Conclusion
City of Spirit Lake Ordinance No. 7-4-10 is constitutional and the magistrate did
not err by denying the Motion to Dismiss. Further, the magistrate did not error by
denying the Motion for Acquittal, in instructing the jury, or by overruling the voir dire
objections.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
DATED this

8~ day of August, 2013.

LANSIN
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NOTICE OF APPEAL

--~-------------------------)
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
1.

The above named Appellant Michael J. Freitas hereby appeals against the above

named Respondent, the State of Idaho, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Intermediate Appellate
Opinion entered in the above-entitled matter on August 8, 2013, the Honorable Lansing L. Haynes,
District Judge, presiding. Judge Hayne's Intermediate Appellate Opinion affirmed the final Judgment
and Sentence entered in the Magistrate's Division of said District Court in the above-entitled matter
on or about January 8, 2013, the Honorable Clark Peterson, Magistrate, presiding.
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2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Kootenai County District Court, and the

judgment described in paragraph one above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 11 (c)(1 0).
3.

That this appeal is taken upon matters oflaw and fact.

4.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then intends to

assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant :from
asserting other issues on appeal, is/are:
(a)

Whether the District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate Court's denial of the

defendant's Motion to Dismiss?
(b)

Whether the District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate Court's denial of the

defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal?
(c)

Whether the District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate Court's denial of the

defendant's proposed jury instruction six?
5.

No portion of the record is sealed.

6.

Reporter's Transcript.

A reporter's transcript of the Appellant's Motions to

Dismiss held on January 3, 2013, and the trial held on January 8, 2013, have already been prepared.
The appellant would request that they be included in the record for this appeal. Appellant requests the
preparation of the entire reporter's transcript of the oral argument before the District Judge held on
July 1, 2013, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 25(b).

7.

Clerk's Record.

The appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to

I.A.R. 28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record,
in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28(b)(2):
(a)

Any exhibits.
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(b)

A copy of the appellant's Motion to Dismiss filed December 12,2012.

(c)

A copy of the plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed December

3, 2012.
(d)

A copy of the appellant's requested jury instruction six.

(e)

A copy of the appellant's Brief Supporting Appeal to the District Court filed March

12,2013.
7.

I certify:

A

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon all court reporters :from whom a

transcript is requested. The name and address of each such reporter is marked below in the Certificate
of Service.
B.

The Appellant is exempt :from paying the estimated transcript fee because the

Appellant is an indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender.
C.

The Appellant is exempt :from paying the filing fee because the Appellant is an

indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender.
D.

The Appellant is exempt :from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of the

record because the Appellant is an indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai County
Public Defender.
E.

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20

I.A.R., to wit the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney and the Idaho Attorney General.
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DATED this

Q

day of August, 2013.
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY

BY:

J

LOGsf>ON
EPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J3

day of August, 2013, served a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this
correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL via interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon
the parties as follows:

X

X

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816

u

u

!){!

u

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

u

~

First Class Mail
Certified Mail
Facsimile (208) 446-1833

First Class Mail
Certified Mail
Facsimile (208) 854-8071

X
Reporter for District Judge Lansing Haynes, Valerie Nunemacher (Kootenai County, PO Box
9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816) via Interoffice Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEAI

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff/Respondent

vs.
Michael Jay Freitas
Defendant/Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT
41378
CASE NUMBER
CR 2012-18513
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1 filed 1-8-13
Transcript: Motion Hearing filed 2-20-13
Transcript: Jury Trial filed 2-20-13

I, Amanda McCandless Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the foregoing
Record in this cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct
and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28.
I further certify that the following will be submitted as exhibits to this Record on Appeal:

Michael Jay Freitas
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff/Respondent

vs.
Michael Jay Freitas
Defendant/Appellant

}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}

SUPREME COURT
41378
CASE CR12-18513

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Amanda McCandless, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I
have personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record
to each ofthe attorneys of record in this cause as follows:

Mr. Michael Jay Freitas
Public Defender
400 Northwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814

Mr. Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General State of Idaho
700 W. Jefferson# 210
Boise ID 83 720-001 0

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
Court this 22nd day of October 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Michael Jay Freitas
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